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 Summary 1
SUMMARY OF THE TWO SEMINARS
“THE ADOLESCENT AND THE LAW” AND
“TREAT OR PUNISH?”
These two seminars were designed to complement each other in examining
two aspects of the problem of adolescent delinquency as it exists at present. A
group of speakers with expert knowledge of the ﬁeld was asked to consider each
topic from the point of view of their own special knowledge, paying particular
attention to the effects of the changing social structure in which a young
Australian ﬁnds himself today.
These topics were suggested initially by the New South Wales Department
of Child Welfare, the general question posed being whether legal procedures and
correctional practices as related tojuveniles required modiﬁcation in the light of
the great social changes affecting young people in recent years.
In the ﬁrst seminar (“The Adolescent and the Law”) consideration was
given to the special provisions of the law which are designed for the protection
of immature members of society, that is, young persons below the age of 18
years. The speakers ﬁrst established the actual state of the law affectingjuveniles
in New South Wales and made some comparisons with the corresponding law in
England. Upon this basis they were able to discuss and criticise several recent
reports and proposals for modiﬁcation of the legal processes affectingjuveniles
in Great Britain, and also to critically examine certain speciﬁc issues such as the
question of the minimum age of criminal responsibility.
Social changes affecting young people were then discussed, including the
changes in family structure from the old “extended" family with a multiplicity
of adult inﬂuences to the “nuclear” family with its almost complete reliance
upon the two parents. At the same time the urban industrial society has been
characterised by the emergence of a special youth sub-culture with young people
ﬁnding their models for identiﬁcation among their peers rather than in parents
or other signiﬁcant adults. The implications of these changes, in so far as they
inﬂuence the attitudes and behaviour of young people, were explored in some
detail. It was suggested that, in the future, much greater ﬂexibility will be
required of agencies having a responsibility for the young.
A Children’s Court Magistrate and an experienced ofﬁcer of the Child
Welfare Department outlined the difﬁculties involved in implementing the
. protective provisions of the law, in respect of young people, from their speciﬁc
viewpoints. Some of the deﬁciencies in services for the young were mentioned;
for example, lack of residential psychiatric facilities. The difﬁculties of
deﬁnition of such concepts as “delinquency” were discussed, and the need for
speciﬁc research and evaluation of present programmes were strongly stressed.
The ﬁnal speaker at this seminar, Judge Levine, re-emphasised some of the
matters dealt with by earlier speakers and put forward some challenging personal
ideas. In particular he suggested that the protection previously required by the
young when Children’s Courts were ﬁrst developed is no longer required by the
modern sophisticated adolescent. It was suggested that the ordinary processes of
criminal law in an open Court might be more appropriate to the present
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circumstances. The speaker felt that the basic need was for the development on
the part of both the adolescent and the parent of 'a sense of responsibility
toward the community, toward each other and toward themselves.
The second of the two seminars (“Treat or Punish?”) concentrated on the
problem of the conﬂict between goals faced by correctional institutions in
recent decades. It seemed that these institutions were expected by the
community to be both instruments of punishment and deterrence as well as
instruments of treatment and rehabilitation.
Descriptions of the existing correctional systems within the Prisons
Department and the Child Welfare Department in New South Wales were given.
In the adult' correctional system it seemed that there was no doubt that
punishment and deterrence were important primary objectives. Like all modern
penal systems, the New South Wales Prisons Department introduces into its
prison programmes what it believes to be positive inﬂuential factors such as
education, work training, psychiatric services, psychological services, and social
case work. However, it had to be recognised that all this occurred against a
background and within a context of punishment. One of the most difﬁcult
problems in a prison system is to devise means of constructively using the
punishment elements of the programme.
The philosophy and practice of training as provided within Child Welfare
Department institutions was discussed in some detail by speakers from that
Department. The important qualification was emphasised that no correctional
agency can carry out its plans free of external inﬂuence. Community attitudes,
number and kind of inmates and finance are examples of matters beyond the
control of correctional agencies which markedly affect their operations. It was
agreed that both elements of the seminar title —— treatment and punishment —
were involved in Child Welfare Department training programmes, and it was felt
that much ingenuity is required to meet the expectation of the community for
custody and management of delinquents at the same time as meeting the
inmates’ need for rehabilitation. Most delinquents were products of inadequate
socialisation and their training essentially should be a process of building up
their self respect, their self control and their capacity for healthy relationships
with both peers and adults.
The recent trend toward the involvement of professionals in correctional
programmes was described by a psychiatrist from the Child Welfare Department.
The difﬁculties likely to be encountered by both parties were discussed in some
detail, together with suggestions for minimising these difficulties.
In discussing the problem for the Courts in reconciling the conﬂicting
approaches implied in the seminar title, Mr Justice McClemens undertook a
review of some of the problems of sentencing, and of the theories which seemed
to him to be expressed by the Courts from time to time in working out
sentences.
Probation was seen as essential as a treatment programme, but it was
pointed out that it draws some ofits inﬂuence from the fact of the existence of
the alternative — punishment. In favourable cases, however, the early
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compulsory aspect could develop into a positive motivation on the probationer’s
part to use the help offered. Some recent developments in probation technique
were outlined.
In a concluding paper, Dr W. E. 'Lucas, psychiatrist from the Prison
Medical Service, discussed the future of correctional practice as he saw it. He
directed attentiori to the fact that the “monstrous punishments” of past times
and the “more humane handling of the twentieth century” have both equally
failed to curtail crime. The limitations of “treatment” in .a penal setting were
mentioned and the problems created for staff at various levels by such an
approach were indicated. He emphasised the need to recognisethe complexity of
the problem and to be realistic about goals. It was suggested that better selection
of types of offenders for types of treatment must be one of the major directions
. in penology. The growing emphasis on non-institutional methods of dealing with
offenders is a notable trend, and some description wasgiven of other promising
developments both in institutional and non-institutional programmes. In
conclusion, it was recognised that the seminar had raised more questions than it
had attempted to answer.
J. S. Blow
 THE ADOLESCENT
AND THE LAW, 1968
A Seminar on the Significance of Juvenile Offences in a Changing society
Held at the State Ofﬁce Block, Sydney,
On 9th May, I968
First Session under the chairmanship of
The Hon. Sir Leslie Herron, K.B.E., C.M.G.,
ChiefJustice ofNew South Wales
Second Session under the chairmanship of
The Hon. K. M. McCaw, M.L.A.,
A ttorney-General for New South Wales
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FIRST SESSION
OPENING ADDRESS BY THE HON. SIR LESLIE HERRON, K.B.E., C.M.G.-
CHIEF JUSTICE OFNEW SOUTH WALES
I think that we owe a great debt of gratitude to the Institute of
Criminology, under whose auspices this seminar has been organised, and also to
Mr Roulston for his contribution. But I should also like to say that the man to
whom our particular thanks are due this afternoon is Dr Blow, who, as you
know, is the senior psychiatrist in the Child Welfare Department. Dr Blow has
really lived with this subject for quite a number of months, and it is his
dedication to the principles which we are here to discuss that has brought us
together. I should like to pay another tribute to Judge Levine, who took over
the judge’s part in this seminar at very short notice. Judge Curlewis,who has
made a lifetime study of these problems of youth, was taken ill and is not able
to be with us, and Judge Levine, with his usual public spirit, took the matter
over. I should also like to thank all of you people for your interest in this subject
and for your coming here and the way you will take away from here the message
and distribute it amongst the community.
I am rather disappointed, in a way, that we have to use the category of
“youth” in these talks. I don’t like the categorising of youth at all. I don’t‘like
the words “juvenile delinquency”. It seems to place young people in a category
as if they were persons who have to be saved from themselves, although we
know that in that class we are dealing with only a minimal number of deviates. I
am very glad to find that the organisers of this seminar have chosen to call it
“The Adolescent and the Law", an expression that I much prefer, because I am a
great believer in youth and I think that the mission of youth is of enormous
importance in the community. I remember the words of Emerson in one of his
voluntaries:
So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
So near is God to man,
When duty whispers low, “Thou must”,
The youth replies, “I can”.
And they do reply, “I can”, and they do the things that you ask them to
do. The fact that there are deviates and there are the problems we have come
here to discuss doesn’t alter one bit the fact that the mission of youth is a new
gospel in the world today. The young, whom we criticise so severely at times, are
only ourselves over again, and — I say this with great respect — may they benefit
from our mistakes. Listen to this:
The world is passing through troubled times. The young people of
today think of nothing but themselves. They have no reverence for
parents or for old peOple. They talk as if they alone knew anything,
and what passes for wisdom with us is foolishness to them. As for
girls, they are forward, immoral and unwomanly in their speech,
behaviour and dress.
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Do you know that that was said by Peter the Hermit, who li
ved in the 11th
century — ifl remember rightly, from 1040 AD. to 1110 AD?
I said to you that the mission of youth is a new gospel in the world today.
The centuries have witnessed the gradual elevation of woman to the high level of
her deserving, and the time has now come to recognise also the worth of youth.
This is what I should like to stress, the part that youth must play in rebuilding
civilization and a realization that in the training of youth is involved the making
of adult manhood. In a larger sense, perhaps, than Wordsworth knew, “The child
is father to the man”. The phrase has become trite only because we have not
grasped its richer signiﬁcance. But “the gilded commonplace” must become, in
Emerson’s words, “the blazing ubiquity”. When once we are seized with the
fullness of its meaning, then I think we will strive with more success to make our
dreams come true. We know that the aged have in large measure been taken care
of —— not perhaps as well as one might wish, but in some measure; women, as]
have said, have been elevated to the high level of their deserving; and it is only
natural that the thought of leaders in the community should now turn to youth
and its problems.
My difﬁculty has been to deﬁne the area of this subject. Delinquency, for
instance, is not a legal term, although as lawyers we use it. So far as 1 am aware it
, has not achieved the status in the Attorney-General’s library of a statutory
deﬁnition. The problems that beset children need specral consideration. The
protection and welfare of children, the incidence of juvenile crime and the
treatment of offenders are matters of serious thought. Children must have
special protection and we must be prepared to give to these problems more than
thought. Time, money and effort must all be expended in large measure in order
not only to understand the problem but effectively to deal with it. It is to this
end that this seminar has been organised, and l have very much pleasure in
calling upon those who know far more about it and its implications than 1 do to
address you.
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THE SPECIFIC PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW IN NEW
SOUTH WALES FOR CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS
P. Macreadie“
No one can come to a full understanding of the functions ofa Children’s
Court, as such Courts are constituted in this day and age, without some
knowledge of the growth and development of a system wherein juvenile
offenders are dealt with by specially constituted tribunals, presided over by
judicial ofﬁcers with specialist qualiﬁcations for the carrying out oftheir duties.
The first recorded pronouncement on the handling of the juvenile
delinquent is to be found in Deuteronomy, XXI 18-2].
If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son, that will not obey the
voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and though they
chasten him, will not harken to them, then shall his father and
mother lay hold unto him, and bring him out unto the elders of his
city, and unto the gate of his place, and they shall say to the elders
of his city — “This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will not
obey our voice, he is a glutton and a drunkard” — and all the men of
his city shall stone him to death with stones.
This is the Mosaic law, and this doctrine with some slight modiﬁcation of
its severity has largely prevailed down to comparatively modern times.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, all offenders, adults and
children alike, were detained in gaols whether they were serving a sentence or
merely awaiting trial. The gaolers were not paid by the State but lived on the
fees that they managed to extort from the prisoners or their relatives. The
conditions in the gaols were utterly revolting. Gross immoralityvand prostitution
were tolerated and a stay in gaol almost certainly meant the exposing of the
child to the most vicious and depraved experiences.
The criminal law made practically no distinction between adolescents and
adults — to either group the scale of punishments was incredibly severe.
It is a matter of historical record that in 1785, two boys aged 14 and 12,
were hanged for highway robbery. A child of the age of 9 was sentenced to
death for stealing two pence worth of paint from a shop.
In 1814, at the Old Bailey Sessions in London, ﬁve children were
condemned to death — Fowler aged 12 and Wolfe aged 12, for burglary in a
dwelling, Morris aged 8, Solomons aged 9 and Burrell aged 11, for burglary and
stealing a pair of shoes. It was common for children of tender years to be
sentenced to transportation. At a Parliamentary Inquiry in 1814 one witness
stated: “I have in my pocket an order for the removal of 52 children who are
under sentence of transportation, many of whom are 7 or 8 years old, one is 9
years and the others not above 12 or 13 . . . . they are for transportation, they
 
*F‘ormerly Special MagistrateMetropolitan Children‘s Court, Sydney
10 The Specific Protective Provisions of the Law
go to the hulks in the ﬁrst instance. There are girls of all ages
in Newgate. There
was a little girl tried at the last session but one that was not
above 9 years I
think. She was privately whipped by order of the Court.”
Little change occurred in the situation in a period of twenty ye
ars. Lord
Hewart, quoting from the records of Stafford Prison in 1834, cites
the following
cases:-
William Biglen, aged 14, stealing a silk handkerchief, transportation
for 7
years.
Matilda Seymour, aged 10, stealing a shawl and a petticoat, transportatio
n
for 7 years.
Thomas Ball, aged 1 l , stealing two silk handkerchiefs, transportation f
or 7
years.
Even eight years later, in 1842. a special establishment with
accommodation for 800 boys, was opened at Point Puer near Por
t Arthur in
Tasmania.
To this situation the winds of change commenced to blow and they blew
to some purpose.
Between 1849 and 1853, the ﬁrst three reformatory schools were
established in England. All were founded and in the early years wholly
maintained by private philanthropic enterprise.
By an Act of Parliament, introduced by Lord Palmerston in 1854, the
courts were empowered to send young offenders to these reformatories but
subject always to a preliminary sentence of fourteen days. The Act led to the
establishing of reformatory schools by charitably minded persons, and by
religious communities in all parts of the country. In 1860 their supervision was'
entrusted to the Home Ofﬁce.
In 186], the Home Ofﬁce became responsible for another class of
children’s institution, namely, the Industrial Schools. These were concerned
primarily with children who came under the Poor Law, and existed mainly for
the reception of orphans and children whose parents were in prison. The placing
of these two classes of School under the same Department of State was the ﬁrst
step towards the present system under which Reformatory and Industrial
Schools have become merged into what are known as Home Office Approved
Schools. The modern type of approved school caters for every type ofwayward
and neglected child and trains him, irrespective of what he has done, according
to his needs.
Following the establishment of separate places of detention, it appears to
be no great step, in theory, to the establishment of special tribunals. It was more
than a half century before this change came to pass.
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All law in New South Wales stems from the English law. In the early days
of the settlement, prior to the grant of responsible Government, the laws of
England were extended into the Colony. Many of these laws still remain, others
have been modified since to meet the existing requirements.
In England, Juvenile Courts were ofﬁcially established by the Children‘s
Act of 1908 — in America such Courts came into existence long before this. By
the time the Children’s Act was passed in 1908, the Children’s Court in Chicago
(set up in 188]) had been operating for almost thirty years and the principle of
dealing with young offenders separately from adult criminals was firmly
established across the Atlantic.
Between the systems of special tribunals for hearing children’s matters, as
established in America, and in England and in this State, there is considerable
difference of opinion as to the procedure to be followed in order that the
functions of the Court may be adequately and advantageously expressed. In
America, the Juvenile Court, from the beginning, has had what may be called a
“Chancery Jurisdiction”, instead of being constituted as in England and in this
State as a criminal Court. In America the primary function is that of
guardianship as opposed to punishment, so that the Court becomes — “a
concrete expression of the State’s obligation to the child, a recognition that the
child is in Court as a result of conditions not of his own making, that he has a
valid claim against the State and is to be saved to it, not punished by it.”
[t has been urged from time to time that the English Courts should be
constituted on a similar basis, and there can be few people with understanding
and a love for children who would not insist that the child’s welfare should be
the primary consideration.
Yet, in theory, there is today by no means so wide a gulf as may be
imagined between the “Chancery” Courts of America and the “Criminal Courts”
in England, for the Children and Young Persons Act, I933, laid down a first and
guiding principle to govern the whole spirit in which the English Juvenile Courts
should approach their task: '
Every Court in dealing with a child or young person who is brought
before it, either as being in need of care or protection, or as an
offender or otherwise, shall have regard to the welfare of the child or
young person, and shall in a proper case take steps for removing him
from undesirable surroundings and for securing that proper provision
is made for his education and training.
Young people possess a keen sense ofjustice and the old maxim is vital in
its application to the young offender: “It is of fundamential importance that
justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly appear
to be done.” This is a point which is sometimes overlooked by these who would
like to do away with Juvenile Courts as courts of law and substitute tribunals of
schoolmasters and social workers sitting in camera.
“It is very important" states the Departmental Committee on Young
Offenders, “that the young person should have the fullest opportunity of
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meeting a charge made against him and it would be difﬁcult for us to suggest a
better method than that based on the well tried principles of English law.”
If the substitute tribunal were to become an accomplished fact, in those
matters where an issue of fact developed, where would be the authority to
decide it, who would determine whether the person before the tribunal had
committed an offence? Who would determine the occasional issues of law, e.g.
determine questions of jurisdiction of persons or subject matter, questions of
procedure, service, interpretation of statutes and rule upon the validity of
matters raised in the cause?
What authority would there be to safeguard the constitutional rights of the
individual — to make sure that nothing happened without due process of law ——
that no person was deprived of the custody of his child without proper cause,
that every child and every necessary adult party had the right to be heard?
In case records (and they are receivable in evidence under the statute) as
well as in hearings, what authority would detect and discount or better
eliminate, incompetent evidence, hearsay, rumour, suspicion, the testimony of
incompetent witnesses, guard against subjective as distinguished from objective
attitudes on the part of officers, see that facts prevail over fancies, see that
science does not overstrip the bounds of law or common sense in administering
treatment?
What authority would there be to weigh such seeming imponderables as
the child‘s best interests as against the natural and legal rights of the parent, the
general security or protection of society, act as as an arbiter when scientists
cannot agree. serve as a check and balance upon the legalistic demands of
' lawyers on the one hand, and the idealistic demands of the theorists on the
other?
The Criminal Law Review (I966) pp. 607 contains some very interesting
observations in this particular area.
The aim of the White Paper, The Child, the Family and the Young
Offender, is to remove offenders under sixteen from the ambit of
the criminal law as far as possible and to provide a kind of pastoral
treatment for their problem whereby appropriate arrangements for
their welfare can be made by agreement with their parents. The
procedure suggested is that if anyone who can now bring, a child
before a Juvenile Court thinks that a child under sixteen has
committed what would, in‘an older person, be an offence, or is in
need of care, protection and control, or has failed to attend school,
he will report to the Family Council,which will then carry out such
enquiries as are necessary and will see the child and the parents in
those cases which require it.
The suggestions contained in the preceding paragraph open a wide ﬁeld for
discussion and speculation and if time permits 1 will refer to it at a later stage.
You will remember my earlier statement that all law in New South Wales
stems from the English Law.
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At times this State has been a little ahead of England with its legislation —
in other instances there are statutory provisions for dealing with chi'dren in
England which have no counterpart here — but all in all there is a substantial
measure of co-relation between the laws of each place dealing with the subject
matter of children.
Section (9) of the Neglected Children and Juvenile Offenders Act, 1905,
provided for the establishment of Special Courts for dealing with children in
New South Wales in like manner as such Courts were established in England by
the Children’s Act, 1908.
The law in New South Wales was consolidated in the Child Welfare Act,
1923. The law in England was treated similarly in the Children and Young
Persons Act, 1933.
There was a further consolidation of the law inthis State in the Child
Welfare Act, 1939.
England followed suit by the Criminal Justice Act,l945. The Child Welfare
Act, 1939, provides a code for dealing with children and young persons from
birth to manhood, and also to entertain matters with regard to their support and
ancillary issues.
The powers of a Court are:-
(l) to exercise the powers and authorities which are possessed by
Magistrates, Courts of Petty Sessions, or Justices in respect of
children and young persons, and of offences committed by or
against children and young persons;
(2) to hear, where a child or young person is charged with an indictable
offence (other than homicide, rape or other offence punishable .by
life imprisonment) and determine the said charge in a summary way;
(i) to hear and determine complaints, applications and proceedings
under the Maintenance Act (formerly the Deserted Wives and
Children’s Act); '
(4) to hear and determine complaints, applications and proceedings
under the Child Welfare Act;
(5) to hear applications for the legal custody of children; and as well,
the Act provides the code under which the legal adoption of children
may be carried out in the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
The term Children’s Court is something of a misnomer, for in. actual fact
there is no age group which under certain circumstances will not come within its
jurisdiction. It can exercise jurisdiction with respect to a babe in arms if the
child is in need of care and protection. The legal age at which a child is in a
position to make a qualiﬁed answer to the law for wrong doing, is with the
attainment of the child’s eighth birthday.  
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8.126 of the Act provides:- “It shall be conclusively presumed that no
child under the age of eight years can be guilty of an offence.” In England this
has been raised to ten. Criminal capacity increases with the age of the individual.
In the case of a child between the age of eight and fourteen there is a
presumption that the child is doli incapax i.e. incapable of doing wrong butthis
presumption may be rebutted by clear evidence of knowledge that what he was
doing was wrong. This cannot be presumed from the mere commission of the
offence, (Kershaw I8 T.L.R. 257) but it may be presumed from the
circumstances under which the offence was committed (Smith 1 CCC. 260).
There is an irrebuttable presumption that a boy under fourteen is physically
incapable of having carnal knowledge (Waite 1892 2 QB. 600), he therefore
cannot be found guilty of rape or of an attempt to commit rape (Eldershaw 3 C
& P 396) but he may be guilty of being a principal in the second degree.
Similarly he is unable at law to commit the offence of sodomy (Tatham 15
CAR. 132). However, before a child attains the age of eight years, he may
evidence aberrations of behaviour to such a degree that his parents have lost the
initiative in his management and he may be found to be an uncontrollable child.
A “child” is distinguished from a “young person” throughout the Act, and
the line of demarction is drawn at the age of sixteen years.
Marriage does not remove a person from the jurisdiction of the Court.
Divorcees, widows and married women under the age of eighteen years have
been dealt with by the Court.
The Supreme Court held in ex parte Gallender 62 WJV. 188 that a married
woman was fully amenable to the terms of the Act and refused to set aside a
finding that the appellant was a neglected young person and confirmed an order
of committal to an Institution for a period of corrective training. Ordinarily the
arrival at the age of eighteen years removes the offender to a Court of Petty
Sessions for court proceedings. There are cases, however, in which the Children’s
Court has the right to deal with a person over the age of eighteen years, for
offences committed by the young person in question before he had arrived at
the age of eighteen.
This power is contained in S. 20 s.s. (2) — “A court may exercise
jurisdiction in cases where the person charged is over the age of eighteen years,
but under the age of twenty one years, if. at the time of the commission of the
offence, the person charged had not attained the age of eighteen years, and such
person shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a young person.”
Adult offenders of any age may be properly the subject of the Court’s
jurisdiction, by reason of the Court’s power to deal with offences by or against
children or young persons. All offences fall into one of two groups — they are
either summary or indictable.
In respect of adult offenders, i.e. those over the age of eighteen years,
summary offences are those dealt with finally by a court of summary
jurisdiction, indictable offences are those heard and determined by a Judge and
Jury, after the presentation of an indictment by the Attorney-General following
a preliminary hearing at a Court of Petty Sessions.
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Courts of Petty Sessions are subject to certain restrictions — certain
offences are expressly excluded from jurisdiction, the conscrt of the person
charged has to be obtained before they can deal with others, certain limits as to
value are imposed — e.g. a Court of Petty Sessions cannot exercise jurisdiction if
the value of the subject matter of the charge exceeds the sum of $500.
Such restrictions do not operate so far as a Children’s Court is concerned.
The only matters expressly excluded from jurisdiction are those in respect of
which the Legislature imposes a sentence of life imprisonment.
Part XIV of the Child Welfare Act, 1939, sections 72 to 93 inclusive,
provides the code for committal of Neglected or Uncontrollable Children or
Young Persons or of Juvenile Offenders..-
Adverting now to the purposes of this Seminar I cite from the paper
outlining its scope:-
There are many social and ethical problems of legal action to protect
the' young. Concepts such as protection and rehabilitation are
generally taken for granted by the Courts, Police, ChildWelfare
Officers as well as the public. The Child Welfare Act permits
juveniles‘to be brought before Court because of behaviour which in
itself is not criminal but from which the young person is regarded as
needing protection e.g. exposed to moral danger, no fixed place of
abode, uncontrollable. Notwithstanding this protective emphasis, the
young person is offered the same rehabilitative opportunities
(probation, suspended committal or committal to an institution) as
the young person who has committed a criminal act.
Is it possible to make any great degree of capital from this situation?
Whenever any person appears before a judicial tribunal to be dealt with, either
he is deprived of his personal freedom or it is returned to him subject to certain
conditions. In the final analysis either he is in or out. Does not the same position
obtain in a Children’s Court?
If it is a care and protection matter then the issues justifying the Court’s
intervention have to be established by evidence.
If it is a criminal matter, it may be admitted, or‘ it may be proved, but in
either event, the Court has the duty of seeing that all the necessary legal
elements are duly established. S.(82) dealing with neglected or uncontrollable
matters provides five ways in which these matters may be approached. S. (83)
(l) dealing with summary matters provides five lines of approach — S. (83) (2)
dealing with indictable matters provides six lines of approach for matters in this
area.
Conditional release of offenders may be used with regard to matters falling
within the scope of S. (83) (l) and (2). It is true that there is a degree of overlap
in certain of these powers — it is equally certain that the expression “upon such
terms and conditions as the Court may think fit” applied to certain release
provisions, creates a very wide discretion indeed. That this discretion has been
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wisely used may be evidenced by the fact that I know of no matter in which it
has been necessary for any application to be made to a superior tribunal for a
corrective writ for misuse of the power so conferred.
It is true that other areas of' the Act have been the subject of severe
Judicial criticism. '
One such matter was ex parte The Minister for Child Welfare: re Hancock
and anor, Court of Appeal. l4th September, 1967 Cor. Herron C. J. Sugerman
and Jacobs JJ.A.
About ten years ago a Children’s Court made an order under S. (82)(d)of
the Child Welfare Act, committing ﬁve children of a family to the care of the
Minister to be dealt with as Wards admitted to State Control. It appears implicit
in the facts as they are set out that this order was made for good and sufﬁcient
reasons. On 27th September, 1966, the father of the family, the respondent ﬁrst
named, made an application under S. (9]) (3) of the Act that the order under S.
_(82) (d) be terminated and this application was granted by a Special Magistrate
constituting a Children’s Court. From this hearing the Minister appealed. For the
Minister it was contended that he alone has a discretion to act in the premises
under the power conferred by S. (23) (l) (h) to direct the restoration of any
ward to the care of his parent and there is nojurisdiction in Children’s Courts to
make such an order.
The Court of Appeal decided that the Magistrate was withoutjurisdiction
to make the order that he did.
In upholding the appeal the Court of Appeal made the following
observations:-
What does emerge from the matters raised in this case is that a court or
judge should be very loath to take action under S. (82) (d) which has the
effect of permanently depriving parents of the guardianship and custody
of their children without any right of review thereafter by the court or the
judge. In the present case, the order having been made, the question calling
for consideration is solely what is the effect of that order. However, the
effect of the order being to deprive parents permanently of the
guardianship and custody of their children unless an administrative rather
than a judicial decision is made to restore the children to the guardianship
and custody of the parents, a court should not make such an order unless
it is satisﬁed that no other course under section (82) would have been
better suited to the occasion.
There is also an unreported decision of the Chief Judge in Equity —
Nicholas J. on 3rd October, 1941. in which sentiments of a like character were
expressed.
The application then under consideration was an application under the
Infants Custody and Settlements Act by one Taylor in respect of his child who
was a State Ward.
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On a preliminary objection by Mr (now Sir Richard) Kirby as to
jurisdiction the Judge said . . . “By the operation of S. (9) (32) and (72) of the
Child Welfare Act, 1939, the manner in which a child can be removed from the
guardianship of the Minister is purely an administrative act and not one the
Courts can deal with. I can see how these sections can easily work out very
harshly, no matter how efﬁciently they are administered, but it appears to us
that Parliament has taken away the jurisdiction which the Equity Court had in
relation to infants to a certain extent and given it to the Minister as advised by
his responsible officers.”
Another ground for criticism lies in the fact that the adoption procedures
contained in S. (163) of the Child Welfare Act, 1939 have been substantially
modified by the Adoption of Children Act, 1965.
In the preceding pages we have given thought to the law as it was, the law
as it is, let us now consider what the law could be if certain trends which exist
are carried to their logical conclusion.
At p. 6 I referred to The Child, the White Paper, and the Criminal Law —
let us now consider the possibilities which could arise if the recommendations
contained therein were implemented.
The aim of the paper is to remove offende.s under sixteen from the ambit
of the criminal law as far as possible and to provide a kind of pastoral treatment
for their problem whereby appropriate arrangements for their welfare can be
made by agreement with their parents. The procedure suggested is that if anyone
who can now bring a child before a Juvenile Court thinks that a child under
sixteen has committed what would, in an older person, be an offence, or is in
need of care, protection and control . . . . he will report to the Family Council,
which will then carry out such enquiries as are necessary and will see the child
and the parents in those cases which require it.
It proposes that children under sixteen should no longer be charged with
offences. lt advances four grounds in support of this proposition:-
(1) children should be spared the stigma of criminality,
(2) that in most cases the facts are not in dispute and the real problem is
to decide on the appropriate treatment and court procedures are not
the best means for achieving this,
(3) that the present arrangements do not provide the best means of
getting parents to assume more personal responsibility for their
children’s behaviour,
(4) that the present system does not allow sufficient ﬂexibility in
developing a child’s treatment according to his responses and
changing need.
Dealing with (1) they argue — is it the desire of the community that a
child who steals fruit from an orchard should be hauled into the criminal courts,
tried, convicted and given a criminal record. The Council of the Law Society
 18 The Specific Protective Provisions of the Law
(England) in a memo issued in June 1966, simply states “if not why not”. The
Council contends that this proposition is based on a fundamental misconception
i.e. that conscious wickedness or criminality is something which can be
determined against a yardstick of age and physical development. In fact, the
Council contends, a strong body of medical opinion inclines to a different view.
There are children of fourteen and fifteen and even younger whose participation
in criminal and forbidden activities is probably more wicked and deliberate than
is ever found in adults. I' can illustrate this point from my own experience — the
case of a youth who got out his chemistry set and tested his father’s medicine to
be soluble to arsenic before putting a lethal dose into it.
Even if children are less likely to behave with conscious wickedness than
adults, there may be some value in allowing young offenders to incur some
stigma if they break the law. For here we must consider not only the offender
but society also. Now the White Paper considers that the determining factor in
deciding what is to be done must always be the welfare of the particular child or
young person. The Council of the Magistrates’ Association, however, in a report
issued in November, 1965, points out that while this must always be taken into
consideration, it cannot always be the determining factor in dealing with
offenders. The determining factor must always be the proper balance between
the protection of the public and the welfare of the child or young person in the
particular case. It may be that stigmatising conduct as criminal and stigmatising
those who perform it as offenders is one of the most useful functions of the
criminal law, and if this is so, then the value of sparing children the stigma must
be weighed against the general value of stigmatising offenders, and it is not
crystal clear that below sixteen the stigma should not be applicable. The need to
Spare children the stigma of criminality is surely an important but not an
overriding consideration.
One reason against dealing with child offenders by means ofthe ordinary
criminal law, a reason not brought out in the White Paper but well underlined in
the‘ Law Society’s memorandum is that children’s offences may, in many cases,
be too trivial to warrant the intervention of the criminal law. In fact it is not so
much the offender, perhaps, as the offence which needs to be spared the stigma
of the criminal law. In this connection the Law Society suggested that there
should be panels to sift complaints againstjuveniles in order to decide whether
it is worth while bringing the offender before the juvenile court irrespective of
guilt. Indeed the arrangements proposed by the White Paper could well operate
in this way, since it would be only in those cases which required it that the
Council would make enquiries and see the child and its parents.
If the age of responsibility is to be raised certain important points arise for
consideration. These will have to be examined from the standpoint of the police,
of victims and of other third parties.
Consider first the effect on the police officer — could a child under sixteen
be arrested without warrant for committing a felony or a breach of the peace, if
the law provides that he cannot commit a crime at all? For being under arrest
means more than mere physical charge, it involves a change of status; for being
under arrest means partly that you are under a duty not to escape and that you
commit an offence if you do escape. A child incapable of committing crime,
however, could not therefore be put under arrest.  
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Consider secondly the effect on victims of crime. This is particularly
relevant to compensation for criminal injuries.
Victims of crimes of violence willfmd their position much worsened if the
age of responsibility is raised to sixteen so that applications for compensation
for injuries inﬂicted by children under sixteen are disallowed.
Consider thirdly the effect on such third parties as aiders and abettors,
receivers and accomplices. Could an adult who assisted a boy ﬁfteen years old to
commit an offence be convicted as a principal in the second degree? Again, if an
adult was accused of a crime in which he had been assisted by a fifteen-year-old,
and if the latter gave evidence against him, would the rules relating to
accomplices apply?
These are points of detail which could, and should be taken into account if
the new scheme were to become law. There is, of course, nothing in law or logic
to prevent an act counting as a crime for some purposes and not for others; and
a provision along these lines could deal adequately with these problems. The
same cannot be said, hOWCVel', of certain other effects of the proposal to remove
the child from the ambit of the criminal law. These effects, unlike thosejust
considered, do not depend upon the raising of the age of responsibility. For even
without this, the general proposal has certain disturbing features. First the new
procedure provides for the determination of facts either by the Family Council
with the agreement of the parents, or by the Family Court without such
agreement. The Family Court then might have to decide against a child whether
he had committed what would, in an older person, be an offence, and this seems
to allow for the possibility that a finding of fact might be made against him
according to the civil standard of proof, whereas at present such a finding can
only be made according to the stricter criminal burden of proof. If in fact the
criminal burden is to be retained, this is nowhere made clear; if it is to be
discarded, then the child is being given protection with one hand only to be
deprived of it by the other; he is spared the stigma of criminality but loses‘the
protection generally afforded by the law of evidence to the criminal accused.
A further alarming effect of the proposal is to‘ deprive the child offender
ofjust that judicial protection which the law usually affords to those against
whom intervention may be taken. In the Family Council decisions are to be
arrived at by agreement with the parents; the child’s agreement is not required.
Yet it is questionable how far parental agreement is an adequate safeguard.
Parents may admit facts because of inadequate appreciation of what is involved,
because of natural anxiety to be done with the proceedings in the shortest
possible time, or because of their own inadequacy, which may allow the Family
Council to overhear them into agreeing to things to which they should not agree.
Indeed in certain circumstances even this inadequate safeguard is absent; for it is
suggested that even if the parents do not agree, the Family Council should have
the power to refer a child to an observation centre for a limited period of
assessment and a report on the type of treatment likely to prove beneficial in his
case. In other words a child could be removed from home without anyjudicial
protection or safeguard whatsoever.
Although there has always been, as indicated in the earlier pages of this
paper, a definite co-relation between the law of England and the law in New
South Wales, in my view this nexus should no longer be maintained.
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I think the reasons that could be advanced for the maintenance of the
status quo, and for the rejection of the thoughts propounded in the White Paper
are both cogent and compelling.
Amend and streamline the existing procedures if you will but the adoption
of such revolutionary concepts would be, in my humble opinion, a retrograde
step.
In conclusion there is one further consideration to which I would direct
your attention. There exists at the present time an undoubted trend to
unification. It is not outside the bounds of possibility that this is a ﬁeld that the
Commonwealth may eventually enter.
S. (SI) of the Constitution Act — Article XXII — permits the
Commonwealth'to legislate in the areas of guardianship and welfare of infants.
A uniform code of general application would have certain advantages,
particularly as to the removal of anomalies. Full legal responsibility in Victoria is
attained at the age of seventeen years, in New South Wales it is not reached until
a person becomes eighteen. '
In Victoria the Church organisations provide the bulk of the corrective
training structure with State subsidy.
In New South Wales, the bulk of the corrective training structure is in the
hands of the State and the Churches, with two exceptions, are concerned with
the handling of dependent children rather than those who are to be regarded as
delinquent.
I advance no opinion as to the relative merits of the position as it exists
from State to State. The Commonwealth has succ»-ssfully entered the ﬁeld with
uniform codes as to Marriage, Maintenance and Divorce. I see no reason why it
should be any less successful in the field of Child Welfare.
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Appendix
The protective provisions of the Child Welfare Act, 1939, extend to any
child or young person falling within any of the ﬁfteen categories enumerated:-
(l)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6) '
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
who is in a brothel, or lodges lives resides or wanders about‘with
reputed thieves or with persons who have no visible means of
support, or with common prostitutes, whether such reputed thieves,
persons or prostitutes are the parents of such child or not, or,
who has no visible lawful means of support or has no ﬁxed place of
abode, or,
who begs in any public place, or habitually wanders about public
places in no ostensible occupation, or habitually sleeps in the open
air in any public place, or,
who, without reasonable excuse, is not provided with sufﬁcient and
proper food, nursing, clothing, medical aid or lodging, or who is ill-
treated or exposed, or,
who takes part in any public exhibition or performance within the
meaning of Part XI” of this Act whereby the life or limb of such
child is endangered, or,
who, not being duly licensed under this Act for that purpose,
engages in street trading within the meaning of Part XI” of this Act, ~
or,
whose parents are drunkards, or, if one be dead, insane, unknown,
undergoing imprisonment or not exercising proper care of the child
or young person, whose other parent is a drunkard, or,
who is in any place, where opium or any preparation thereof is
smoked, or,
who is living under such conditions as indicate that the child or
young person is lapsing or' likely to lapse into a career of vice or
crime, or,
who in the opinion of the court is under incompetent or improper
guardianship, or, ,
who is destitute, or,
 22
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
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whose parents are unfit to retain the child or young person in their
care, or, if parent be dead, insane, unknown, undergoing
imprisonment, or not exercising proper care of the child or young
person, whose other parent is unfit to retain the child or young
person in his care, or,
who is suffering from venerealdisease and is not receiving adequate
medical treatment, or, ‘
who is falling into bad associations or is exposed to moral danger, or,
who, without lawful excuse, does not attend school regularly.
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SOCIAL AND ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF LEGISLATION
TO PROTECT THE YOUNG
Professor Rupert Cross *
The scope of this paper is limited. More than three quarters of it is
concerned with children and young persons who have committed, or are believed
to have committed, a crime, and yet. do not come within the provisions of 5.72
of the Child Welfare Act of New South Wales. To use the familiar expression of
English Children’s law, I am not directly concerned with children or young
persons in need of “care, protection or control”. Furthermore, I write merely as
an English lawyer, I have no claim to expertise, or even a special interest, in
child welfare; and I am quite incapable of forming any kind ofjudgment on the
operation of the Child Welfare Act of New South Wales.
Having confessed the extent to which I am not entitled to make them, I
begin with two dogmatic assertions which are not related to the main theme of
this paper. The first assertion is that the English formulation of the conditions of
the exercise of care and control jurisdiction, as distinct from criminal
jurisdiction, over children and young persons, is preferable to that of the New
South Wales Child Welfare Act; the second assertion is that care, protection and
control jurisdiction should cease to be exercisable over those above the age of
sixteen.
The effect of 5.2 of the English Children and Young Persons Act. 1963 is
that a child or young person is in need of care, protection or control if either (a)
certain specified conditions are fulﬁlled and “he is not receiving such care,
protection and guidance as a good parent may reasonably be expected to give”;
or (b) “he is beyond the control of his parent or guardian.” The specified
conditions are that the child or young person is (a) falling into bad association or
exposed to moral danger; or (b) likely to suffer unnecessarily or be seriously
affected in his health or proper development in consequence of lack of care
protection or guidance; or (c) is the victim of an offence involving cruelty to
children or is a member of a household in which such an offence or certain
sexual offences have been committed. My preference for this formulation is
based on a general dislike of excessive legislative detail of the kind contained in
the definition of a neglected child in the Act of New South Wales, but, if bad
jokes such as the unliklihood of a juvenile unlicensed street trader necessarily
being held to be in need of care, protection or control in England, are set aside, I
must admit that it is difficult to think of examples of cases which would come
within the English formulation and not within that of the New South Wales act
or vice versa.
Within the past few years, two important sets of proposals concerning
juvenile delinquency have been published in the United Kingdom. They are the
White Paper, “The Child, The Family and The Young Offender”, and the‘ report
of a Scottish committe presided over by Lord Kilbrandon. Further reference is
made to each of them later, and the first is discussed in Mr Macreadie’s paper.
They each propose that the criminal jurisdiction should not be exercisable over
*Vinerian Professor of English Law. Oxford University, Visiting Professor, University of
Sydney, 1968.
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those beneath the age of sixteen; they also propose that the protective
jurisdiction should cease to be exercisable over those above that age. At present
this jurisdiction is exercisable in the United Kingdom over those beneath the age
of seventeen. A criticism has been made in some quarters of both the White
Paper and the Kilbrandon proposals on the ground that the protective
jurisdiction is especially valuable in the case of girls between the ages of sixteen
and seventeen. I think, however, that it should be clearly recognised that there is
such a thing as over-protection of the young. In the United Kingdom a girl can
lawfully consent to sexual intercourse at sixteen, she can validly marry at that
age with her parents’ consent; at sixteen a girl has often left school and been in
employment for two years and she cannot be excluded,on the ground of her
youth, from classified films: and theatrical performances. if such a girl is found
to be in need of care, protection or control, she can, in practice, only be placed
under the supervision of a probation officer or required to reside in a hostel. A
society which is prepared to allow her complete freedom of choice in the
matters which have just been mentioned ought not to force her to undergo
supervision, or to reside where she does not want to live, when she has not
broken any of its laws.
I proceed to consider the child or young person who has broken these laws
or is believed to have done so, or has done acts which would constitute a breach
of the criminal law in the case of an adult. Both in the United Kingdom and
throughout Australia the law seeks to protect the juvenile delinquent in at least
three ways. It prescribes a total immunity from criminal jurisdiction up to a
certain age, it provides that, up to a certain age, the young shall be tried in
specially constituted courts and it provides that, if they are convicted, the young
shall be subject to special penal measures.
The age of criminal responsibility
At common law the age of criminal responsibility came to be ﬁxed at
seven, but only after an earlier period during which the English judges had
examined the individual infant brought before them in order to determine
whether he or she was possessed of sufﬁcient malice to warrant a conviction. If
it is assumed that only those who know the difference between right and wrong
should be held criminally responsible, the older procedure was a sensible one,
but it was bound to yield to the greater conVcnience of a fixed age of
responsibility. That age is now eight in New South‘Wales and ten in England.
The law of both jurisdictions is complicated by two presumptions which
make nonsense from the social point of view. The ﬁrst is the rebuttable
presumption that a child between the ages of eight (or ten) and fourteen lacks
the guilty mind which is generally an essential ingredient of criminal liability; the
second is the conclusive presumption that a boy under fourteen is incapable of
rape and offences involving sexual intercourse. '
So far as the first is concerned, neither the presumption nor the precise
aim of the rebutting evidence has been formulated in modern terms. We have .to
make do with such jargon as that children between eight (or ten) and fourteen
are presumed to be doli incapax, but the presumption is rebutted by proof that
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the child in question knew that what he was doing was “gravely wrong” because
malitia suplet aetatem. In spite of these defects, the presumption makes sense if
one adopts an exclusively retributive view of the purpose of legal punishment,
i.e. if it is assumed that moral blameworthiness is a necessary condition of the
inﬂiction of punishment. Different children’s knowledge of right and wrong
probably does vary considerably and the presumption under consideration, like
the earlier common law, caters for this fact. The reason why the presumption
makes nonsense from the social point of view is that its logical consequence is
the conviction of a child from a good home because he has been properly
instructed in the difference between right and wrong, and the acquittal of a child
from a bad home because he has not had the benefit of such instruction. For
those who think that, at least in the case of the very young, the emphasis should
be on treatment rather than punishment, this is topsy»turvy. Whatever the right
solution to the problem of the age of responsibility may be, there is a lot to be
said for abolishing the presumption. This was recommended by the Ingleby
Committee in England in 1960. They contemplated an age of responsibility
which would ultimately be fourteen, although they were content with twelve as
an immediate recommendation; between twelve and fourteen they would have
had no presumption. Although I have no statistical knowledge of the subject,[
get the impression that reliance is very rarely placed on the rebuttable
presumption of innocence in England, but there must be many cases in which
there is room for argument that it should be applied.
The conclusive presumption of innocence of rape and kindred offences
makes nonsense from the social point of view because one does not have to go
further than the annual statistics published by the English Registrar of Births to
show that, whatever the position may have been in former times, the
presumption is based on a fallacy today. The statistics show that each year there
are one or two proud fathers of twelve. The only good that this presumption
does is to provide academic fodder in the shape of problems whether a boy
under fourteen can be convicted of sodomy or attempted rape, and the provision
of academic fodder is nojustification for the continuance of out-of-date law.
Granted that there should be no presumptions, rebuttable or conclusive,
what should be the minimum age of criminal responsibility? The answer to this
question largely depends on the answers to two further questions. (1) Why do
we want to have a minimum age of responsibility? (2) Is the commission by a
child beneath the age of responsibility of what would, in the case of an adult, be
a crime, to be a ground for the exercise of the protectivejurisdiction?
(1) At least four answers to the first question may be suggested. In the first
place there is the necessity, in the case of most crimes, of proving that the
accused acted with a particular kind of intent or with knowledge of certain
matters. It borders on the absurd that, in theory, the common law requires the
court to satisfy itself that a boy of seven intended to deprive his comrade
permanently, and not merely temporarily, of a toy, or knew that a particular
article was stolen; the bare possibility of such an inquiry in the case ofa child of
a substantially lower age would be preposterous. If scrupulous attention were
paid to the mental state which must be proved against the accused in the case of
each crime, it would be necessary to have a different age of responsibility for
different crimes, but we must have regard to practicalities and be content with a
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single age of responsibility just as we rely on the good sense of those who invoke
the criminal jurisdiction of children’s courts only to do so in clear and simple
cases.
The second answer to the question why we want to have a minimum age
of responsibility has already been mentioned. It is the impropriety of punishing
those who are too young to know the difference between right and wrong. I
have suggested that the logical consequence of this approach might be different
ages of responsibility in the case of different children, but the impracticability of
such a conclusion is obvious. A further objection to the view that criminal
responsibility Should begin when a child knows the difference between right and
wrong is that, although it is plausible to argue that such knowledge should be a
necessary condition of criminal liability, it does not follow that knowledge of
right and wrong is a sufficient condition of criminal liability. In general we only
punish adults for knowingly doing what is wrong if their conduct is seriously
antisocial. Yet another objection to the view under consideration is the highly
dubious accuracy of describing as “punishment” the measures which the courts
can take in the case of the very young offender.
Whether the word “punishment” is or is not apposite the measures are
certainly not inhumane. This disposes of a possible third answer to the question
why we want to have a minimum age of responsibility. When the punishment for
very many crimes was capital, there was a case for a minimum age of criminal
responsibility on humanitarian grounds. The;fact that the age was as low as seven
is poor testimony to the humanitarianism of our ancestors in the matter of the
treatment of the young.
Times have changed, and a fourth answer to the question why a minimum
age of responsibility may be desirable is that modern society is highly tolerant of
juvenile delinquency or at any rate recognises that calling the law in to deal with
such delinquency is like taking a sledge hammer to crack a peanut. On this view,
immunity from criminal jurisdiction should last as long as the bulk of society is
prepared to say “Leave punishment to the parent or schoolmaster; only bring
the courts in when the child cannot be controlled by these agencies or is
otherwise in moral danger.” It is anyone’s guess what the age of responsibility
would be on this view. My guess is that it would be higher than eight but lower
than sixteen, canvassed as the age of responsibility in the Kilbrandon Report and
the White Paper, “The Child, The Family and The Young Offender.” Perhaps
fourteen, the age mentioned by the lngleby Committee, would be as good a
guess as any.
(ii) The Kilbrandon Report and the White Paper each recommended that a
person under sixteen should be subject to the protective jurisdiction if he was
alleged to have committed what would, in the case of an adult, be a crime.
According to the Kilbrandon Report, the person in question must have “violated
the law as to crimes and offences”; according to the White Paper, he must have
“done an act which is an offence in the case of an older person.” The lngleby
Committee made a similar recommendation with regard to those beneath the age
of twelve (the age of criminal responsibility suggested by the Committee) who
act “in a manner which would render a person over that age liable to be found
guilty of an offence.” As children are all to be treated alike from birth to sixteen
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(or twelve), such expressions must be taken to mean the external conduct
mentioned in the deﬁnition of a crime, for, as I have already pointed out, the
notion of determining whether a child of two or four really had the animus
furandi is preposterous. Responsibility would not be in issue, and the “juvenile
court” (lngleby), “family council” (White Paper), or “juvenile panel”
(Kilbrandon) before which the child was brought would simply have to satisfy
itself concerning the external conduct alleged and then decide what, if any, steps
should be taken.
If it is decided that no one shall be brought before a criminal court until
he is sixteen, but that anyone below that age can be subjected to the protective
jurisdiction on the ground that he has committed what would, in the case of an
adult, be a crime, it seems to me to be a mere matter of words whether this is
described as “raising” the age of criminal responsibility from eight (or ten) to
sixteen, or “reducing” it to zero. Of course there is always the argument in
favour of the proposal that it avoids the stigma of a criminal conviction for those
beneath the age of sixteen; but I confess to a suspicion that the stigma would
come to be attached to being brought before the court, council or panel even
though thejurisdiction it exercises is non-criminal.
Anyone who takes the age of criminal responsibility seriously should be
prepared to stomach the fact that children below a certain age cannot be
brought before a court unless they are in need of care, protection or control.
The commission of what would, in the case of an adult, be a crime will often be
evidence of such need, but it is certainly not conclusive. Although I cannot
pretend that it is a subject on which I hold strong views, I am inclined to take
the age of responsibility seriously, and I am far from convinced that it could not
with advantage be raised to twelve, or even fourteen -— the current English
school-leaving age.
Special courts
The “Children’s Courts” of New South Wales and the English “Juvenile
Courts” are special in the sense that the judges are to some extent, specialists,
and the procedure is, to some extent, informal. Why should this be so? Ought
these tendencies to be encouraged? Up to what age ought people to be liable to
be brought before such courts?
Presumably the reason for having specialist judges is that they are better
qualified than the ordinary judge to decide what order should be made. I think
that everything possible should be done to encourage this tendency:3ven"t6~the
extent of having those who are professionally concerned with child welfare on
the Bench. In England, a juvenile court normally consists of three lay
magistrates, one of whom is a woman, or of one stipendiary and two lay
magistrates, one of whom is a woman.
Whatever its merits may be (and on this I share many of Mr Macreadie’s
misgivings) the proposal of the English White Paper of 1965 that those beneath
the age of sixteen who are alleged to have committed what would, in the case of
an adult, be a crime, should be brought before a “family council” breaks new
ground in proposing that social workers etc. should be on the council. In the
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present state of penological knowledge, and as long as prison sentences are based
on a fairly regular tariff, I do not see much point in invoking the aid of
specialists in the case of adults, but the experiment ought to be tried in the case
of juveniles because there are child welfare experts with the requisite knowledge
and there is no tariff system in the case of children and young persons.
The reason why the procedure of the special courts is informal is
presumably the desirability of placing the accused and his family at ease.
According to some, there is a countervailing consideration in that the experience
of being brought before the majesty of the law may be chastening and salutary.
This is a further matter with regard to which one man’s guess is as good as
another’s. For my part I doubt the therapeutic efﬁcacy of the forensic
experience in the case either of juveniles or of adults; accordingly I favour
procedural informality. Nevertheless, I recognise that, when the facts of a case
are disputed, a juvenile has just as much right as an adult to have them
determined according to the full rigour of the law. I also recognise the
importance of bringing the family into the discussion preceding the making of
the order, though not necessarily to the extent of hammering out some kind of
agreement with them as proposed in the White Paper of 1965. The participation
of the family is often somewhat unrealistic in England; the father is seldom in
court because he is at work, and the mother’s contribution is often little more
than “He is a good boy at heart”. Weekend or evening sessions would at least
removU the first of these defects.
The criminal jurisdiction of the English juvenile courts is conﬁned to those
under seventeen. The White Paper of 1965 proposed special courts for young
offenders between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one. The proposal was mainly
based on the desirability of avoiding contamination by contact with older
offenders but if, as appears likely, the age of majority in England is reduced to
eighteen, it may be thought better for England to take a leaf out of New South
Wales’s book and simply increase by one year the age of those over whom the
juvenile courts have criminaljurisdiction.
Special institutions
I say nothing about special penal or educational institutions to which
those brought before the special courts may be sent. This is partly because of my
ignorance of the “institutions” mentioned in the New South Wales Child
Welfare Act, and partly because this is not the place to discuss the merits of the
English institutions; but the main reason for my omission is the fact that the
existence of these special institutions does not give rise to controversial ethical
or social problems. We all agree that they are far from perfect and that
everything possible must be done to improve them.
‘The age of majority
The likelihood that, in England, the age of majority will be reduced to
eighteen has already been mentioned. This is the recommendation of a
committee presided over by Latey, J. whose report has recently been approved
by the English Government. The recommendation is mainly based on the greater
maturity of young persons today than in former times. Nonetheless, the
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enactment of the recommendation will remove a great protection from the
young so far as the law of contract is concerned. Not unnaturally the proposal is
welcomed by hire-purchase companies, but is it really wise, at a time when those
between eighteen and twenty-one are possessed of more money than ever before,
thus to decrease the age at which they can be overreached? Doubt on this point ,
is not inconsistent with the suggestion, canvassed at the beginning of this paper,
that the protective jurisdiction should cease for those over sixteen._The'general
immunity of infants from contractual liability is a case of privilege, not a case of -
over-protection.
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CHANGES IN SOCIAL PATTERNS AFFECTING THE RELEVANCE
OF THE PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW
DrD. C. Dunphy*
It is reliably reported that, on being ousted from the Garden of Eden,
Adam turned to Eve and remarked pontiﬁcally: “My dear, this is an age of
transition!” Most historical periods have seen important changes occurring in the
fabric of society and there has never been a lack of social thinkers ready to
pontificate on the meaning of these changes. What is different about change in
our own age is, not that we have it, but that we have deliberately planned for it,
built it in, and developed a society where the tempo of change is constantly
increasing. We have embarked on creating a society where people live in larger
and larger urban units and where the style of urban living is constantly adapting
to technological innovation. All this implies continuing changes in our values,
our jobs, our family life. But it affects different segments of society differently
and in particular it has had, and will continue to have, its greatest impact on the
character of youth culture. The protective provisions of the law apply
particularly to youth. Consequently if these provisions are to be reasonable and
consistently implemented, we would be wise to try to understand the world in
which the juvenile lives today. It is easy to imagine that we understand it,
because after all we were once juveniles ourselves. But we lived in a different
world. That world has passed and there is no use wringing our hands about it. To
understand the world of the juvenile today means putting aside our
preconceptions, trying to see the world as they see it, and then trying to
understand why they see it that way. To achieve the latter aim, we need to know
how society as a whole is changing and what these changes mean now, and will
mean in future years,for the youthfuljuvenile.
It has become fashionable to decry the “breakup” of the family today and
the decline in control exercised by parents over their children. Judges in
particular are inclined to sound such notes when given the opportunity. This
raises the question: what is happening to the family and why? The family is
certainly changing. The traditional extended family consisted not only of
parents and children but also grandparents, uncles, aunts and cousins. This kind
of family is less commonly found as a cohesive social unit. Industrial society is
marked by a high degree of mobility. Workers change theirjobs more frequently
in search of better economic conditions, and changed jobs often mean a changed
locale of employment and residence. Well, you can’t take ten or twelve relatives
with you, so you move off with your wife and children. The result is the nuclear
(or conjugal) family. In this way, industrialisation has emancipated the married
couple by getting. them away from their parents. One result is that the members
of the nuclear family become much more emotionally dependent on each other.
(If things aren’t going well, the wife can’t run over to Mum’s and get things off
her chest. Nor can the families be used to bring pressure to bear on an erring
husband or wife). This affects the young child who is now far more dependent
on his parents, particularly his mother, for affection and training. There aren’t so
many relatives around to stand in for the mother. In many traditional family
systems, much of the affection and training is provided by a variety of relatives
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and, of course, this means that parental failure is relatively less important. The
nuclear family, by contrast, places tremendous responsibility for the care of the
young child on the mother, and this at a time when we’re constantly telling
women they’re emancipated! In the nuclear family the young child is more
dependent on his parents and because of that more vulnerable to them. It is
probably unnecessary to point out in this gathering that the situation I have
described creates a particular problem for the courts; if parents are unﬁt, unable,
or unwilling to provide for the child, it is harder for the courts to ﬁnd relatives
who mean something to the child and are prepared to care for him.
lndustrialisation has created the nuclear family but it has also created
adolescence as we understand it. lndustrialisation has enormously increased the
need for an extended period of education. The consequence is an extended and
const‘antly extending adolescent period between childhood and adulthood.
Compare primitive societies where a child is made a man in ceremonies lasting a
few days or a few weeks. It takes us years to “make a man” out of our children
because a man can be so many different kinds of being and needs so many
different kinds of complex skills. Necessarily society offers the adolescent very
diverse cues about what he should be at any particular time and as a
consequence he can experience considerable confusion about what he is and
where he is going. Status confusion leads to identity confusion and the result is
thousands of Hamlets asking themselves “Who am I?” “What am 1?”
Consequently adolescence becomes a time of searching for appropriate role
models; the adolescent looks at people around him and tries them for size.
Things used to be more simple when the adolescent could answer: “I’m going to
be a . . . (butcher, baker) . . . like my father”. The range of occupational choices
was small, what father did was visible and understandable. Now the father’sjob
is often invisible; “He’s at the office”. The child may be lucky to see much of his
father at all and anyway his job may no longer exist when the child comes to be
a man. Father cannot be a complete role model.
Then where does the adolescent get his role models from? Role models,
after all, don’t grow on trees. There are two social institutions that have come to
specialise in training the adolescent. One is the school, the other is the peer
group. Let’s look at these in turn.
In our school system we have chosen to emphasise academic achievement
rather than social development. This involves selection, i.e. some make it and
some don’t. Those “deselected” (to use a current euphemism from the Peace
Corps) — the not-so-bright, the unintelligent, the emotionally unstable, the
unmotivated — soon learn that they are “no-hopers”. The labelling, stereotyping
process often begins here and ends up in the courts with the label
“uncontrollable”, and consignment to an institution with other “misfits”. The
ﬁnal stamp can confirm a negative identity and lead to the abandoning of hope.
The result is frequently a blind frustration ready to hit out at any representative
or symbol of the moral authority of the society which has no use for them. A
few years ago I spent some months wandering around a Sydney suburb with a
delinquent gang of “Rockers”. (I was in the role of social researcher rather than
member as I would never have made the grade on my own merits.) I remember
being puzzled by the “pointless, meaningless” agressive behaviour they often
indulged in. They would break half the windows in a school, yell Obscenities at a
policeman, revolt against an adult youth leader and end up smashing the club
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premises, and ﬁnally, after being caught for one of these misdemeanors, be sent
“up the river” for an extended term for laughing at the judge. Stupid as these
acts were, there did seem to be a thread of common meaning. “We’ll show ’em
teenagers won’t be pushed around,” they’d say. Like the unwanted child in a
family, they would draw attention to themselves by being naughty. Better to be
noticed and punished than to go unnoticed; better to experience anger from
others than to be ignored. And how eagerly they sought people who would play
“the authority game” with them, make speeches about their wickedness, and
confirm their sense of the way the world operated.
‘ Of course, the academically successful adolescent may find role models to
emulate at school. But even he will ﬁnd these models have little to offer him in
some of the new and exciting areas of adolescent life. The school, by
emphasising academic training, largely abandons social training to the peer
group. And so the adolescent turns for role models and a style of life to the peer
group and to the burgeoning youth culture which these groups support.
A most remarkable characteristic of urban industrialised society is the
emergence of this special youth sub-culture. It is in the peer group that most
adolescents find their role models for general social behaviour. The peer group
prepares the adolescent for adulthood by stages and its major functions relate
most closely to the areas covered by the protective provisions of the law —
personal identity, relations with parents and authority generally, relations with
peers, particularly the opposite sex. But the problem here is that these are the
areas of life undergoing most rapid transformation in adult society. Not so long
ago we lived in a society which was firmly British and strongly puritan in the
ethical code it accepted. We live increasingly in a world society where we rub
shoulders with different ideologies, ethical codes, and styles of life. The local
community begins to reflect this diversity. A pluralistic society must necessarily
be a polymoral society, i.e. a society accepting a variety of different standards
and codes of behaviour as legitimate. A polymoral society doesn’t necessarily
mean “you can do what you like” but that the individual has a greater
opportunity to choose the person he wants to be, the kind of life he wants to
live. Where codes are not simply handed on from one generation to the next, the
individual can assume greater moral responsibility. And make no mistake about
it, young people are becoming aware of alternatives. Afﬂuence, mobility,
migration, public education, and mass media bring diverse people and diverse
ideas together in a way never before experienced.
Before reflecting on the consequences of this for the adolescent, we might
pause to consider brieﬂy the kinds of general social values emerging to replace
the puritan ethic which our grandfathers (and, to a large extent, we ourselves)
took as self-evident. Although juveniles are not adults and don’t live completely
in the adult world, their marginal status makes them very quick to scent that
change is afoot and to react quickly to it.
I would characterise some of the most relevant value changes now
occurring as follows:
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(1) The value of unquestioned respect for formal authority is
changing
more and more toward respect for the authority of expertise. In
a
pluralistic society the law cannot depend on a monolithic structure
of authority and ethics. Respect for the legitimacy of other points of
view gains strength as a value, ethical relativism (“situational ethics”)
replaces ethical absolutism, consultative authority gains over
autocratic authority. Concurrently rationality gains in value as
against divinely derived or traditionally derived principles. As a
result the public is less likely to react in moral outrage and more
likely to ask “why?” and “what is the best way to change this?”
Retributive justice therefore declines in popularity and reformative
justice becomes more popular.
(2) The value of individualistic competition is losing importance and the
value of interdependent collaboration increases in importance.
(3) The value of submissiveness or resignation to one’s lot is decreasing
,
while the value of self-realization is increasing.
(4) In contrast to valuing stability and the status quo, change and
innovation are actively sought as ends in themselves.
Now how have these social changes, which are still c
ontinuing affected youth
culture? How will they affect it in the future?
First, we can confidently predict that juveniles will increasingly
experiment more widely in social relationships. The decreasing respect for
absolute moral authority will mean that the individual will increasingly see
himself and his own reference groups as the final arbiter of what is right for him
rather than simply accepting what he is told by parents, teachers or courts. In
order to decide what is right he will try more alternatiVe forms of behaviour. The
fact that he tries a particular form of'behaviour that is legally disapproved will
not necessarily mean that he intends to persist in it. Nor will it‘necessarily mean
that he intends to ﬂout the law. When such cases are presented. in court they
may readily be presented as immoral, rebellious or irresponsible but they may
sometimes represent more a search for new deﬁnitions of responsibility and
personal identity. An emphasis on intention and situation will require increasing
assistance from psychologists and social workers.
There will be plenty of cases that are motivated by a desire to rebel or
revolt against authority. It is often said that youth in our society is rebellious
and unmanageable compared to the docile youth of other societies. There is a
characteristic rebelliousness, studied irresponsibility and compulsive rejection of
adult standards in youth culture. But this must be seen in its social context
where it can be quite useful if it doesn’t get out of hand. The nuclear family, as I
described it earlier, makes the young child more emotionally dependent on his
parents; but adulthood demands that he become more independent of his
parents than adults usually are in other societies. The peer group makes a useful
contribution to adolescent development by testing the individual’s willingness to
break his dependence on his parents. It rewards rebelliousness as a symbol of this
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emancipation. I remember that this was brought home very clearly to me when I
was studying a normal middle class adolescent peer group a few years ago. A
newcomer to this informal group of agemates was describing his attempts to
become fully accepted in the group. He remarked that “everyone seemed to have
a quarrel with their parents” and that the group seemed to spend a good deal of
time discussing these quarrels. He went on to say: “The trouble with my parents
was that I couldn’t fault them. When I was in Sydney I decided I’d have to ﬁnd
some disagreement so when I went home to the country, I took a pile of jazz
records, some books by D. H. Lawrence, and I started to grow a beard. I thought
that would provoke some comments. When I got home, I put the records on and
turned them up loud — but they didn’t even mention the jazz. Mum said she
thought the beard suited me and Dad started reading D. H. Lawrence. What can
you do with parents like that?”
Rebellion against adultstandards and values is often purely symbolic. It is
useful that therreak be made so that the child can become the adult. It is also
useful because it does prepare the adolescent to adopt standards that are
different from those of his parents. In a society developing as rapidly as ours,
new standards and new kinds of relationships are developing within each
generation rather than over a number of generations. I have emphasized this
point about the sources of rebellious behaviour because I think that those
involved in administering the law often get very upset by assaults on symbols of
authoritypand tend to respond with a retributive form of justice which often
only heightens the problem. I think it will become increasingly important to
look at why the juvenile is rebellious or uncontrollable and to deal with different
individuals in quite different ways. Of course all this makes legal wOrk more
complex.
I have mentioned that the values of collectivism and collaboration are
increasing. These values are of course strongly supported by adolescent group
life and expressed in it. The kinds of behaviour that the protective provisions are
designed to cover will be increasingly an expression of group life. This means
that it is often a good deal less meaningful and certainly less effective to deal
with individuals rather than with groups. We readily accept that, when we deal
with a small child, we have to take his family into account. But we do not yet
accept that when we deal with an adolescent we might have to take his peer
group into account even though this group may exercise considerably more
inﬂuence over him than his family. One of the most effective crime prevention
programmes in theU.S. has been the “detachedworker” programme operating
particularly in New ’York and Chicago. In this program trained youth workers
live in communities where delinquency rates are high and they attach themselves
to the worst gangs. By working directly with the gangs in their own community
settings, they have reduced the incidence of bashings, robberies, and “rumbles”
in these areas. Similarly there is a growing emphasis on treating the whole family
rather than separating a child from his family if he exhibits extreme behaviour
problems. One of the most interesting experiments of this kind that I have
witnessed was a series of therapy sessions for families with young children who
had been diagnosed as schizophrenic or near schizophrenic. Four of these
families met together with an experienced therapist. As families cause such
problems, it makes sense to treat families. If peer groups cause problems, it
makes sense to treat the peer groups.
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The value of self-realisation means that we will see a delcine in the simple
materialism of post war years; less value placed on the acquistion of wealth and
the luxury it can purchase; more emphasis on spending time, money and energy
on understanding oneself and exploring personal experience. This has gone
further in the US. than here until it has become fashionable in some juvenile
circles to have your own “shrink”, to smoke “pot” and to get “high” on drugs.
There was a time when sex performed a similar function, but that was when D.
H. Lawrence was considered revolutionary. As the sexual mores of adult society
change, adolescents will continue to take sex more for granted and see it as a less
appropriate avenue for expressing rebellion against adult standards. The general
availability of oral contraceptives has already made a major impact in this area.
Drugs have become the new symbol of rebellion and they will probably continue
to play this role for some time to come. The community does not accept them
as legitimate, they are seen as a mode of achieving a heightened sensory and
emotional awareness, and they are much more open to group experimentation
than sex ever was. No doubt part of the answer lies in providing less dangerous
avenues of achieving the same ends.
Because change is valued for its own sake, we can expect fads of various
kinds to sweep the juvenile world. Some of these will seem foolish, some
dangerous, some harmless. We would do well to retain a sense of humility and a
sense of humour, remembering that many valued social institutions of our time
were seen as decadent, immoral or irreverent when they were first introduced.
Ballroom dancing was held to expose even adults, let alone juveniles, to moral
danger and the inventor of the umbrella was stoned for trying to keep God’s rain
off his head.
All this is to say that we have to develop appropriate kinds of consultative
authority that will embody a positive, helpful approach to framing and
implementing protective provisions. Rather than judging on the basis of the
offence itself, we need to inquire more diligently about the nature of the person
committing the offence and perhaps even if it is an “offence” at all. Rather than
classifying juveniles into rigid categories, we need to preserve as much openness
as possible so that they may change. Rather than adopting the most formal
procedures of authority, we need to operate less formally and more as advisers
and consultants. Rather than decreasing respect for the law (as might have been
the case thirty or fourty years ago), these measures should now increase respect
for it. We need in addition more trained personnel who are not seen as “arms of
the law” but who can deal realistically, firmly but personally with individual
juveniles, their families and their peer groups. Because these personnel are less
strongly attached to the formal legal structures, they are freer to act ﬂexibly in
response to deviance, and they can present alternative role models to those
young people who are threatened by authority but looking for guidance. At the
same time there is a need for the legal profession to work out clear and sensible
standards for the protection of the life, property and privacy of other citizens in
contemporary society, to see that these standards are understood by juveniles
and enforced. More importantly there is a need for responsible adult citizens in
the community to stop crying about “the good old days” and start building and
supporting the kinds of social institutions that will offer youth positive
alternatives to license, despair and alienation.
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PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROTECTIVE OBJECTIVES
OF THE LAW IN THE COURTS IN NEW SOUTH WALES
J. M Callaghan, S.M. *
Lest it be thought that my life is one long series of difﬁculties and
frustrations, perhaps I should begin by saying that I have enjoyed, during my
term as a magistrate specialising in juvenile cases, the utmost cooperation from
members of the legal profession, ofﬁcers of the Police and Child Welfare
Departments, members of the medical profession, social workers, and indeed
many others on whom I have called for help. In the main, also, the parents of
the children who have come before me have had the interests of their children at
heart, and their sins were of omission rather than commission. If this paper is
only concerned with the problems, that is because I have been asked to limit
myself to this theme.
Before examining any speciﬁc difﬁculties in the implementation of the
protective provisions of the law in New South Wales it is pertinent to look at the
functions of a Children’s Court. These have been stated succinctly in the lngleby
Report, where it was said —
The Court will often be trying to produce several different and
conflicting results. It must try at one and the same time to protect
the public, to promote the welfare of the child, and to stress the
responsibility and respect the legitimate rights of the parents.
Finally, it must satisfy public opinion that justice is being done.
It is difﬁcult to particularise the protective objectives of the law in New
South Wales. I take these to mean more than protection from the abuse of, or
neglect of, parental responsibility or from exploitation by others. It must be
extended to include some measure of protection from the consequences of the
child’s own actions. If it is desirable for a child to have remedial rather than
punitive measures taken for such things as truancy, surely it is desirable to
extend this same attitude to such things as petty larceny. Indeed we ﬁnd the
Child Welfare Act allows much the same orders to be made under ss. 82 and 83.
In practice the percentage of cases which are dealt with according to law or in
which the juvenile is committed for trial is very low.
The powers of a Children’s Court are derived from s. 12 of the Child
Welfare Act. It might be noted that since the passing of the Mental Health Act,
1958, there is no power to refer a juvenile directly to an Admission Centre.
Normally this is unnecessary, but there is always the possibility of an acute
psychotic being brought before the Court. A Children’s Court, in common with
other Courts of Summary Jurisdiction, has special difﬁculties where the question
offimess to plead is raised.
85. 72-80 of the Child Welfare Act specify the instances in which a child
can be brought before the court for other than an offence. These sections should
be coupled with the definition of “uncontrollable” in S. 4.
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I feel that the choice of the word “uncontrollable” is
unfortunate. It
implies that the child cannot be controlled within a no
rmal home setting. In
most cases this is not true. By and large the home atmos
phere in such cases is
anything but normal. I can remember one case where the c
hild was charged as
uncontrollable when in fact there were neither parents no
r guardians nor any
person who had assumed control of the child. I could
find no machinery for a
guardian to be appointed, and the matter was resolve
d by a fresh complaint
alleging that the child was a “neglected child”.
The definition of “neglected child” under S. 72 of
the Child Welfare Act
contains a number of obsolete provisions which cou
ld be omitted. Sub-sections
(c), (e), (g) and (i) are rarely, if ever, used. S. 72 (h
) mentions opium smoking
but no mention is made of any of the other prohib
ited drugs, nor indeed of any
other means of taking opium. This means that i
f a teenager is frequenting a
discotheque or other place where prohibited drug
s are being freely peddled the
Court will only have jurisdiction if it can be prove
d that the child comes within
the provisions of one of the other subvsections.l
S. 72 (b) is often used to bring
children before a court when the family has been evi
cted and they have nowhere
to live. This seems an extension of the original con
cept, which was obviously
aimed at the children of itinerant vagrants, but i
t is doubtful if any other
sub-section could be used to bring these unfortunat
es before the Court. I have
not seen S. 72(d) used. Either S. 72 (j) or S. 72 (k)
is preferred. If the occasion
warrants, prosecution under S. 148 is instituted.S. 72
(i) is a favourite of police
who find children associating with prostitutes o
r criminals, but I feel that it is
almost impossible of proof, and the instances mentioned a
re adequately covered
by S. 72 (n). S. 72 (j) appears wide enough to cover
most cases of parental
neglect or mistreatment but I am not sure that the wo
rd “incompetent” is the
best available to describe a father of young children wh
o has been deserted by
his wife and ﬁnds himself unable to work and look after th
e children at the same
time.
S. 72 (n) is the most widely used of the categories set out i
n S. 72. Here
the difficulty is in formulating an adequate test for the terms “b
ad associations”
and “moral danger”. I suppose one can only work on t
he analogy of the
“reasonable man” theory, but with the rapid change of cult
ural values there is
little, if any, precedent which can be called upon for help. D
o we accept a kind
of majority standard, or are there absolutes below which we
should not go?
What degree of contact is necessary to form an association
? Even if the
association is with a known criminal, is it necessarily bad
, or likely to lead to
delinquent acts by the child? In compulsory associations such as s
chools, and
more particularly Training Schools, has it been shown that the effect
s have been
“bad”? Is it' necessary to prove delinquent acts arising from the assoc
iation, or is
 
1. This sub-section was repealed by the Chi
ld Welfare Amendment Act, 1969, and was
replaced by the following:
(h) who is found:
(i) in any place where any drug is unlawfull
y manufactured prepared
administered consumed used smoked distributed o
r supplied; or,
(ii) administering, consuming, using or smoking any dr
ug and is in need of
care, protection or control by reason thereof.
“Drug“ means drug of addition or prohibited drug as d
efined in section 4 of the
Poisons Act, 1966, as subsequently amended and incl
udes any substance injurious to
health.
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it sufﬁcient to show a possibility or a probability that such association will result
in delinquent acts? Or is the criterion whether a reasonable parent might forbid
such association, having in mind inter alia the effect on the reputation of his
child?
“Moral danger” is another amorphous expression. Is this, as is generally
accepted, to mean deviation from accepted standards of sexual relationships?
Certainly here is an area where standards will differ from district to district,
from class to class, and from family to family. Apart from such obvious cases as
prostitution, perversion or homosexual relationships, what other cases are to be
included? Is extramarital sexual intercourse to be completely forbidden to all
girls under 18 although the legal age of consent is 16? What of intercourse by
boys with girls over 16 years of age? Is the test to be whether a reasonable
parent would have consented, or is it whether the actions of the boy or girl are
such that extra-parental supervision or control is necessary? Is the standard
required that of the Court, the parents, or the norm for the age group of the
child in question?
One wonders whether it might not be better to repeal SS. 72-80 and
replace them with a broad definition akin to the British custom of alleging that a
child is in need of cure and control. There are of course dangers inherent in this
course, principally a substitution ofjudicial standards for parental ones. There is
always a tendency to see the protective provisions as somewhat akin to a “Bill of
Rights” for the child — a right to proper food, clothing, housing, education,
discipline, affection, etc. Some legislative guidance would be necessary to limit
the causes for intervention whilst enabling the Court to retain sufficient
discretion to deal with all relevant cases.
Sub-normal children are a specific problem. What degree of “mens rea”
can be attributed to a sub-normal child? If we hold that they are incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong, what can be done about the mental defective
who wanders around the place stealing everything which takes his fancy, or who
yields to primitive instincts and indecently assaults young girls? if they are
charged as uncontrollable (and they often are) what order should be made? The
placements available in residential schools for the intellectually retarded are
pathetically inadequate. Many of the facilities. for State Wards are devoted
exclusively to this type of child, but because of behaviour problems many find
their way into Training Schools. It is to be earnestly hoped that implementation
of Part IX of the Child Welfare Act will be accelerated so that these unfortunates
can be adequately looked after on a long term basis.
Having found that a child is neglected or uncontrollable, the question then
becomes, “What order should be made?” Cases of incompetent or improper
guardianship are usually dealt with by committal to the care of the Minister to
be dealt with as 3 Ward or by committal to the care of some church or charitable
home. Here again the availability of suitable residential homes lags behind the
need.
For those children in need of sustained psychiatric care, there is no
institution specifically devoted to their needs. There are some facilities at
psychiatric hospitals, but these hospitals are oriented to adult rather than
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juvenile patients. There is increasing psychiatric assistance available to
Child
Welfare Department establishments, but it is difﬁcult to treat a genuine sch
ool
phobia case within the regimen of such a place as “Anglewood”. The network
of
Child Guidance Clinics renders valuable assistance to parents but they are
too
busy to accomplish much by individual therapy. The system‘ of school
counsellors is as yet inadequate to deal with the more difﬁcult children.
What of the children who are behaviour problems? Being convinced that
most behavioural problems are the result of environmental pressures and are
closely linked with emotional stress, one must regard the child not only as a
whole, but also in his immediate and past settings. The difﬁculty lies in
obtaining the requisite information. To get “the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth” requires skill, perception and perseverance on the part of
many people. It is by no means always available to me at the beginning of a case,
nor often at all. There is always a tendency for any person brought before a
court to “cover up”, and parents are as adept as their offspring in rationalising
their behaviour. Referral to a Child Guidance Clinic helps where the child is
disturbed, but it is preferable to have a clinic attached to the Court, as at
“Yasmar”, so that information may be freely exchanged and one has not to rely
solely on the written report, In getting to know the capabilities and
characteristics of a child, the help of a capable and experienced shelter staff is
invaluable. The children who are detained are always the problem children, and a
discerning manager or matron can be an enormous help. Here too it is preferable
to be able to maintain personal contact. Unfortunately the Metropolitan Girls’
Shelter and the Child Guidance Clinic at Brisbane Street, Sydney, are too far
away from the Metropolitan Children’s Court for this to be practicable.
If one decides to release a child on probation one is faced with many
difficulties. How much discretion should be left to the Pr
obation Officer?
Bearing in mind that S. 91 allows the Court to vary the ter
m of a probation
order but not the conditionsz, what provision can be m
ade so that a child will
not find himself in breach of his order through conditions bey
ond his control? If
compensation is to be paid, what should be the apportionment? What
of the case
where the offender is a young child incapable of earning and the
mother is a
deserted wife on a pension with other young children to support bu
t where the
victim cannot afford the loss?
If one decides that the home is such that there is little or no likelihood of
the child succeeding there and it is better for the child to be removed therefro
m,
it is necessary to ﬁnd a suitable placement. Sometimes, but not often,
placement
with relatives is available. About the only people who seem to have an endle
ss
supply of counsins are the aborigines, but placement with these relatives is mo
re
often than not unsuitable. Foster placement is rarely available for childre
n who
are behaviour problems. There are the Child Welfare Training School
s, and some
Church Homes are willing to accept these children. The Child Welf
are Training
Schools and the Catholic Homes are self-contained entities
except that a few
girls from the Girls Training School at Parramatta and the Good S
amaritan
Training Centre at Arncliffe are allowed to go out to work, each day.There
are
 
2. 5.91 has now been amended to allow thejudge or court to vary terms and conditions
as well as the period of a probation or committal to care order.
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several Protestant Homes for Schoolboys where the children are all
owed to go
to State schools, and the “Pallister” Church of England Home als
o allows the
girls from there to go to a State school. For boys of working age the Metho
dist
Church has a farm, “Iandra” at Grenfell, for selected boys. The only home
for
working-age boys who are allowed to engage in normal employment is
the
Charlton Boys Home at Ashﬁeld, which is run by the Church of England Ho
me
Mission Society. At present there is accommodation for 20 boys. The Metho
dist
Church Department of Christian Citizenship operates a similar home for gir
ls at
“Heighway House” Thornleigh, with accommodation for about 15 girls. Whe
n it
is realised that about 7,300 boys and about 2,500 girls appeared before
the
courts in 1966 it can be seen how inadequate these provisions for host
el type
accommodation are.
Over and above the difﬁculties caused by obsolete legislation and the lack
of adequate facilities for the placement and care of the children the Court is still
faced with a considerable degree of public ignorance of, and indeed resistance to,
its efforts to rehabilitate young persons who come before it. Many persons can
think only in terms of punishment as a means of reform. Many ﬁrms refuse to
accept as employees children who come before the courts. Despite the closed
court, police records are available to public authorities. There is a tendency
amongst some members of the public to regard Children’s Courts as “softies”
and the “Welfare” as a crowd of snoopers intent in interfering with parental
rights.
It is difficult to see how this can be overcome. Opening of the courts to
the press may or may not help. Knowing the appetite of newspapers for
sensationalism one wonders how much space would be given to any orders made
and how much to any lurid details of the evidence. At any rate, the success or
failure of an order can only be judged long afterit is made. Perhaps if a series of
critical studies could be made of the effectiveness of present procedures and the
results given wide publicity we might benefit by the acceptance of our aims and
methods and gain some action to remedy those defects in the system which limit
its effectiveness.
 
3. There is now additional hostel type accommodation at Bailey Cottage, Coogee
(Methodist), Lisgar, Arncliffe (Church of England), Marillac, East Sydney (Catholic).
and Currawong House for girls from the Girls Training School, Parramatta.
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SECOND SESSION
OPENING ADDRESS BY THE HON. K. M. McCAW, M.I..A.,
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR NEW SOUTH WALES
Ladies and Gentlemen:
The Chief Justice was called away to another very urgent engagement, and
at the invitation of Mr Roulston I accepted the honour of chairing the sec
ond
session of this seminar. There are still two papers to come, which I thi
nk you
will ﬁnd as interesting as the four which preceded the dinner adjournment an
d it
is hoped that there will be interest sufﬁciently provoked to lead to questions and
contributions.
The other day it was my privilege to speak to the toast to a retiring teacher
and being hard up for a story I asked the Parliamentary Draftsman if he could
suggest one. He said, “When I was a small boy my teacher had great difﬁculty
with me, and to make me behave she sent for Father. Then, to make Father
behave, she sent for Mother”. Perhaps this doesn’t entirely satisfy the Question
asked by Professor Cross and others as to the age at which criminal responsibility
should begin. Perhaps it doesn’t even perfectly answer the question, “Did he
(either the small boy or the father) know that what he was doing was wrong?” It.
does serve to illustrate the difﬁculty in ﬁnding a boundar
y line, both
chronologically and in the criminal sense.
I think it is my duty to say to you, in relation to the age of majority, that
this is a matter which has now for three years concerned the Government. In
1965 the Premier (then the Leader of the Opposition) said, “We will establish a
Law Reform Commission if and when we get into government. When we
establish the Law Reform Commission we will refer to it the question of
whether the age of majority should be reduced, and if so, to what age”.
Well, the Law Reform Commission has been established and has been
functioning since the beginning of 1966 under the chairmanship of Mr Justice
Manning, and the question of the age of majority, including the franchise, was
referred to the Commission in 1966. There was some criticism in the press and
other publicity media to which I as Attorney-General yielded, and I asked
Cabinet’s approval to withdraw from the Commission the question of the
franchise because it wasthought (and I agreed) that that was a political question
for government to decide rather than a legal question for the Law Reform
Commission.
However, the remainder of the question —— whether there should be a
reduction in the age of legal responsibility and legal privilege —~ was in fact
referred and is now under the consideration of the Commission. The Chairman is
going abroad next Thursday for several months and he will have the opportunity
of examining at ﬁrst hand what motives and reasons prompted the Committee in
England to make its recent recommendation and what prospects there are of
Parliament implementing the report.
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The Premier has said publicly that when the Commission’s report and
recommendation upon the reduction (if there is to be one) comes to hand,
obviously it must inﬂuence the Government’s opinion in relation to franchise.
When we come to consider the question it is also obvious that since
Commonwealth Electoral Rolls are used the matter must be considered at the
level of the Commonwealth and the other States, so I have no doubt that it will
come to be a problem for the consideration of the Standing Committee of
Attorneys-General and probably of the Premiers’ Conference.
What has been said in the papers today and in the discussion that follows
them will be matters to which I will listen with interest and deep respect and
would like to see passed on to the Law Reform Commission for its
consideration.
 
 Problems in implementing the Protective Provisions 45
PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS OF
THE LAW IN NEW SOUTH WALES IN THE COMMUNITY
W. C. Langshaw*
The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice in its 1967 Report on the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society pointed
out that “America’s best hope for reducing crime is to reduce juvenile
delinquency and youth crime. In 1965 a majority of all arrests for major crimes
against property were of people under 21, as were a substantial minority of
arrests for major crimes against the person. The recidivism rates for young
offenders are higher than those for any other age group. A substantial change in
any of these ﬁgures would make a substantial change in the total crime ﬁgures
for the nation.”
No doubt the same or a very similar comment could be made in regard to
juvenile delinquency in New South Wales although it would appear, even
allowing for difﬁculties in comparing statistical material, that the rate ofjuvenile
crime in the USA. is substantially higher than it is here.
Certainly there is no gainsaying thatjuvenile crime has a signiﬁcant effect
on the well-being of our nation. It is costly not only to the victims and to
society as a whole, but also in terms of the wasted lives of the offenders should
our protective and rehabilitative measures fail.
The notion that children need special consideration is well stated in the
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted unanimously by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in 1959. Principle 2 of the Declaration provides
that, “the child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities
and facilities, by law and by other means to enable him to develop physically,
mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in
conditions of freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose the
best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration.”
What are the special objectives of the law in New South Wales in its
attempts to provide this special attention?
I suggest that these objectives can be summarised as follows:
(1) To protect juveniles from neglect and exploitation, including the
prevention or treatment of neglect or other inadequate care,
safeguards against child labour, the insistence on school attendance,
the limitation on criminal responsibility;
(2) To promote the welfare of juvenile offenders through diversiﬁed
measures designed to promote opportunities for care, treatment or
training; and
(3) To prevent the occurrence or re-occurrence of juvenile crime
through remedial rather than punitive measures.
*Director, Department of Child Welfare and Social Welfare.
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Criticism has already been made by previous speakers both of some
weaknesses of the present law and of some suggestions that in other countries
are seen as measures of reform. With some relatively minor amendments the law
regarding juvenile offenders has not been changed in this State since 1939, but I
anticipate that although a major review or re-drafting of the Child Welfare Act is
not immediately contemplated, there may be several adjustments made to those
sections that contain the most obvious weaknesses in an amending bill which
should be introduced to Parliament later this year.
However, for the purposes of this Seminar, I have been asked to comment
on current difficulties in implementing existing protective provisions of the law,
not prognosticate on what might or might not happen in the future.
Firstly, there is a problem in determining what we mean by juvenile
offences. The point must be emphasised that terms like “crime”, “delinquency”
and “offences”, are legal terms, not medical, psychological or sociological, even
though in attempting to understand the complexities of an occurrence that is
criminal or delinquent or that constitutes an offence one needs to take into
account these other factors that might have inﬂuenced the individual to a
particular course of action. Certainly these factors are crucial in attempting to
apply protective, rehabilitative and treatment measures.
Swanson has commented that “it is impossible to define crime in
sociological terms since no such definition can satisfy the requirement that it
shall apply universally to all social cultures irrespective of time.” Klineberg
comments that “crime is sometimes identiﬁed with immoral behaviour or
conduct which results in some harm to society” but he acknowledges that such a
deﬁnition is relative only as an act regarded as a crime in one society may be
considered unobjectionable in another (e.g. homosexual behaviour and certain
forms of heterosexual conduct are punishable as crimes in N.S.W. and other
Anglo-Saxon communities, but are not uniformly proscribed by the criminal law
of certain European and Asian countries). The one definition of crime of general
application would accordingly appear to be the strictly legal definition that
crime is conduct prohibited by a criminal code under pain of sanction,
authoritatively expressed in Lord Atkins’ classic statement that “the domain of
criminal jurisprudence can only be ascertained by examining what acts, at any
particular period, are declared by the State to be crimes and the only common
nature they will be found to possess is that they are prohibited by the State and
that those who commit them are punished”.
Similarly, the term “delinquency” is a legal term even though, as far as i
am aware, the word itself does not occur in the legislation of this State. As
commonly used the term refers to behaviour by young people which, in the
context of the particular culture, is recognised as requiring special programmes
of prevention and treatment, limiting such behaviour to include only violation of
the criminal law.
Talk about the causes of delinquency can be so complex that it seems
essential to focus upon the legal sense of this term’s meaning while recognising
the broader social and psychological variables that are involved.
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Obviously delinquency has something to do with misbehaviour. Beyond
that there is considerable disagreement in relation to such matters as the age of
the child, psychopathology, and legal versus moral transgression.
Thus whether or not an act is considered as delinquent will partly depend
upon the age of the individual whose behaviour is under consideration. A given
act may be quite acceptable at one age and an indication of anti-social
tendencies or severe mental illness at a later age. For example very young
children reach for and sometimes will destroy pretty objects that attract their
attention. At an older age the same behaviour might attract a charge of malicious
damage or it might indicate disordered behaviour that suggests a need for
psychiatric treatment.
In New South Wales the legislature has arbitrarily determined that no child
under 8 years of age can be guilty of a crime. This age of criminal responsibility
varies from place to place, and has been determined at age 10, 16 or even 21
years in other parts of the world. ‘
Lord Kilbrandon the Chairman ofa recent Scottish Committee on services
for children quoted a newspaper report in which an English Chief Constable was
stated as saying that “crime in his borough had gone up in every category during
the past year but that juvenile crime had fallen by about 20%”. The Chief
Constable went on to say, “The decrease injuvenile crime was due partly to the
raising of the age of criminal responsibility from eight to ten years”. Another
way of presenting the same interesting thought is: “The decrease in juvenile
crime is due partly to our shutting our eyes to a larger proportion of it”.
When we are considering behaviour that might be regarded as criminal we
must then, in comparing two similar acts, have regard to the age and mental
health of the alleged offenders rather than just the similarity of the acts.Further,
as l have indicated already, we must also have regard to the country in which the
alleged offence occurred. What amounts to a crime in one place may be socially
acceptable in another. Another problem in determining whether or not our two
alleged offenders are delinquents or not may depend on the actions of others. If
one only is known to the law enforcement authorities and dealt with under the
law, only one will be regarded as a delinquent and included in any measure of
recorded crime. Yet both may in fact be equally guilty.
As a result, Wirt and Briggs have defined a delinquent as “a person whose
misbehaviour is a relatively serious legal offence, which is inappropriate to his
level of development; is not committed as a result of extremely low intellect,
intracranial organic pathology, or severe mental or metabolic dysfunction, and is
alien to the culture in which he has been reared. Whether or not the individual is
apprehended or legally adjudicated is not crucial.” (p. 24 Herbert Quay —
Juvenile Delinquency).
However, in New South Wales the term “juvenile delinquency” is used by
the Child Welfare Department in the restricted sense recommended by the
Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of
Offenders that the “meaning of the term juvenile delinquency should be
restricted as far as possible to violations of the criminal law.” Rates of
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delinquency published in the Department’s Annual Reports relate to the number
of offenders who appear before the courts or who, in certain cases, are officially
cautioned by the Police in reSpect of criminal offences admitted or proved and,
in the case of girls, with the addition of those girls who have been found by a
children’s court to be neglected in that they have been exposed to moral danger
— a condition normally involving sexual misconduct.
Such measures of delinquency are sufficient for official purposes but they
make no claims to be a measure of all delinquent acts committed in the
community. They simply reﬂect the number of individuals dealt with ofﬁcially
following admission or proof of guilt, and they do not even reﬂect the total
number of offences committed by this group of recognised offenders.
In New South Wales we have also had our problems in deciding what is a
crime and what is not. Before lst November, 1967, for example, it was not an
offence to have certain drugs in one’s possession. Today it is. We can presumably
expect therefore a dramatic increase in a new category of crimes concerned with
possession of drugs and drug usage, and no doubt many of these cases will
involve persons under 18 years of age. The range of offences that are regarded as
crimes is so great and crime occurs under such widely differing circumstances as
a result of such wide variations in the motives of the offenders, that any
discussion of causes of crime in general terms, becomes well nigh impossible.
Indeed we could with some reason almost go so far as to say that law itself is the
cause of some delinquency.
This is particularly relevant to a study of a female delinquency. One of the
leading American writers on delinquency, Albert Cohen, points out that in all
social classes, female delinquency is primarily sexual, and he suggests that this is
because the main source of female status in our society is attractiveness to men.
Be that as it may the female crime rate for girls is 1.1 per 1,000 girls 8—18 years
of age, compared to a male rate of 17.2 per 1,000, while if“exposed to moral
danger" cases are added to the female rate the female delinquency rate rises to
3.55 per 1,000 girls 8—18 years of age. It is to be noted that the law in regard to
the sexual behaviour of girls is somewhat inconsistent. Evidence of sexual
intercourse, especially in parks, cars or residentials is usually an important part of
the case where a girl is before the court as neglected in that she is exposed to
moral danger. This is reasonable enough if the girl is under 16 years of age since
the male concerned is liable to a charge of carnal knowledge. However, when the
girl reaches the age of consent, 16 years, and allows sexual intercourse to take
place, the male commits no offence, but the girl, in exercising her right to
consent, is likely to find herself before the court as exposed to moral danger.
The male is very clearly privileged. When the girl turns 18 years of age she has
nothing further to worry about from the law, providing she doesn’t become a
member of the oldest profession. I have heard of a girl 17 years 10 months
before the Court as exposed to moral danger and committed to an institution for
a period expiring after she was 18 years, who had previously been in an
institution and had borne a child. I would have thought that she was well and
truly exposed to moral danger before this occurrence and one wonders whether
the law is being used, not to protect the innocent, but to enforce a strict moral
code that the law itself does not really prescribe. On the other hand if the male
is protected in relation to a girl over 16 years, the males have been worse off
when it comes to homosexual contacts, since such relationships between females
do not constitute a crime.
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These then are some of the problems in defining delinquency. When the
concept is so diffused and when it can be measured only by reference to the
offenders who are caught, it can be appreciated that for these reasons alone,
quite apart from psychological or sociological factors involved that further
complicate the matter, a discussion on causes is likely to be inconclusive if one is
hoping to obtain a single, simple explanation. Further, there can be no single
proposal to constitute a rehabilitative programme that can be guaranteed as
likely to be successful. A diversiﬁed approach is essential.
It is not my responsibility in this Seminar to enter into a discussion
concerning the causes of crime. Sufﬁce it for me to emphasise that causes are
likely to be many and their relationships one with the other most complex.
Consideration of the causation of delinquency is, of course, essential in
planning programmes for the prevention or treatment ofjuvenile delinquency.
Preventive policy can be viewed at three levels ,- primary, secondary and
tertiary. Primary prevention is concerned with the whole of social, medical and
educative provisions which cover the juvenile population in general, and can be
regarded as a measure of general prophylaxis. Such measures aim at organising
society in such a way as to, guarantee the satisfaction of the basic needs of its
young members and to ensure their protection from the dangers to which they
are in general exposed. In this State we have gone a considerable way towards
ensuring that a satisfactory range of services and facilities are available, though,
of course, there are still gaps, notably in some aspects of special education, the
provision of psychiatric treatment facilities especially for adolescents and in the
provision of sufficient workers in the family welfare field who can provide
specialist counselling services.
Secondary prevention aims at detecting and treating as early as possible,
juveniles whose health, security, morality or education arejeopardised. These are
not general measures, but those providing individual help or protection for
particular children who appear to be specially at risk. In this category would
come the services provided through the Child Welfare Department, often via
Children’s Courts, for the care of neglected or dependent children, or for
juvenile offenders.
Tertiary prevention seeks to prevent complications and after effects of
juvenile misbehaviour and is aimed at providing more specialised services to
prevent the occurrence of recidivism in juveniles who have already been dealt
with following an adjudication of delinquent behaviour.
While it cannot be said that a comprehensive national plan for the
prevention or decrease ofjuvenile'delinquency has been defined and approved, it
is apparent that services in New South Wales have been developed in accordance
with the following principles:
(1) The family as a unit is of fundamental importance. Preventive work
is therefore directed towards maintaining the juvenile in his family
group and towards involving the family in working towards a
solution. If this fails, the best alternative is found. This is not
necessarily institution placement.
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(2) Decentralised services must be available to the community as a
whole. Provision of the same range of services needs to be made for
outlying rural areas as well as for the city.
(3) Early identiﬁcation of problems and the mobilisation of all
community resources, both Government and private, is essential in
providing necessary diagnosis and treatment.
(4) Liaison must be maintained between Departmental services, social
agencies and children’s courts.
(5) A casework service, with wide lines of communication with the
community is required to ensure early contact with juveniles
released on probation, and subsequent regular casework counselling.
(6) After-care service for juveniles committed to institutions which
include counselling and planning with the juvenile and his parents
for 'his training and ultimate re—establishment in the community
from the time he enters the institution, throughout the period of
detention, and subsequent to release is essential for effective work in
reducingjuvenile delinquency.
(7) A gradation of institutions or training schools is required to make
possible the classification and treatment ofjuveniles according to
their age and delinquent sophistication and to provide ultimately for
the complete segregation of the subversive, the “acting out” and the
would-be persistent absconder who is likely to influence in
undesirable ways the more responsive inmates. These training
schools need to be integrated within the total services of the Child
Welfare Department and share the professional services of the several
disciplines involved in the earlier, more direct preventive operations.
(8) ‘A continuum of care in relation to the total programme of child
welfare must be provided since continuity and interdependence of
measures taken to ensure the protection and the development of the
child are required from birth to adulthood.
I am convinced that services based on these eight points offer a real
possibility of protecting the welfare of children, of combatingjuvenile crime and
of rehabilitating juvenile offenders. In New South Wales we have the
organisational structure to provide a statewide programme for the control and
treatment of delinquency. What is still required is the allocation of sufficient
resources of trained and competent personnel and of material facilities to be able
to provide each child and youth with the most appropriate service at the most
appropriate time to meet his particular problem and to provide the most suitable
treatment and training.
The Seminar held at the Australian National University, Canberra, in
February this year on “The Control of Deviant Behaviour in Australia”, in its
report to the Commonwealth Attorney-General, set out two principal
recommentations. These relate to the need for practical research in the ﬁeld of
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crime prevention, law enforcement and correctional procedures and to the need
to develop statistical facilities to establish the extent and nature of the problems
and the trend and ﬂuctuation that occurs in overall numbers. I think it can be
claimed that more work is being done in this State along these lines than
anywhere else in Australia so far as State Child Welfare Departments are
concerned, but this is said not so much to make claims about how progressive we
are here, as to emphasise how pitifully inadequate are the resources allocated to
this work, by comparison with the tasks that could and should be undertaken.
However, both the Minister and the Public Service Board have recently approved
that a Senior Research Officer be appointed to the Child Welfare Department
and-that he have duties that free him from responsibility for maintaining the
statistics that routinely are available in this State, admittedly at the cost of an
undue proportion of the time and staff resources of the present Research
Section.
The same emphasis on the need for research and evaluation of services has
been placed by the Advisory Committee of the International Union for Child
Welfare on Delinquent and Socially Maladjusted Children and Young People,
whose discussions in 1963, 1965 and 1967, have been attended by the Under
Secretary of the Department. In its report to the 1967 Session of this Advisory
Committee, which was devoted to the question of “Planning and Coordination
in the Field of Child Welfare to Prevent or Decrease Juvenile Maladjustment and
Delinquency”, my Department made the following comment on the question of
evaluation of programmes and services:
“There is a danger which needs to be recognised at all levels, that whilst
services and programmes may be well co-ordinated this in itself is no guarantee
that the services and programmes are of value and are achieving the desired
effect in the most desirable manner. Undoubtedly, it is extremely difficult to '
undertake research in such an area as child welfare where there are so many
uncontrolled variables, but likewise it is in the field of providing for the needs of
children that the community and the State assume the greatest direct
responsibility, and it is essential that more serious attempts be made at the
evaluation of services. This applies not only to delinquency and maladjustment,
but also to education, vocational training, etc. One of the difficulties in
undertaking research is ,to obtain the services and interests of academically
‘ trained people, competent to undertake such research. It is true to say that in
the, field of psychology the Unchrsity Departments tend to decry fact ﬁnding
research and are not prepared to acknowledge research as such unless it involves
testing of clear cut hypotheses derived from theoreticar concepts. Undoubtedly,
there is a place for such research, but in the absence of information about the
bare bones of the problem so much of this more theoretical speculative research
tends to become isolated insignificance and be readily ignored. It is possible that
the Institute of Criminology again may provide an avenue of examining the ﬁeld
of delinquency, along the lines of the various institutes attached to Cambridge
and London Universities.
“In any case it would appear to be essential that where new projects are
being introduced, an essential part of the programme from the beginning should
be the inclusion of regular opportunity for planned evaluation and review. If this
is not done there is a real possibility of unproven methods being employed on a
long term basis, and for biased opinion to be confused with hard fact.”
 52 Problems in implementing the Protective Provisions
Mr Callaghan has already indicated some of the practical problems which
face children’s courts magistrates in dealing most appropriately with individual
children who appear before them. These same problems face District Officers of
the Department of Child Welfare and Social Welfare in preparing reports for the
information of the court in dealing withjuveniles, and even more importantly, in
attempting to offer the most eifective rehabilitative service. Similar problems
face Child Welfare Administrators in attempting to provide appropriate services
by using what are really often inappropriate resources.
(a)
(b)
(C)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Foremost is the need for adequately trained staff at all levels and in
all agencies involved in this area, supplied in sufficient number to
allow some possibility of individual needs of the children and their
families being met.
Over the past two years thirty-nine trained staff have become
available for appointment as District Officers, while another group
of thirty are in training at present.
The Premier in his recent election Policy Speech undertook that
staff training programmes for residential and other staff employed
both by the Department and private agencies in child care work
would be improved and extended.
Unfortunately, it remains true that suitable treatment facilities for
other than a small number of emotionally disturbed children and
adolescents are just not available in this State. Even diagnostic
facilities are not really adequate. Lack of alternative facilities has
resulted in a great increase in the number of emotionally disturbed
and atypical children in the Department’s care, and the
Department’s psychiatrists and psychologists and other staff, are
hard pressed to provide adequate assistance.
Despite steady improvement since 1964, there is still a shortage of
adequate school and residential facilities for intellectually
handicapped children.
It seems fair to say that special school programmes for duller or
educationally retarded children need supplementation if such
children are to progress as far as they might with their education.
Inadequate school adjustment is often a factor in delinquency.
Residential training facilities for delinquents are confined almost
solely to Departmental institutions. Although a fair measure of
diversification has been achieved, it has not been possible to develop
small special treatment units or experimental proiects. Hostel type
accommodation is almost completely unavailable.
At a very specific level one would sometimes query the suitability of
certain orders made by some children’s courts from time to time, if
one accepts that rehabilitation is the aim of the court, e.g. commitals
to institutions for period of two weeks, etc. However, on the whole
one would have to say that co-operation between the courts and the
Department is at a high level.
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(g) Inevitably, there is a conﬂict of opinion between those persons in
the community who wish to emphasise rehabilitation and those who
speak in terms of punishment and deterrence. Although the press has
occasional editorials condemning such things as hooliganism,
vandalism, juvenile shop lifting, teenage gate crashing and youthful
immorality, in general the tone of the mass media is reasonably
sympathetic to the problems of youth. The fact that juvenile crime
is relatively stable in this State is important. If there were a major
upsurge of delinquency, one would expect a much more censorious
attitude by mass media. The creation of informed public opinion is
dependent, admittedly, upon a sound public relations policy, and
Government agencies in particular should be prepared to take some
pains to outline and explain official social welfare policy at every
opportunity both to educate the public generally and to create a
climate where families at risk are prepared to seek help in the early
stages of their problem.
Perhaps the problems experienced by child welfare workers can best be
illustrated by mentioning some of the difficulties faced by Child Welfare District
Officers in supervising young people who have been committed to institutions
for delinquent acts following their discharge back into the community.
The following material is taken from a report submitted by the
Department to the International Union for Child Welfare in 1963, but is still
applicable today.
“Because of the range of duties undertaken by District Officers,juveniles
who are committed to institutions may well be known to officers before
committal. In any event committed cases are allotted to field staff who are
responsible for visiting the home during the period that the child is in the
institution with a view to discussing the child’s progress in the institution,
assisting the family problems which could hamper the child’s successful
readjustment to the home on discharge, and sometimes making alternative
arrangements for the child’s future placement, if the home is quite unsuitable.
Also during the period, certain officers stationed in the metropolitan area visit
the institutions regularly to interview the children, to help in preparation for
discharge and to discuss progress with the Superintendent and other staff.
“Prior to discharge of school age children, school progress and future
placement will have been discussed with a School Counsellor from the Education
Department, who visits institutions regularly. The most suitable school
placement is arranged for the child, the school is advised of the child’s
attainments and of the most appropriate course to follow, and the parents are
told where the child should enrol after his return home.
“Upon discharge being arranged the Superintendent notifies the District
Officer who will be responsible for after-care supervision so that a follow up visit
may be made immediately. The District Officer attempts to help the child or
young person to find suitable employment or to recommence at school; if
necessary he may help to effect introductions to sporting, recreational, religious
or other community organisations which may be able to assist; he will continue
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to work with both child and parents in an endeavour to assist with personal
problems or to encourage development of changed attitudes that may help the
child to make a satisfactory adjustment to the home situation.
“School Counsellors, appointed by the Education Department, also assist
in the child’s readjustment to a normal school situation.
“With the exception-of children committed under the provisions of the
Public Instruction (Amendment) Act to a special school for truants, release from
an institution on licence is not possible. If the child is not making satisfactory
progress the only effective action possible to a District Ofﬁcer is. to lodge a
complaint that the child is uncontrollable, unless of course the police have
already charged the child with the commission of a fresh offence. Under the
Child Welfare Regulations after-care supervision may be continued until the
child concerned reaches 18 years of age. Any breach of the condition of release
can lead to the imposition of a ﬁne by a court. Where ajuvenile is committed to
an institution for a definite period expiring after 18th birthday, but is discharged
prior to the expiry of the period of committal, after-care supervision is
continued only until the period 'of deﬁnite committal has expired.‘Where a
satisfactory casework relationship has been built up between officer and child, it
is not unusual for the youths to continue to keep in informal contact with the
officer long after formal supervision has been withdrawn.
“It is not possible to prove just how effective after-care supervision has
been. The opinion has been expressed that although the provision made for
after-care supervision is theoretically sound, the practical quality of the
follow-up needs to be improved.
“In attempting to evaluate the causes of recidivism it is extremely difficult
to determine which set of factors operated most strongly in bringing about the
breakdown in any particular case.
(a) Was the period of institutional training too short, or were the
methods used ineffective in changing anti-social attitudes? Most
inmates soon learn that at least a superficial conformity to the rules
pays off. In many this veneer of co-operation and respectability
wears off rapidly after discharge.
(b) Was the juvenile’s personality too disturbed, was he too dull, was he
too immature, or were his anti-social habits too deeply ingrained for
him to resist the strains and pressures inherent in his return to the
very environment which helped produce his delinquency in the ﬁrst
place?
(c) Were the case work techniques employed in after-care work of too
poor a standard to be effective?
((1) Because of an excessive caseload, was it impossible for even a highly
skilled officer to devote sufficient time and give sufficient support
and supervision to a particular case to prevent breakdown?
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(e)
(0
(g)
(h)
(i)
(i)
00
Was too little time available to the officer during the period the
juvenile was undergoing training in the institution for him to develop
good casework relationships with the parents and the inmate, or to
maintain effective liaison with the institution staff?
Were the parents so dull, so weak, so lacking in control, so
indifferent or so anti-social and subversive in their attitudes as to
make breakdown in the home almost inevitable?
Did the lack of effective legal sanctions other than limited action
under the Child Welfare Regulations mitigate against the effective
after-care supervision when there was resistance by the juvenile or
his parents towards accepting supervision? This question emphasises
the importance of skilful casework techniques in this ﬁeld.
Unfortunately not all District Officers have special aptitude for this
work and some lack the necessary casework skills to overcome the
negative attitudes they meet in a number of cases.
‘Did staff changes prevent continuity of follow-up?
Were counselling or psychiatric services tOO restricted or inadequate
to undertake effective therapy with seriously disturbed inmates
needing intensive treatment?
Were the training, qualifications, personalities and outlook of'the
general institution stuff of too poor a quality to allow them to make
an effective contribution to the task of rehabilitation?
Although before the inmate’s discharge it was known that the home
and community environment were such that a breakdown was likely
if the juvenile returned home, was discharge to the parents’ care
effected as a matter-of expediency, either to reduce pressure on
institution accommodation or because there was no other home
available? In anyicase is continued lengthy detention justified solely
because it is known that environmental conditions to which the
child will return are not satisfactory? Despite evident risks should
the child not have a trial in the community?”
These then are some of the problems in implementing the protective
objectives of the law. There are no easy answers. If we are to meet the challenge
ofjuvenile offenders in a changing society, we must, as a community do‘far
more than we are doing now both in terms of finding additional money and
skilled personnel and in evaluating our present policies and programmes in order
to promote more effective services that give paramount consideration to what
are the best interests of the children and youth whom we are trying to help.
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Appendix
STATISTICALMATERIALON DELINQUENCYIN NEW SOUIHWALES
In the material below, male delinquency is equated with crime, female
delinquency is equated with crime plus cases of “exposed to moral danger”
Children dealt with as “uncontrollable” or for failure to attend school are
excluded when crime rates are being calculated.
Raw figures and rates are based on persons having charges upheld against
them in Court plus official police cautions where the offence is admitted, but
police decide to caution rather than bring the matter to Court. If one person
appears more than once in the year, he is counted as two people and in each case
the most serious of his offences is selected for inclusion in statistical tables on
 
offences.
Juvenile Crime Rate— Male
Court Official Population Rate
Year police Total _appearances cautions 8 18 (per 1,000)
1964—65 5,747 738 6,485 388,791* 16.7
1965-66 5,905 504 6,409 392,343* 16.3
1966—67 6,320 451 6,771 393,763+ 17.2     
*Population Estimate + Actu'al population at census count.
It is to be noted that census ﬁgures at 30.6.66 showed that 1965—66
overstated the actual juvenile population. Accordingly, delinquency rates for
these years should have been slightly higher than those shown, but it is not
possible to give corrected rates for these years.
Type and Occurrence of Offence in 1966— 67
 
Number of Percentage
Offence court Cautions Total of
appearances grand total
Steal 2,723 207 2,930 43.4
B.E.S. 1,717 148 1,865 27.5
Receive 167 4 171 2.5
Take and use m/v 562 21 583 8.6
Assault 172 17 189 2.8
Robbery 47 — 47 0.7
Malicious damage 308 27 335 4.9
Carnal knowledge 220 5 225 3.3
Indecent assault
(female) 102 2 104 1.5
Indecent assault
(male) 46 -— 46 0.7
Other sex offences 18 — 18 0.3
Other offences 238 20 258 3.8
Total 6,320 451 6,771 100 percent    
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During the year ended 30th June, 1967, six juveniles appeared in cou
rt on
charges of murder, six on manslaughter, and 25 on charges of rape, a to
tal of 37
juveniles appearing in the Supreme Court on offences punishable
by life
imprisonment. In the same period, 56 adults appeared for murder, 10
0 for
manslaughter, and 102 for rape, a total of 258. The juvenile contributions to t
he
total number of offences, punishable by life imprisonment, were as follows:
for murder 10.3 per cent; manslaughter 5.7 per cent; rape 19.7 per cent
and of the total, 12.5 per cent.
The number of court appearances by boys increases exactly as age
increases,with most court appearances coming from 17 year olds (29.4%). This
pattern has been typical in recent years.
Female Delinquency
 
(a) Crime
Court Official Crime rate per
Year appearances police , 1,000 population
(Crime) cautions 8—18 years
1965—66 364 18 0.98
1966—67 381 33 1.1   
(b) Exposed to moral danger cases
Year Court appearances Rate pegiigogezepulation
1965—66 1,141 3 0
1966—67 923 2' 4;  
(c) Rate for crime plus exposed to moral danger
1965—66 3.99 per 1,000 8—18 years of age
1966—67 3.55 per 1,000 8—18 years of age
Summary of all Children’s Court Orders
(Juvenile Offenders under Crimes Act; Child Welfare Act cases (all neglect,
uncontrollable, breach of probation etc); Public Instruction Act (truancy);
Minor offenders). ,
\
30587—3  
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Totals
Court order 1965—1966 1966—1967
Male Female Male % Female %
Released on probation 3,456 1,210 3,386 28.9 1,012 35.5
Committed to an
institution 1,335 480 1,444 12.4 445 15.6
Committed to an institution—
order suspended 401 42 353 3.0 69 2.4
Admonished and discharged,
not proceeded with..etc. 977 157 1,004 8.6 178 6.2
Fined 4,658 536 3,975 34.0 407 14.3
Bound over _ 326 37 97 0.8 4 0.2
Committed for trial _ 43 —- 12 0.1 1 —-
Committed to the care of an
approved person 163 182 208 1.8 204 7.2
Committed to the care of the
minister 314 316 306 2.6 305 10.7
Returned to former custody 18 46 24 0.2 45 1.5
Variation of order - -— — — 6 0.2
Other orders 287 40 879 7.5 172 6.0
Totals 11,978 3,046 11,687 100 2,848 ’100
Metropolitan — Country Distribution
The metropolitan — urban contribution to total juvenile offenders in
1966—67 for males was 53.5% which is a slightly lower contribution to the total
than metropolitan population is to total State population. This seems to be the
normal pattern over recent years.
For girls appearing on complaints of being exposed to moral danger 74.6%
were from metropolitan — urban areas and 25.4% from the country.
(For this purpose Metropolitan—urban area includes the Sydney
Metropolitan Area, Newcastle and Wollongong).
Comparison with Adults
The total number of arrests for indictable offences in New South Wales
during the year ended 31.12.67 was 19,848.
Of these 14,445 were of adults (72.8% of total), and 5,403 were of
juveniles under 18 years of age (27.3%).
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‘The Police have kept an age break-down on the charges arising from the
above arrests for adults only. On average there are 1.6 charges to each arrest for
adults. If we assume the same ratio for juveniles the number of charges for the
various age groups are as follows:
Age Groups No. of Charges
8 — 17 years incl. 8,645 (estimated)
18 — 24 years 16,003
25 — 29 years 4,700
30 — 34 years 2,727
35 —— 39 years 2,144
40 — 44 years 2,091
, 45 — 49 years 1,712
50 ~— 54 years 1,087
55 — 59 years 678
60 - 64 years 367
65 ~ 69 years 139
70 + ' 63
Population of New South Wales as at 30.6.66 was 4,231,103 while the
population aged 8 to under 18 years was 766,720 or 18.1% of the total
population.
As shown above this age group provided 27.3% of all arrests for indictable
offences. '
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A RECONSIDERATION OF THE RELEVANCE
OF THE PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW IN THE LIGHT OF
' CHANGING SOCIAL PATTERNS
His Honour Judge A. Levine
I say at the outset that I do not believe that the troubled problems of the
adolescent can be solved by any one simple reform, either in the law or in legal
procedures and not indeed by any operation of the law alone. All sections of the
community must play their part, including the Church, the schools, and
particularly the parents.
By reason of the great and rapid changes which have taken place in society
in recent years, I do not rely upon my experience of adolescents gained over
twelve years ago when I was practising at the Bar. In expressing my opinions this
evening I have drawn particularly upon my experience gained over the past
twelve years as a Chairman of Quarter Sessions. In such capacity I have heard
, and determined appeals by adolescents from the decisions of Children’s Courts
and from Courts of Petty Sessions, and I have presided over criminal trials by
jury in which adolescents have been the accused. Recently, I have studied some
young men in relation to parole in my capacity as Deputy Chairman of the
Parole Board.
No good purpose can be served by an analysis of differences between
decisions and orders on appeal and decisions of the Children’s Court because, in
my experience, if the decision of the court below is varied or reversed it is done
for the most part because there was presented on appeal additional evidence,
based, no doubt, upon the observations of the skilled and learned magistrate in
the court below and prepared with a View to the personality, if not the
idiosyncracies, of the appellate judge. I appreciate that at Quarter Sessions I
would see but a very small proportion of the cases dealt with in the Children’s
Courts, and it is only very seldom that persons under 18 years appear before me
on trial by jury. Nevertheless, a great number of young persons of 17, 18 and 19
who do appear have long records, which show that they have passed through the
Children’s Courts.
Mr Keefe, the Principal Probation Officer, has kindly provided me with
some statistical information obtained in 1964, and I must say that my
experience shows that the trend which these statistics show operates today, and
I quote:
“In respect of 8,000 male offenders on whom pre-sentence reports
were prepared, about 27% had previously been through the juvenile
courts and half of this number had spent some time in institutions”
and “of those who succeeded on probation, approximately one-third
had previously been through juvenile courts and institutions and
that those who broke down on probation, almost one-half had been
through juvenile courts and institutions.”
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I have always been amazed when coming to the matter of sentence to have
tendered against an accused person as part of his criminal record a list which
starts off with the first offence being in the Children’s Court as “neglected
child”. It has always seemed to me that such an offence might more properly be
entered against the parent under the heading of “neglectful parent”. However,l
do not propose to deal with those many matters which come before Children’s
Courts grouped under the definition of “neglected child”.
Reference has been made to the 1966 White Paper on “The Child, The
Family and The Young Offender”, and for reasons which will appear later I do
not myself approve of any system dealing with adolescent offenders which
makes obligatory consultation with or the consent of the parents before the
determination of guilt or innocence or punishment or arrangements for
rehabilitation. I do not believe that the Family Court referred to in the White
Paper would be of any real practical assistance in dealing with the adolescent
offenders in New South Wales in 1968. I do not agree with the views expressed
in the White Paper that adolescents under the age of 16 should be removed from
the ambit of the criminal law. On the contrary, in my view involvement in the
procedures of the criminal law could well play an important part in the
stemming of adolescent crime presently so rife in New South Wales. In an age
where every conceivable crime against moral law, natural law and man-made law
is fully described and ventilated in the newspapers and on television, in books,
magazines and comics, there can be no possible doubt but that the adolescent,
except in very rare cases, is well aware of what crimes are being committed, and
it would be unreasonable to suppose that the knowledge of crime and its method
of perpetration would be limited in the case of any particular adolescent
offender to the very crime in respect of which he happens to be charged. In
short, our adolescents are very knowledgeable these days. In one way, of course,
having regard to the pace and direction which society is taking, this could be a
very good thing. It all depends on whether in the end this knowledge is brought
to bear in favour of civilised living or against it. It is true that our permissive
society does not frown upon behaviour in adolescence which in my youth would
have been considered totally unacceptable, and it seems to be generally true that
adult behaviour in private and public life is such that one could not expect
adolescents to accept correction or reprimand from parents whose behaviour
falls below the standard which some expect from their children.
In their own way, adolescents do have a very real and sensitive sense of
justice, and in the circumstances I have referred to it is not surprising that they
should reject parental direction. I believe such rejection takes place for the most
part without any consideration of whether the standards of behaviour sought to
be enforced be good or bad, but merely because the adolescent has lost faith in
established authority.
I think it is put very aptly by Dr Dunphy, that where his parents fail as
models and his peers be inadequate, where is an adolescent to turn?
As I have said, the problem cannot be magically resolved by the operation
of any law. The important task is to inculcate into parent and adolescent a sense
of responsibility to society, to each other, and to themselves. I believe that this
may be done if they are brought to understand the part played in a civilised
community by the operation of the rule of law.
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In the state of society in the circumstances I have referred to, the
adolescent in 1968 is in quite a different position to the children who so direly
needed protection in 1785 and 1849. Penalties have changed over the past
hundred years; world statistics, including those of New South Wales, show that
children reach physical maturity at a much earlier age. Rehabilitation has
become an important corner-stone in the administration of the sentencing side
of the criminal law. In short, the adolescent offender of 1968 does not need the
protective provisions of the law as prescribed in the Child Welfare Act, and
although there is no single or simple answer to the question “What can the law
do to solve the social problems arising out of adolescent behaviour?”, in my view
a positive beneficial step would be the abolition of the closed court in the case
of adolescent offenders. For too long have such courts protected irresponsible
parents rather than assisted offending adolescents. For the purposes of what I
have to say, I would define “adolescent” as a person who has attained the age of
15 years and is not over 18 years. Where such an adolescent pleads “Not guilty”
to the offence charged, in my view his guilt or innocence should be determined
in open court under the ordinary criminal law, applying the ordinary rules of
evidence, and in accordance with the ordinary practices as they apply to adults.
My faith in our criminal law is such that I believe the ordinary law will afford
the adolescent all the protection necessary to ensure that he will not be
convicted if he in truth be innocent. The law should provide that where
practicable the parents should be present, or at least one of them, and that the
offender should be provided with legal representation.
I do not believe that the stigma of a trial, or indeed of a conviction, has
the same adverse effect these days as it did years ago. In any event, any possible
social stigma would be far outweighed by the following advantages: An
experience of the function and procedures of the criminal courts may bring the
adolescent to an understanding of the reality of the offence, whether committed
for gain or for excitement, He would be brought to face the reality of the
situation by seeing his victim. I believe that confrontation with the victim would
have the effect of destroying any illusion that the episode which is the subject of
the charge was merely a game. The appearance in public would act as a deterrent
to himself and to his associates. The public appearance of the parents might
conceivably deter an adolescent who might be prepared to hurt his parents
privately yet be greatly affected by any public distress on their part. The parents
would no longer be able to privately abandon the offender, but parental
responsibility and failure would be exposed.
What I have said refers to the resolution of the issue raised upon a plea of
“Not guilty”. It may be that after conviction, or upon a plea of Guilty, the
evidence on sentence might well be taken in a closed court, although the order
of the court in the end should be made public. The determination of guilt or
innocence publicly made is most important for law enforcement and the
protection of the public in New South Wales. However, upon sentence it may
well be that there could be disclosed material affecting the parents and the child,
:he publication of which might have a special adverse effect upon the child’s
uture.
To sum up, I would suggest that the following could prove to be a valuable
contribution to the solution of one aspect of the problem involved, namely, the
failure on the part of the adolescent and of parents to have a sense» of
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responsibility to the community, to each other, and to themselves. What I
propose, very shortly put, is that young persons who have attained the age of 15
years should be subject to the ordinary criminal law of the land, and be tried for
offences in the ordinary courts for the determination of the question of guilt or
innocence. A parent of the offender should be present, and the State should
ensure that the adolescent has legal representation. Once guilt has been
established, or on a plea of guilty, the court should have a discretion to take in
private evidence on the matter of sentence. The adolescent should have the right,
and be asked if he so wishes, to say anything himself in addition to what may
have been put by his counsel. In short, he should be encouraged to participate in
the proceedings in some way. A medical examination should always be had of an
adolescent, and a report be available to the court. The dominant principle on
sentence should be the welfare and rehabilitation of the adolescent. Finally, the
proceedings up to the ﬁnding of guilt, or to a plea of guilty, should be held in
public and the order for sentence made in the end should likewise be publicly
pronounced.
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A Seminar on Correctional Programmes
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OPENING ADDRESS BY THE HON. SIR LESLIE HERRON, K.B.E., C.M.G.,
CHIEF JUSTICE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
For many years this State has lacked directive in the matter of live
questions affecting the law and social problems, and it was not until the Institute
of Criminology was set up in the University of Sydney Faculty of Law that this
guiding hand was seen, and it has been operating with considerable effect ever
since it was established. We have done our best to select live questions for debate
by those people who are most vitally interested, and my only regret is that the
dissemination of our deliberations is not wide enough. We have already
attempted a massive programme. We have attempted to get down to a very
practical paper on confessional statements by arrested persons for the beneﬁt of
the Police Commissioner. We have had three seminars on drug abuse, three
seminars on sentencing to attempt to achieve some measure of uniformity, and a
seminar on fitness to plead. We are to have a seminar on abortion and one on
computers and the law. We have had a special seminar on juvenile deviation as
distinct from this afternoon’s seminar on correctional programmes for adults as
well as juveniles. And I think that the Solicitor-General has in mind to propose
to the Advisory Committee a seminar on sexual offences against females, which I
think is another very live question in today’s disturbed social world.
I want to take the opportunity of saying how indebted. I think the
community should be to. those who are interested in the Institute of
Criminology. I am sorry that Professor Shatwell is not here to hear what I am
saying; with his ability he is, of course, one of the guiding hands in the
lnstitute’s great work. I would like to mention also my grateful thanks to those
who are responsible for calling you together and having the papers prepared.
This afternoon the subject for our discussion is perhaps an extension of
the previous one on juvenile delinquency, and we are calling it “Treat or Punish?
Correctional Programmes for both Juveniles and Adults”. I personally have no
association with juveniles in my day to day work, because unless a person
qualiﬁed as an adult he does not come before me in the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, I feel that it is a subject on which one has a general knowledge in
the community, especially a person with my experience of some twenty-seven
years on the Bench. But this afternoon in the few remarks that I am going to
make as Chairman’s introduction to the subject I pose problems and I don’t
profess to find answers. For myself, I can speak only of the correctional
programme for adults, and others much more knowledgeable than I am will be
dealing with the subject from the point of view ofjuveniles. '
My opening comments are merely these. Janus was a god with two faces
and, like Janus, judges and courts have always turned two faces towards the
punishment of criminals. We expect the judge to be human, and yet inhuman.
He is employed by the State to administer the law and yet some (though by no
means all) penologists, psychiatrists, politicans and students ask him to waive it.
Let us face the plain truth. There are only two forms of punishment with
any practical consequence for adults — ﬁnes or imprisonment. And Parliament
with respect to indictable offences prescribes only one form -— imprisonment.
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Yet, like Janus, the judge is expected to turn two faces to the problem. The
wrongdoer and his supporters resent him when he enforces the law in the
individual case, yet the public and the press demand his dismissal when he does
not. People criticise the judge for being free with other people’s time, yet they
praise his inte'grity when he carries out Parliament’s directions. We expect the
judge to be a member of society and yet not to share its values.
Violence against society is increasingly common and in some cases
admired, but the use of force by police and prison authorities is condemned. The
assassinations of President Kennedy and his brother, Senator Kennedy, and Mr
Martin Luther King fill us with horror, and yet the judge is expected to turn one
face against retribution and punishment and deterrence of others, in favour of
rehabilitation of the offender. To be Janus-like certainly offers its problems of
casuistry. The public asks for crime to be eradicated, but some experts say,
“Only by the use of sporting methods, please, only by the detection of the
offender”.
And so, Janus-like, like all judges, I turn two faces to the problem by
asking, “What do we want prisons for?” Only by resolving the conflict between
social values, between liberty and law enforcement, can we determine the
paradox of the prison system in our future society. It is time that people like
you — the intelligent and responsible people in the community who are
concerned with these problems -— start to think clearly. I know from reading the
papers that the panel of Speakers intend to introduce light and not heat into the
discussion, and it is to this end that the seminar has been organised by the
Institute of Criminology.
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THE ADULT CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM
J. A. Morony *
The adult correctional system is readily divided into int
ramural and
extramural operations. The totality of the system is, in New
South Wales, as in
some other places, under one administrative head but as there
is to be a paper
considering this problem by a ﬁeld (i.e. an extramural.) of
ﬁcer, I propose to
concentrate largely on the intramural aspects of adult corrections.
So that the record may be kept straight, it is well to remember that the
number of persons under extramural supervision is not much less than the
number under intramural control (about 10% less at this stage) and the
difference in volume is decreasing. But intramural control is both greater
publicity material and is more significant in terms of personal impact and effe
ct
on the individual.
The obvious question, in relation to “aims and practices” mentioned in the
title is — what is prison for? And if one can hope today to ﬁnd answ
er with
more certainty than in 1900, it still has to be found; it is nowhere gi
ven to us
ready made, authoritative and of general acceptance.
For this, one may offer explanations; the ﬁrst, particular, the second,
general.
The first explanation lies in the nature of British tradition and the
structure of British law. It is characteristic of the English genius for practical
affairs that we are suspicious of system . . . the English tend rath
er to deal with
the situation confronting them and afterwards discover on what
principles they
have done so, and what precedent for future action they have establ
ished. Thus
our law is not disposed to arrange itself in consistent, comprehensive a
nd logical
codes; certainly neither our prison system nor the penal system of
which it
forms part derives from such a code. Indeed it is not until the Act of
1952-66
that one can hope to learn from the law — and then largely by inference
— what
place Parliament has assigned to the prison in its general order of battl
e for the
attack on crime.
To the modern development of our prison system this situation has
been
of some real advantage; it has indeed permitted it to acquire some
of the merit
which it may possess.
We may therefore be grateful on the whole that, as Dr Grunhut point
s out
“England with her traditidnal system of non-codified law, has been sp
ared the
cumbersome way of total reform —— even though one effect be the ine
vitability
of cumbersome explanation.”
Another effect will be that when we come to view our prison system, it
can only explain itself as Topsy did: “I never was born, I just growed”. We s
hall
not see a machine running to blueprint speciﬁcations, but the contemporary
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phase of a long historical process, a vital organism claiming to be judged not only
by what it now is but by what it has been and what it is becoming.
The second explanation of our uncertainties will take longer. It derives
from the fact that since a prison system is part of a penal system'it cannot — to
put it no higher at this stage of the argument — be dissociated from the idea of
punishment. And as to the ends, the means or the values of punishment it does
not appear either that philosophers or psychologists are yet agreed among
themselves, or that such conclusions as some of them may have reached
necessarily commend themselves to the general sense of the man in the street.
With the general ethics of punishment we cannot concern ourselves here; it is not
the easiest branch of metaphysics. But when it is brought into relation with the
particular ﬁeld of penal action by society against criminal offenders, particular
difficulties arise and these we cannot ignore even if in the end we cannot resolve
them. Some conclusions on them if only as-a working hypothesis, are essential if
an answer is to be given to our question; yet it would not be easy to formulate
any which could with certainty be said to be of general acceptance among those
concerned with these matters, be they jurists or judges, penologists or
politicians, prison administrators,-police or just plain members of the public —
the actual or potential victims of crime. And though the views of these last may
rarely become articulate, they are of central importance, for the prevention of
crime, which is here our concern as a matter of abstract speculation, is for every
member of the community a matter of serious actuality.
First, then, let us consider what crime is.
It is plain that in every community professing to be civilised there must be
rules and regulations which the citizens must obey; and standards of behaviour
to which they must conform; and those rules and regulations, designed for the
benefit of all, and made by the Parliament the citizens themselves have chosen,
must be enforced. Crime, in its broadest sense, is the breach of such of these
rules as the community decides to enforce through its penal system. But these
may range from playing football in the street to being drunk while driving a
motor car; from hawking without a license to publishing a false balance sheet;
from stealing an apple to embezzling millions; from a minor assault to a
homicide or rape. In neither popular nor technical thought are all these offences
“criminal”; yet our concern is with all, since as we shall see, all may in the end
be the concern of the prison.
Apart from these distinctions of degree, opinion as to what kind of
conduct should be deemed criminal has varied widely from time to time and
from place to place; few indeed are those classes of offence of which it can be
said “quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus. .”. Even from a point of
view of legal policy there is hardly any uniformity of opinion as to whether — to
give only a few examples — attempted suicide, homosexual activities, adultery,
euthanasia and certain types of abortion should or should not be generally
treated as criminal offences and where conduct of one of these types is treated
as an offence, there is often a strong body of opinion against conviction, with no
disposition on the part ofthose who hold that opinion to consider the offenders
as criminals.
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While therefore we cannot forget that there are in the world a considerable
number of extremely wicked people, disposed when opportunity offers to get
what they want by force or fraud, with complete indifference to the rights of
others, and in ways that are inconsistent with the existence of civilised society,
we must also remember that it is not with those alone, nor mainly, that the
penal system, and therefore the prisons, are concerned. And in particular we
must avoid the pitfall of treating crime and sin as synonymous terms, and
confusing the criminal law with a code of ethics. It is not through its penal
system that society seeks to vindicate its moral basis. That system has in view a
much more limited and practical end, which we may see more clearly, so far as
concerns our own system, by the inductive process of asking what in fact are the
actions which in this country, at this time, are treated as criminal offences, a
task which I do not propose to undertake here.
These considerations haw'ng suggested the need for care in making
generalisations about criminals and crime, whether in relation to prevention or
to treatment, we now approach what Lord Justice Birkett has described as the
central problem: what is to be done when it is proved that these rules and
regulations have been broken?
The prevention of crime in the widest sense calls for action in many fields
outside that of the penal system To expect from a penal system that it should
by itself create law abiding citizens can only be regarded as a grotesque
over-estimation of its powers
The action of the courts in relation to each individual offender has a
certain ambivalence; it looks to the effect on that individual who has not been
deterred from offence by general prevention but may be prevented from
offending again; but it looks also to the effect on all who may be tempted to
commit that sort of offence. It is this ambivalence which has led to some,
though not all, of the difﬁculties that have arisen in relation to the punishment
by society of individual offenders.
Punishment is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “to cause an
offender to suffer for an offence” and legal punishment is defined by Dr
Grunhut as “a legal sanction against unlawful acts committed with a guilty
mind”. Given that to cause suffering is an evil, unless it can be justified as the
means to a good end, the problem posed has been thejustification of the use of
evil as a legal sanction.
The tendency today is to speak rather of the “treatment” than of the
“punishment” of offenders, it being always and clearly understood that
treatment may include punishment and severe punishment in a proper case. We
nowadays realise that the basic vindication of the law is that the offender is put
within the power of the court. And the court has the choice of punishment, that
is, of treatment.
It would at least appear to be in the light of such considerations that legal
punishment can today be defined as “the action which the court sees wise to
take towards a person on conviction” or “the totality of the legal consequences
ofa conviction for crime'.’
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To shorten the discussion, in which the thoughts and indeed the words of
L. W. Fox have been freely used, the whole question of prevention by deterrence
involves answering the question — what is it that the offender and/or the
potential offender fears?
The only answer that it can offer in any general way is “the totality of the
consequences of being found out”. One school of thought - a strong school
which was even stronger a century ago -— pins its faith on the severity of the
punishment. Directly opposite this is the view expressed by Margaret Wilson that
“crime decreases in every country as the pain inﬂicted for it is diminished”, and
Fox’s own statement that there is a plain lesson “to be drawn from the history
of penal law that a policy of uniform deterrent severity has never been effective
for either individual or general prevention.”
Contemporary opinion, I think, accepts that the penal system should be
strong enough to vindicate the law and that this must, therefore, lead to
punishment, and at times and in proper cases to very severe punishment. It
rejects, however, a principle that general prevention should wholly subordinate
the interests of the individual offender.
Arid here, for the ﬁrst time, I touch upon the topic subject “Treat or
Punish?” So far as prison is concerned, this is not a real alternative -—
punishment is of the essence.
To return to the totality of the consequences of being found out — and I
do not need to spell these out —- we reach a situation in which by and large,
criminal law is constantly compromising between treatment and punishment.
The only cases which might be excepted are those which either by their nature
or their apparent prevalence, bring down the- need to “satisfy the public
conscience”. In these the interests of the individual are ruthlessly and necessarily
sacriﬁced by reason of the peculiar danger to the community of such crimes —
treason, property offences of outstanding scale (the Great Train Robbery),
breaches of trust by public officials in positions of great trust.
One might, at this point, look also at the remarks of Lord Justice Asquith:
“Everyone has heard of an ‘exemplary’ sentence: and nearly everyone
agrees that at times such sentences are justified. But it is not always
observed that an exemplary sentence is unjust; and unjust to the precise
extent that it is exemplary. Assume a particular crime is becoming
dangerously frequent. In normal times, the appropriate sentence would be,
say, two years. The judge awards three; he awards the third year entirely
to deter others. This may be expedient; it may even be imperative. But one
thing it is not; it is not just. The guilt of the man who commits a crime
when it happens to be on the increase is no greater than that of another
man who commits the same crime when it is on the wane. The truth is that
in such cases the Judge is not administering strict justice by choosing the
lesser of two practical evils. He decides that a moderate injustice to the
criminal is a lesser evil than the consequences to the public of a further rise
in the crime wave”.
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There is a third category; those crimes usually associated with gross cruelty
or violence which excite repugnance and disgust, which cause us to see “red”.
But Justice is blindfolded and may not see red.
These are the reasons for punishment.‘
What are the types of punishment?
Traditionally, there are six types of punishment (involving suffering);
(1) Death;
(2) Banishment;
(3) Public shame;
(4) Physical punishment;
(5) Forfeiture of money or other property;
(6) Deprivation of liberty.
Of these, only the last two are of practical consequence here and now, and
this paper is principally concerned with the last, that is, imprisonment.
Without debating the issue, one must say that, whatever prison is for, it is
not for one clear, single understood purpose. There are three main purposes
which can be distinguished:
(a) custodial, for the unconvicted and certain other groups;
(b) coercive, for those who could secure release by paying what they
owe;
(c) correctional, for the convicted and particularly the convicted
seemingly amenable to influence for the better.
But imprisonment in its simplest form is largely the same — it deprives
each of his liberty, his right of choice and those other aspects which go to make
up the rather amorphous mass of what are called, for convenience, human rights.
A modern penal system introduces into its regime what it believes to be
inﬂuential factors; medicine, education, work training, leisure usage, spiritual
ministration, social case work and, at its end, parole. It is undoubted that many
people who have been imprisoned do not return to prison but no one has yet
found the answer to the question of Why? Previous terms and differing types of
custody can exclude imprisonment itself as a universal factor. The other factors
can come from within a wide compass of “treatment”. Which of them is most
effective, or effective at all? No one knows, though all will agree that the same
, impacts have different effects on different people. Rather pessimistically, I
wonder whether there are research techniques which can isolate the quantitative
influence of the treatment factors. Penal administrators have perforce to make
subjective judgments and the tendency is probably to include some useless items
for fear of throwing out the indistinguishable baby with the bath water.
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But all this is against a background and within a context of punishment. It
is treatment as well as punishment, and one of the most difﬁcult problems is to
devise means of counteracting, or of using constructively, the punitive elements
in the treatment programme.
Prison is legally for punishment. Sociologically, treatment directed
towards better citizenship is an accepted task of penal authorities, but wherever
conﬂict arises, as sometimes it must, there is really no choice; punishment must
prevail; it is what the law says and, in general, what the populace intends.
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THE AIMS AND PRACTICES OF THE JUVENILE
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM IN NEW SOUTH WALES
N. C. Polden*
Clearly, the object of this seminar has been to pose a provocative topic for
examination and this has been expressed in the title “Treat or Punish?” We ~
would not agree that there is in fact a true dichotomy or that these two words
describe the available alternative methods of juvenile correctional systems. The
word most commonly used in relation to such systems in this State is “train” and
we would argue that there is a real component of treatment in our training
programmes and of punishment only in so far as deprivation of liberty in itself
constitutes punishment. It is difﬁcult to convey in a paper the elements of
training or treatment in our programmes and we doubt if this can be done
merely by description. Having developed this view from our own experiences in
reading and studying descriptive material about institutional programmes
overseas, we would urge that those of you who are interested in this work would
be better able to understand the feeling and atmosphere of our juvenile
institutions by visiting them and we would welcome the opportunity to show
them to you in actual operation.
Although it is difﬁcult to convey this feeling or atmosphere in a paper, it is
at least possible to convey some of the ideas and concepts that underlie their
operation and how these are expressed in certain features of their programmes;
but we need ﬁrstly to look at some of the external factors and influences which
operate to affect institutional programmes generally.
Juvenile correctional institutions, like other instrumentalities of society,
do not exist in a social or political vacuum; nor can their aims, policies and
methods be entirely self-determined. They depend both on the attitudes and
values of the community in regard to their role, which affects their policies, and
on the ﬁnancial resources made available to them which determine their facilities
and levels of staffing and, to some extent, their programmes. The attitudes and
expectations of the community in relation to correctional systems forjuveniles
must influence the attitude of institutional staff and, most importantly, must
affect freedom to experiment and to implement substantial variations in
practices if these are likely to be out of step with what the community expects.
In this State, it is simply not feasible at present to contemplate the allocation of
resources available to such services in some states in the U.S.A. or in Europe
which, by our standards, can provide for a wide range and diversiﬁcation of
institutions, high staff/inmate ratios and for a heavy involvement of professional
staff. Again, while it is generally true that there has been a gradual modiﬁcation
of earlier concepts of retribution, punishment and deterrence in the juvenile
ﬁeld, these influences continue to exist to a greater or lesser degree in all
communities and to some extent to determine existing systems and practices.
The extent of such influences on institutional aims and practices in this State
may be arguable, but they are certainly signiﬁcant enough to be spelt out both
legally and administratively.
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Another major external factor affects institutional programmes. This is the
composition of the population for which the institution must provide, both in
quantity and quality. In this State there is no selectivity in either area and our
institutions have therefore at times been called upon to operate not only with
numbers in excess of their accepted capacity but also with a substantial
admixture of inappropriate cases where committal to an institution has
presumably been ordered in default of some more appropriate facility in the
community. For example, our institutions have been called upon to accept and
to provide for substantial numbers of identifiably disturbed adolescents because
of the unavailability or unsuitability of existing psychiatric facilities and this
group can have a disrupting influence on an institutional programme out of all
proportion to its number. While on this point, and with due recognition of the
authority conferred on Courts and of the problems which they face in disposing
of such cases, it seems reasonable to suggest that deficiencies sometimes
attributed to institutional programmes and results are determined as much by
these and other factors outside their control as by any particular qualities of
insti'intions themselves.
It is probably accepted that the main task of administration in the juvenile
field is to minimise the negative aspects of custodial and disciplinary functions
‘and to emphasise the constructive use of the opportunity to rehabilitate; to
reconcile the apparent conﬂict between responsibility to the community in this
custodial and management sense and responsibility to provide effective
rehabilitative and treatment measures for the individual. While we do not
consider these aims to be incompatible, it tests the ingenuity and skills of
administration and personnel to ensure that a balance is maintained between
them and that programmes are not distorted by too great an emphasis on either
side. In looking at this problem, a recent American study (1) suggests that
institutions as defined by their stated goals and practices may be placed into
three major categories. There is, ﬁrstly, the “obedience/conformity” institution
with a strongly authoritarian and routinised system which utilises high levels of
staff domination with many negative sanctions; secondly, the
“re-education/development” institution and emphasis on training, the provision
of more incentives and the development of closer staff/inmate relationships.
thirdly, the “treatment” institution, defined as relatively libertarian, free from
arbitrary punishment which “focuses on the psychological reconstitution of the
individual.”
Although there is not necessarily a definite line of demarcation between
these three types of juvenile institutions, it is evident that a pure “treatment”
institution by the foregoing deﬁnition is unlikely to reproduce any of the
features of the other types. Such an institution does not exist in this State and is
unlikely to exist in the foreseeable future, but in our opinion it would be
incongruous to argue that an element of treatment is absent from living
experiences in an appropriate institutional setting or independent of the
contribution which sound training programmes associated with adequate
controls and sanctions can make to the process by which the individual may
learn to adjust to reality expectations, both within and without the institution.
(1) “Organisation for treatment ..... ” — David Street, Robert Vinter and Charles
Perrow. '
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Exposed to such experiences, character strengths may be developed and
unhelpful personality traits may at least be modified. The important thing seems
to be that a “climate of treatment” should be fostered so that the training
opportunities provided for the modification of behaviour and for acquisition of
new knowledge, attitudes and skills through co-ordinated socialising, educational
and vocational programmes may be fully utilised. Such experiences may well
provide the basis and preparation for a better subsequent adjustment to normal
community living and to society as a whole. We believe that the “climate of
treatment” in our institutions rests on the development of positive relationships
between individual inmates and the institution itself, which in effect means
between inmates and staff, and that this relationship, although essentially of a
non-punitive nature, should be corrective where necessary and both controlling
and supportive at all times.
In broad terms, juvenile institutions in this State may be seen as falling
within the second category (“re-education/development”), retaining some
aspects of their expectations and procedures from the “conformity” institution
and making fairly recent and tentative steps towards a specifically treatment
orientated programme. By definition, as constituted under the Child Welfare
Act, they are “Schools for the reception, detention, maintenance, discipline,
education and training of children and young persons” and the terms employed
and particularly the term “training” are significant in determining our
programmes: they are in fact officially designated as Training Schools. A brief
appendix to this paper provides some basic, factual material about these
institutions; but the important consideration here is to examine the basic
concepts underlying their programmes and how these are implemented in
practice. We have tried to formulate these in a meaningful sequence.
FIRSTL Y, we must have and must hold to a beliefin the capacity of children
(and here we include adolescents) for healthy growth if they are given the
opportunity. As they have already, by virtue of committal, been removed from
environments which most frequently were inconsistent and often damaging to
their development, we must attempt to provide a living environment in which
they can grow and mature.
SECONDLY, and as a corollary, we must attempt to place emphasis on the
positive aspects of training and character development. We must aim to provide a
series of experiences by which youngsters may move from a fully supervised and
controlled situation into one in which they have increasing opportunities for
self-direction and consequently for learning by trial and error; and, as far as
possible, to gear their progression to individual capacities.
THIRDL Y, we believe that the vast majority of delinquents are the products of
inadequate socialisation rather than of serious emotional disturbance or real
anti-social qualities. Their deﬁcient socialisation has been reflected in inadequate
control of impulsive behaviour, inability to delay gratification or to think of
consequences and basically pleasure-seeking attitudes. We therefore see the need
for our training programmes to provide means whereby these attitudes may be
modified, if not corrected, and to provide clearly deﬁned expectations which
must be met before return to community living will be considered. This is clearly
a different concept from that of serving a speciﬁc sentence and is one reason
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why our Department strongly favours committal to an institution in general
terms except in those cases (usually nearing 18 years of age) when a committal
in speciﬁc terms may be called for. Our expectations are explicitly stated in
terms of internal goals, rewards and sanctions and in the inmates’ immediate
knowledge of failure or success in meeting these expectations. In general practice
this involves a system of points, which may be both earned and lost; progression
within groups involving additional privileges, including periods of home leave,
and even more importantly recognition and status; and in most institutions
ultimate transfer to a designated Privilege Section.
FOURTHLY, we believe that a common experience of delinquent youngsters
has been their failure to meet the generally accepted standards of success in our
community and that many of them have been identified in their home, in their
neighbourhood and in their schools as failures. We therefore see one of our
responsibilities as being to provide opportunities for recognition which are
rewarding even in the restricted institutional community to which they now
belong. The first of these is in the system of points and progression; another is in
the provision of educational, vocational and group opportunities of a more
specialised kind than normally exists in the community through which they can
hope to experience the stimulation of being involved in and successfully
completing worthwhile tasks; have the experience of learning that they can by
their own efforts meet the expectations and gain the approval of adults which
they have very often significantly failed to do in the community; and, again, by
close contact with a number of staff members, to gain the experience of forming
more satisfying relationships with adults. implicit in these aspects of our training
programmes is the accessibility of staff to inmates. Such contacts provide many
opportunities both of a formal and informal nature for youngsters to discuss
their progress, their future and their problems with different staff members and
the short-term and long-term success of this arrangement can be documented
over and over again anecdotally by reference to individual cases.
FIFTHLY, we recognise that an institutional programme does not exist in its
own right and could not separate itself even if it would from the youngsters’ past
in the community and most importantly from their future in the community.
Our Department is fortunate in that it provides a co-ordinated social service in
the community and in the majority of cases youngsters committed to
institutions will have been known to a field ofﬁcer before committal, will be
visited by him (or by a proxy) while in the institution and will continue under
his supervision after discharge. There is every reason to believe, both subjectively
and from research studies, that the after care services provided particularly in the
early stages following discharge from institutions may well be one of the most
significant features making for success or failure, and the continuity of
personalised contact provides the basis for our after care service.
From all of this it may appear as if there are no elements of doubt or of
conflicting demands in our thinking or in our training programmes. This is, of
course, far from the case either in general considerations or in relation to
particular situations or with particular staff members or inmates. The major area
of problem is still concerned with the apparent contradictions of our function to
detain and control in the legal and ostensibly authoritarian connotation of these
words and our expressed aim to train or to treat. We have already commented
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brieﬂy on these issues earlier in this paper and understand they will be the
subject of further discussion in the seminar. However, there are a few further
comments which might be relevant at this point.
In regard to our responsibility to detain, while most institutions are
“open”, some provide a measure of physical security and two small institutions
(the Institution for Girls, Hay, and the Institution for Boys, Tamworth)
speciﬁcally provide physical security for inmates who have signally failed to
remain or to respond satisfactorily in our normal institutions. At this point of
time, there are 20 inmates in these institutions out of a prospective population
at risk of some 700. For the remainder, the onus of remaining in an institution,
in keeping with the notion of growth and of internal progression, is placed
increasingly on the individual: he is increasingly trusted. In most institutions, for
most of the time, there is substantial peer group pressure against absconding
expressed in a positive and helpful way. This attitude is the product of long term
efforts to build relationships between staff and inmates and to have certain
codes of behaviour accepted internally by the majority of inmates. The
absconding rate in our institutions is relatively low in relation to comparable
institutions elsewhere, but this result is not achieved by harsh or repressive
custodial measures.
In regard to control, we see this as an essential element of the training
programme which has been already discussed. The Child Welfare Act makes
provision for certain salutary methods of punishment including the use of the
cane on inmates up to a certain age (16 for boys and 15 for girls) and for
isolated detention for inmates over 14 years of age. These provisions are invoked
only in very serious cases of misconduct and control in general is maintained
through the operation of the points system and by personal counselling. Marked
loss of points in effect means loss of status and privileges, principally recreation.
The Child Welfare Act states, and our Department rigidly enforces, an absolute
prohibition on the use of physical duress as a disciplinary measure. Apart from
the legal stipulation, we believe that such measures have no place in a
constructive training programme. We believe rather that the dignity of the
individual must be recognised and, without sacriﬁce of adult control, set out to
afford this recognition by techniques which will modify rather than reinforce
attitudes of hostility and aggression directed towards adults to which most
delinquent youngsters have been conditioned by their earlier experiences. It
would be invalid to put forward the proposition that all institutional staff are
equally capable of'operating on this level, but we attempt to incorporate a
philosophy of control in our institutions based on this principle, and to educate
our staff in its day-to-day application.
In regard to treatment in the more speciﬁc use of the term, we provide a
psychological assessing and counselling service both in our Remand Centres and
in institutions and have the services of two psychiatrists to whom particular
cases may be referred and who are available for general consultation with
institutional staff. Recently we have inaugurated discussion groups at two
institutions involving educational and supervisory staff and the extension of this
scheme, which already appears to have been benficial, particularly in staff
development, to other institutions is planned; but again the accessibility to
inmates of staff generally and in this connection particularly of administrative
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staff with training and experience in case work forms the basis
of treatment of
individuals.
We have refrained from making any forecast about the future of corr
ective
practices in the juvenile ﬁeld in this State but this does not mean that we a
re
unaware of deﬁciencies within our system and of desirable are
as of
improvement. Some of these are merely listed:-
.(a) Smaller institutions and smaller groups within institutions;
(b) Improved staff training;
(c) Extension of group work;
(d) More appropriate and varied educational, vocational and
trade
training;
(e) Improved after care.
Each of these aspects is important in its own right but our belief, based on
the importance which we attach to the relationships developed in institu
tions
between staff and inmates, is that the areas of staff training and
the extension of
group work involving staff are most important and these are currently rece
iving
particular attention. It appears that our institutions for juveniles will continue t
o
evolve steadily along lines already deﬁned without any dramatic change o
f
policy or practice: that there will be further modiﬁcation of custodial aspect
s
and correspondingly increasing emphasis on treatment, gradual enrichment o
f
programmes and improvements in stafﬁng, both quantitatively and qualitativel
y,
and in the greater involvement of professional staff at both treatment and
consultative levels.
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Appendix
There are somevl,200 juveniles in custody in institutions and shelters
(remand centres) in this State. Of these approximately 1,000 are in institutions
and the remainder in shelters.
There are four major shelters in the metropolitan area, two of which
provide exclusively for boys, one exclusively for girls and one for both boys and
girls, and two smaller local shelters at Newcastle and Broken Hill.
The function of shelters in terms of the Child Welfare Act is to provide for,
the reception and temporary detention and maintenance of children and young
persons. Having regard to this function and to the transitory nature of the
population for which they provide, they are designed to afford a substantial
measure of physical security. In respect of those youngsters committed to
institutions, medical, psychological and, where appropriate, educational
assessments are made within the shelters and on this and other relevant material
decisions are made regarding institutional allocation. Although allocation is
. primarily on the basis of age, individual differences and needs are taken into
account.
The four metropolitan shelters are:
(a) Metropolitan Boys’ Shelter, Sydney, associated with the
Metropolitan Children’s Court and providing for boys 16 years and
over. Accepted maximum capacity 30: current population 23.
(b) Metropolitan Girls’ Shelter, Glebe, situated in reasonable proximity
to the Metropolitan Children’s Court and providing for girls of all
ages, most of whom are 15 years or over. Accepted maximum
capacity 25: current population 23.
(c) Yasmar Hostel, Haberfield, associated with Ashfield Children’s Court
and providing for boys under 16 years of age with two separate,
self-contained sections accommodating junior and senior groups.
Accepted maximum capacity 50: current population 38.
(d) Minda Remand Centre, Lidcombe, associated with Lidcombe
Children’s Court and providing for both boys and girls of all ages up
to 18 years; the most recently completed shelter (opened in 1966)
providing all facilities normally associated with a modern remand
centre. Two separate, self-contained sections are provided for both
boys and girls. Accepted maximum capacity 115: current total
population 94.
There are two major institutions providing for girls and four major
institutions providing for boys. In addition there are two restricted institutions
(Institution for Girls, Hay, and Institution for Boys, Tamworth) whose purpose
was indicated in the main paper. They have a respective capacity of 14 and 25.
Each of the other institutions has in common the aims and features previously
described although these are naturally expressed differently in terms of facilities
is
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and programmes having regard to such considerations as the sex, age and social
development of inmates. With the exception of the institution at Tamworth, all
institutions for boys are conducted in accordance with the concept of “open”
training and therefore without physical means of containment. Those for girls
afford at least a measure of physical security although the Privilege Cottages at
Ormond, School are similarly “open” and girls from both major institutions
participate freely in activities outside the institutions themselves.
These institutions are:-
(a)
(b)
(C)
(d)
0rm0nd School, Thornleigh, which provides primarily for girls of
school age although accepting older girls with less serious delinquent
histories. It is a modern institution opened in 1962 and making
provision on a basis of four dormitories for a complement of 100
girls and for an additional 22 girls in Privilege Cottages detached
from and outside the main institution. The basic emphasis in this
institution is on socialisation through the educational programme.
Accepted maximum capacity 122: current population 115.
Training School for Girls, Parramatta, which provides for girls in the
post school age group (from 15 to 18 years). An older institution
which has been gradually modiﬁed and where substantial extensions
are currently proposed to provide more adequate and modern
educational and vocational facilities. It likewise operates on a
dormitory basis with seven dormitories, two of which are regarded as
semi-privileged sections towards which progression is encouraged,
with a separate Privilege Cottage within the main grounds of the
institution. Accepted maximum capacity 168: current population
140.
Training School for Boys, Mittagong, which provides for boys from
the statutory age of responsibility (8 years) to approximately school
leaving age. This is an older institution of cottage home type with
eight different cottages (and a Hospital Home) staffed by married
couples. and each providing for a complement in the vicinity of 20
boys. The range and diversity of these cottages permits ofa ﬂexible
policy in regard to the internal allocation or transfer between
cottages of youngsters. Again, because of the age range, there is
substantial emphasis on socialising experiences within the cottages
and on the educational programme. Accepted maximum capacity
180: current population 160.
Daruk Training School, South Windsor, provides for boys in the
younger adolescent age group, in the main between 14 and 16 years,
with a degree of flexibility in allocation based on individual
considerations. This is a modern institution opened in 1960 with
excellent facilities. It operates on a dormitory system with four
“Houses”, each accommodating 50 boys the majority of whom are
involved in an educational programme which places special emphasis
on remedial education and on the development of craft skills.
Accepted maximum capacity 200: current population 190.
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(e)
(0
Mt Penang Training School, Gosford, which provides for older
adolescent youths, primarily between 16 and 18 years of age.
Because of the provisions of the Child Welfare Act, a proportion of
inmates of this institution who have been committed for specific
periods are over 18 years of age before they are discharged; in a
limited number of cases, inmates who have been sentenced to a
period of imprisonment for serious offences have been ordered to
serve their sentence in this institutionvor have been transferred from
prison to this institution in terms of the Act. This is an older
institution, also organised on a dormitory basis with four
dormitories each providing desirably for a maximum complement of
50 boys and with a separate Privilege Cottage providing for an
additional 20 boys. Although an older institution, facilities for both
educational and vocational training at Mt Penang are extensive and
emphasis is directed towards the acquisition of knowledge and skills
in a variety of areas. Prior to the opening of Daruk Training School
in 1960, Mt Penang was forced to carry numbers far in excess of the
desirable level and its population is still above what is considered to
be appropriate for an institution of its type. However, the
Department is currently building a new institution to be known as
“Yawarra” at Kurri which is expected to be in operation within a
year and which will substantially relieve Mt Penang. Accepted
maximum capacity 220: current population 280.
St Helier's, Muswellbrook, which provides for a particular group of
boys from secondary school age to 18 years. These are selected on
the basis of limited delinquent history and anticipated
responsiveness to a less controlled environment than initially exists
at Daruk Training School or Mt Penang Training School. St Heliels
functions as a cottage home type institution with five separate
cottages, one of which operates as a Privilege Cottage, each staffed
by married couples.lt is situated in excellent pastoral country in the
Upper \Hunter Valley and older boys receive specific training in
agricultural and pastoral activities, while those of school age have the
same educational facilities provided as at other institutions. Accepted
maximum capacity 98: current population 60.
The Department’s immediate‘ plans provide for the completion of an
institution for boys at Kurri, already mentioned, and for the early acquisition of
a property for an additional institution for girls.
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CONFLICT BETWEEN GOALS AS VIEWED BY THE COURT
The Hon. Mr Justice J. H. McClemens*
Almost at the end of his great book “Alexander Maconochie” Sir John
Barry wrote:
“A great American judge, Mr Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, once asked:
‘What have we better than a blind guess to show that the criminal law in its
present form does more good than harm? I do not stop to refer to the
effect which it has had in degrading prisoners and in plunging them further
into crime, or to the question whether ﬁne and imprisonment do not fall
more heavily on a criminal’s wife and children than on himself. I have in
mind more far-reaching questions. Does punishment deter? Do we deal
with criminals on proper principles?’ Mankind has made little progress
towards final answers to these questions, but in all civilised countries the
search for them goes on in a climate of opinion created by a body of
reformers among whom Maconochie was outstanding. Except when
emotion aroused by some deed of horror distorts calm judgment,
vindictive punishment is no longer recommended as the solution of the
problem of crime. The exigencies of maintaining society as a going concern
occupy us largely, but not entirely; we no longer identify the best that
can now be managed with the best that can be achieved. It is right that this
should be so, for recognition of the limitations of our knowledge and the
imperfections of our machinery should at least prevent us from falling
victims to a dogmatism that results from ignorance and intolerance.”
As each year goes by I become more convinced of the rightness of that
passage and I become more convinced of the sterile and crimogenic qualities of
imprisonment. It may be there are no alternatives but it is I think desirable that
Judges should face the implications of the processes of status degradation and
depersonalisation involved in the existence of a society of captives. We should be
aware that a prisoner community exists and has real effects on men who are
incarcerated based upon their social rejection and that prisoners are attracted as
conditions of survival to the prisoner group. This would be so no matter how
good gaols were. It is independent of physical maltreatment, but it stems from
the perpetual reminder that a man is a prisoner and being a prisoner the pain of
imprisonment lessens the more he moves to prison solidarity. I understand that
it happens that many prisoners become so used to maximum security conditions
that they are threatened when moved to open institutions and cannot stand
being in a place without fences round it.
Those ideas are not my own but have been gleaned by me over the period I
have been on the Bench and while I was at the Bar from many sources —— prison
ofﬁcers, chaplains and in the past even from prisoners themselves.
When one has said all that one has to ask — what alternative is there to
imprisonment in 1968 as the sanction for major breaches of the criminal law? Or
is there an alternative way which emphasizes treatment more and punitive
conﬁnement less?
 
*B_A.,LL.B. (Sydney), a Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
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Can one nakedly put the alternatives as starkly as “Treat or Punish”? One
has to live in a political world — and I am using “political” in its wide and no
t its
narrow sense — in which there are wide varieties of crimes and wide varieti
es of
people who commit them.
Often it is the young man who commits the atrocious or irresponsible
crime that would seem to be the most appropriate subject for treatment, yet
because of the very atrocity or irresponsibility of what he has done public
opinion, at least as represented by the press, would prevent a philosophy of
treatment being applied by Courts to such crimes.
This problem is referred to in a passage in the Report of President
Johnson’s Commission on Crime in the United States at page 141 where this is
said “There is no decision in the criminal process that is as complicated and
difficult as the one made by the sentencing judge. A sentence prescribes
punishment, but it also should be the foundation of an attempt to rehabilitate
the offender, to insure that he does not endanger the community, and to deter
others from similar crimes in the future. Often these objectives are mutually
inconsistent, and the sentencing judge must choose one at the expense of the
others. A man who has committed murder in a moment of extreme emotion
may require no correctional program and may present no significant threat to
the general safety, but few judges would be likely to respond to an offence so
heinous by suspending the offender’s sentence or granting him probation.”
At one end of the criminal spectrum one has the planned crime that
involves no emotional disturbance or anything other than quite a calculated
expectation of adequate monetary or other gain right through to the offence
which can scarcely be regarded as the work of a morally responsible person even
though he is fully legally responsible within the deﬁnitions of mental disease as
enunciated by the Courts.
Another reason why the alternative “Treat or Punish?” does not cover the
whole field is because in recent years increasing attention has been paid to
organised crime — a phenomenon that hitherto has rarely engaged the attention
of Judges in the Criminal Courts of this country. The effects of organised crime
are more likely to be seen in Taxation Boards of Review than in trials on
indictment.
According to an article published in the “Financial Review” of the 16th
April, 1968:
“American industry has been warned by the Research Institute o
f
America, a major advisory service, that organised criminals are attempting
to take over business of every size and description through fraud and
threats of violence.” —— “The criminals have gained a foothold in many
communities and industries including some major banking industries and
Watt Street Securities ﬁrms.”
“Legitimate business has become a prime target for organised crime
because it provides a legitimate front, a market for ‘hot’ goods, an outlet
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for investing its enormous capital, a cover for illegal pay-offs, the
insulation of respectability and last but not least an important and useful
source of power.”
If anyone believes that is an exaggerated statement let him read chapter 7
on Organised Crime in the RepOrt of the President’s Commission p.187 et seq, or
the working paper prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations
Organisation to the Third United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders at Stockholm in August 1965. I annex a copy’
of a passage from this working paper “Social Change and Criminality” for your
information.
“45. Another pattern of criminal behaviour which the modern complex
society with its advanced methods of communication and transport, and
its scientific technology, has made possible is that of organised crime.
Organised crime was not unknown in the past; there was the thuggee
society of India, for instance, whose members were reputedly votaries of
the Goddess Kali and who murdered and robbed in her name. But
contemporary organised crime is different in its organisation and methods
of making money; it is subtle, sophisticated and preserves the semblance of
respectability through a general avoidance of violence and through the use
of legitimate techniques of business. The proﬁts from such organised
crime are enormous; the difficulties of destroying such criminal enterprises
are no less enormous. In a recent article on organised'. crime in the United
States (The New York Times, I4 February 1965, p.65) it was observed
that the ‘underworld penetration of business and industry has reached a
degree undreamed of a generation ago’, and that crime syndicates ‘have
taken over bowling alleys, real estate holdings, food packaging concerns,
industrial plants, Wall Street brokerage houses and trucking companies,
and to be eating their way into banks, union welfare funds, the
construction industry and other components of the national economy’.
Further, that ‘investigating bodies have been told that organised gambling
involves 7 billion dollars a year in the United States, that loan sharks take
I billion dollars and that the narcotics trade comes to 350,000 million
millions of dollars’.
46; There are also the international aspects of organised crime, to wit the
theft and disposal of art objects, the traffic in narcotics, the smuggling of
pharmaceutical drugs and other goods and forbidden traffic in armaments.
47. Still another pattern of criminal activity which the complex social
institutional structure of modern society makes possible is that of white
collar criminality. In some of the developed countries, the existence of a
multiplicity of ﬁnancial institutions and the way in which they are often
interlocked with other business organisations such as brokerage houses,
investment firms, insurance companies and the like, make it possible for
unscrupulous bankers, brokers and business partners to harvest millions of
dollars of proﬁt through prescient purchase of stocks, shares and securities
or through expert manipulation of investment funds. It seems hardly
necessary to cite cases in individual countries; wherever there exist
complex, and sometimes interlocking, business and financial institutions,
there invariably exist also ample opportunities for fraud.
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48. Apart from white collar criminality in the stock market, there i
s also
the opportunity which social progress brings for an increase in other typ
es
of white collar criminality. These types include misuse of funds held
in
trust for others, fraudulent advertising and sales, cheating on income tax
and payment of inheritance duties and the like, illegal fee-splitting, etc.
Perhaps, there should be included also in this category of white collar
criminality the greater opportunities for graft and corruption which an
increase in governmental activity tends to provide.
49. One particular feature of white collar criminality which would bear
special comment is its corrupting influence on the general population.
Social change, it has been pointed out, implies a change in the values and a
change in behaviour, and in times of rapid change the values and behaviour
are in a state of constant flux; there are few fixed points of reference. It is
all the more incumbent, therefore, on the leaders of a society — leaders in
business, government, commerce and in social life — to try to set standards
which the general population can aspire to. The standards are often set,
however, by the success of white collar criminality. Malfeasance in ofﬁce,
the impunity of such operation, and the relative immunity from
prosecution which such malefactors seem to enjoy, tends to conﬁrm the
general impression that such crime does in fact pay; the basic
perniciousness of the values and the behaviour becomes hidden, and what
emerges is a value and behavioural system which is accepted because it
seems pragmatic and profitable.”
Organised crime in Australia is much more prevalent,
I fear, than most of
us think and there is much in the techniques of the modern
media of
communication and of the methods adopted by large retail organisat
ions and by
traders which even if not strictly illegal have, to use the words of
the United
Nations Paper, a “corrupting inﬂuence on the general population” which re
sults
in “the basic perniciousness of the values and the behaviour becomes hidden
,
and what emerges is a value and behavioural system which is accepted becau
se it
seems pragmatic and profitable.” Organised crime is not capable of being d
ealt
with by treatment. It is only capable of being dealt with by an elevation of the
moral and the religious standards of the community and where it is discovered
and established by legal processes punishment or dispossession of ﬁnancial
beneﬁts would seem to be the only form of control.
However, by and large the inhabitants of docks in Crim
inal Courts all over
this city and State are pretty pitiful and inadequate
specimens of humanity,
none of whom ever seem to indicate that crime does pay. I
t may pay for the big
operators but not for the ones we catch up with. The reci
divists particularly
indicate to those who are prepared to read the signs that our
present system of
sentences followed by sentences followed again by further sen
tences fails as a
measure of crime prevention.
I conclude these preliminary observations with Dostoevsky’s dictum:
“with ready—made notions one cannot judge all crime. lts philosophy is a
little
more complicated than people think” and turn to an examination of
the
conflict. This conﬂict has been summed up by Sheldon Glueck in his book “Law
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and Psychiatry” subtitled “War or Entente Cordiale”. In view of Glueck
’s
worldwide authority and reputation I take the liberty of setting a passage out in
full:- (p.6 et seq).
“Though usually only implicit, the freedom/determinism issue is
fundamental to criminal law and penology . . . The reason for this
multiform realistic signiﬁcance of the free will/determinism argumentation
is that it contributes heavily to the definition of the water-shed between
those who stress the prime social need of blame-worthiness and retributive
punishment as the core-concept in crime and justice and those who, under
the impact of psychiatric, psychoanalytic, socialogical, and
anthropological views, insist that man’s choices are the product of forces
largely beyond his conscious control, and that simply to blame and punish
is neither to understand nor to cure the offender, nor in the long run to
protect society.
The jurist who claims that the Criminal law is built on the reality of
intentional and controllable wrongdoing, holds the offender both morally
blameworthy and legally culpable because, he claims, the offender could
have avoided doing the prohibited act. The jurist thereby expresses a face
of truth based on his interpretation of experience. The psycho-analyst who
insists that human behaviour is largely conditioned by subconscious forces
and by crucial experiences of early, dependent childhood concludes that
the attitude towards human failing should be sympathetic and therapeutic
rather than condemnatory and punitive. Thereby he too is expressing an
aspect of truth. And the geneticist, who reminds us realistically of a
feature of the problem which many behavioural and social scientists tend
to ignore — that there are such tough, and as yet unyielding, substances as
genes and protoplasm — is likewise expressing an aspect of truth.
Who shall decide, when doctors disagree,
And soundest casuists doubt, like you and me?
Can these apparently contradictory truths be reasonably
accommodated?
It is important that this be done, for these conﬂicts of basic and
emotionally charged belief lead to misunderstandings and clashes of policy
and action in daily practice.
Thus the judge, concerned at the trial or in appellate decisions with
concepts of conscious, intentional wrongdoing, guilt and punishment,
tends to be suspicious of the positivistic and therapeutic attitudes of the
psychiatrist, who seeks and often ﬁnds causative chains which to him
explain the dynamics of antisocial behaviour. To the typical jurist the
doctrine, “tout comprendre c’est tout pardonner” is fraught with danger
to society. He believes that under the mistakenly beneﬁcent sun of
modern clinical explanations of criminalism, the moral wings of Icarus
have already been melted too far and that mankind is in danger of falling
into a sea of self-destruction through the soft doctrine of
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“permissiveness”, of therapy in place of punishment, and of too ready
verdicts of “not guilty by reason of insanity.” The jurist tends to believe
that what is needed is stern, albeit fair, punishment for conscious and
deliberate wrongdoing which, he is convinced, could have been avoided.
He fortifies his position on the grounds of both “just retribution” and
deterrence of the offender and prospective wrongdoers. He is willing,
nowadays, to concede that perhaps something ought to be done to help
the criminal once he has been formally convicted and has “paid the price”
of his blameworthiness; but he is inclined to imply that this is the “quality
of mercy” rather than any right and reason deriving from the attribution
of criminality largely to forces beyond the conscious ken and control of
the offender.
The typical psychiatrist, on the other hand, concerned as he is with
understanding and therapy in the individual case, tends at the trial to
overlook his role as a member of the collectivity of society whilst
emphasising his mission as clinician and doctor. If argued with, it is likely
that he would not completely exempt delinquents and criminals of all
blame, any more than he relieves his own children of all blame. In his
practice he deals often with the reality of the feeling of guilt — both its
destructive and its therapeutic currents. Even while insisting on the
dominance of subconscious motivation and of early parent-child affective
and disciplinary relationships in determining the mental state and
behavioural tendencies of his adult patient, he holds him “responsible” to
meet the psychotherapeutic session-hours on time and to pay his bills with
reasonable promptitude.
The psychiatrist has also observed that with the progress of the
therapeutic efforts and the release in the disturbed person of repressed
materials, the patient gains in understanding, conﬁdence and power —
qualities which might be equated with gain in the quantum of
old-fashioned “freedom of will”. The psychiatrist has seen, too, that even
when on a level of conscious communication he sympathetically
encourages the patient to control his impulses and improve his efforts and
conduct, the patient often shows surprising capacity to do so. The
psychiatrist also knows of instances, on the other hand, where the
comfortable, protected environment of a private mental hospital has
induced certain patients to cling to their illnesses, when, with some effort
on their part as well as encouragement and therapy by the doctor, they
would have developed enough capacity for intelligent choice and
self-control to enable them to step once more into the arena of life on the
outside. .
It would seem, then, that the psychiatrist’s personal experience must
raise doubts in his mind about the imperious and universal sway of
deterministic cause-and-effect in human mind and conduct.
As far as the law is concerned, the conditions of guilt and
punishability are set forth with what many judges regard as adequate
clarity but about which perceptive legal scholars have'long expressed
scepticism. For example, of the well-known concept of “criminal intent”
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in the law, Dean Roscoe Pound long ago said.: “Historically, our
substantive criminal law is based on a theory of punishing the vicious will.
It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right
and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong. It assumes that the
social interest in the genera] morals is to be maintained by imposing upon
him a penalty corresponding exactly to the gravity of his offence."
The conflict of which Glueck speaks is accentuated by the fact that the
judiciary in ademocracyhave to function in public under the gaze of cynical and
dishonest media of communication and a public that is liable to call for heavy
punishment when emotions are involved even though cooler reason might
indicate that the long range interests of society could be met in an appropriate
case by treatment. Sir Lionel Fox wrote: “I suspect the two basic assumptions
of public opinion are still the feeling that evil-doing should be met by retributive
justice of an unpleasant character and that the principle of less eligibility should
prevail”. Quoted from “Crime and its Correction” by John P. Conrad, p.79.
One is bound in honesty to ask oneself whether part of this conflict is due
to the fact that the judiciary as a body do not know where they are going and
have not worked out a valid basis of sentencing.
It may be. that in the present state of human knowledge and political
development a .valid basis of sentencing cannot be worked out and the best one
can do is to work along pragmatic lines based on the supposed needs of an
ordered society. But that raises the question — is our sentencing good enough for
those needs? Glueck in the book to which I earlier referred says at page 135: “It
is high time it was generally realised that persistent delinquent and criminal
behaviour cannot be ‘cured’ by either the threat or the execution of
pain-inflicting punishment. The chief reason for this is that the appeal to fear is
an appeal to but one constituent of the total deeprooted personality involved in
wrong-doing. Published prison statitistics generally and the intensive follow-up
studies which Mrs Glueck and l have conducted over the years specifically, have
demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that the product of routine penal
administration is much more likely to be recidivism than reform.”
“The Young Adult Offender — A Review of Current Practices and
Programmes in Prevention and Treatment” produced by United Nations in 1965
refers to “the general experience that persons and especially young adults who
are sent to prison do not necessarily improve but very often become more crime
prone than they were before through the influence of the bad elements to which
they are exposed in prison. This experience completely changes their set of
values giving them an anti-social orientation and they are confirmed in this
attitude by the ostracism of society which makes it well-nigh impossible for the
young adult convict, even if he has the best intentions, to find a useful place in
the community after his release from an institution.” (page 72).
These views cannot be reconciled with the decisions of the Courts to
which I shall refer later and express a philosophy different fromtthem.
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When one comes to the consideration of the sentencing ofﬁce of the Judge
or Magistrate one has to remember it is a Law which he has to administer. This is
his basic postulate. He does not make the law; whether it is good or bad his
obligation to administer it is the same; his power to adapt the law to
circumstances is very limited. The judiciary have to try and work out within the
ambit of the sections of the Acts of Parliament concerned and the decisions of
Appellate Courts a sort of “rough and ready” seeming uniformity. The Judge,
though in one sense independent, is in reality an instrumentality of Government
and Government has to keep order and essential services going. Within the law he
administers he has very limited scope and has to be by virtue of his ofﬁce
conservative. Basically the Judge’s function is associated with the preservation
and strengthening of a system. A Judicial Ofﬁcer might regard the impulse
buying mechanisms of modern shops as more morally indefensible and
reprehensible than the behaviour of the person in the store who, instead of
succumbing to the deliberately created impulse to buy something he does not
want, succumbs to the impulse to take without paying. The Judge still has to
punish the shop-lifter though the vendor through his own public relations
organisation is the direct creator of the impulse to which the shop-lifter
succumbs. The youth who buys the car advertised to be able to do 125 miles an
hour or who uses a petrol that is claimed to be more powerful and who drives
too fast and kills someone else is doing something that the morally indefensible
advertising is encouraging him to do. But he is still to be punished. We have seen
in the last few years large companies encouraging people with no credit stability
to open accounts with them on the calculated basis that the extra business
gained by such methods will outweigh the foreseen and calculated bad debts
incurred by people who just cannot afford to pay for the goods they have been
encouraged to purchase. But that does not diminish the legal responsibility of
the person who obtains these goods by false pretences even though the
representatives of the companies concerned gave credit not caring whether the
information on the credit application was true or false and with knowledge that
some of it was false even though the business concerned could by easy methods
have discovered cases in which commitments far exceeded income.
It is in the background of a society of this type that the Judge publicly has
to work and to seek to prevent by deterrence and to reform by punishment in
the circumstances described by Glueck and the United Nations Publication.
Perhaps an impossible feat.
I turn now to the various theories on which the Court sends men to gaol.
Basically the proposition is that punishment deters others and the offender
himself, a proposition which is I think unprovable both positively or negatively.
Whether the theory of deterrence is valid or not and should be replaced by one
of social defence we will, I believe, have the deterrent theory of imprisonment
with us for a long time and the grey stone walled century old places of
incarceration show no sign at the moment of being replaced. These will remain
with us well into the 21st Century and longer as practically indestructible
monuments.
I propose now to examine the decisions of the Courts on sentencing to see
if and how they illuminate the conﬂict between punishment and treatment.
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The ﬁrst category on which one can divide sentences is on the basic of the
Tariff system against individualization. As Glanville Williams says:
“ . . . .the attitude of the courts has always been that there is in gromz'o
judicis a moral scale which enables the judge to pronounce what quantum
of punishment is justly appropriate to what offence. This is the
punishment that fits the crime . . . . The just punishment may be reduced
by reference to the circumstances of the particular criminal . . . but it may
not be increased by reason of any special circumstances relating to the
offender as opposed to the offence, for such an increase would be unjust.”
He is speaking of the “Tariff System”.
The Tariff System has the claimed advantage that it prevents disparate
sentences and the Courts particularly in England have attempted to prevent the
extension of this tendency and have sought to lay down what is in effect a code
of sentences — so much for this. so much for that-
The drawback of the Tariff System is that it can result in persons capable
of rehabilitation, who should not be so sentenced, being sent to gaol.
lndividualisation of sentences can lead to a sense of injustice because one
man will get a much heavier sentence than a man with more convictions for a
more serious offence because of an individual Judge’s particular ideas. Of course
it is axiomatic that Judges’ philosophies of sentencing vary greatly and that
differing Judges will impose differing types of sentence.
The Courts have not as yet resolved the question of the true nature, limit
and extent of the Tariff System nor the individualisation of sentencing.
A “treatment” centred theory of sentencing must be based on
individualisation but the Courts it seems are moving more to “consistency” in
sentencing which is in reality the tariff system. A convincing argument against
the Tariff System is R. v. Ball (35 CAR. 164 at 165) —
“In deciding the appropriate sentence a court should always be guided by
certain considerations. The ﬁrst and foremost is the public interest. The
criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing
crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in
public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who
might be tempted to try crime asseeming to offer easy money on the
supposition that if the offender is caught and broughtt‘o justice, the
punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the
particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induce him to turn
from a criminal to an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and
best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to
honest living. Our law does not, therefore, fix the sentence for a particular
crime but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the court to decide
what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal
in the particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each
crime, but in regard to each criminal, the court has the right and the duty
to decide whether to be lenient or severe.”
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From my reading of the reported cases and knowledge of the various types
of prison sentences imposed I have sought to make a rough division of the
theories which seem to be expressed by Courts from time to time in working out
sentences. This division may well highlight the conﬂict we are considering.
Practically every sentence involves more than one of these theories. The division
I have made is completely arbitrary and in the notes that follow I do not
propose to deal with all of them because some overlap so much with others.
The theories which the Courts seem to express are:
(l) Punitive.
(2) Retributive.
(3) Denunciatory.
(4) Deterrent.
(5) Exemplary.
(6) Preventative.
(7) Protective.
(8) Rehabilitative.
(9) Reformative.
(10) Therapeutic.
(] 1) Educational.
The Punitive Theory:
In the case of Whittaker, 28 SR. 412, a man was charged with the murder
of his wife but was acquitted of that and convicted of manslaughter. He was
sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment by the trial Judge but on appeal by the
Crown this sentence was increased to 5 years’ penal servitude. At p.419 P.W.,
Street C.J. said: “The jury found that his wife’s death was the result of
unjustifiable violence of some kind which she met at his hands. That is all that
was involved in their ﬁnding and the Judge’s duty then was to consider all the
circumstances surrounding the crime for himself and to determine what in his
opinion would be a fitting punishment.”
Withers’ case, 1925 SR. at 382, was another case of a man charged with
murdering his wife who was found guilty of manslaughter under intense
provocation and with a strong recommendation to mercy. In that case the
sentence was on a Crown Appeal increased to 7 years. The. judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeal spoke at p.394 of “severe punishment”, "increased
punishment” and “permissible degrees of punishment”. In the much later case of
R. v. Simpson, 76 Weekly Notes at p.589, a sentence of 3 years for
manslaughter was increased to 5 years, the Court of Criminal Appeal referring to
the three aspects of punishment to which consideration has to be given, namely,
the punitive, the deterrent and the reformatory. In none of these cases was there
any prospect of repetition by the convicted men and in Simpson’s case his wife
(whose lover he had killed) found the three boys of the marriage so completely
out of control that she successfully petitioned to have him released to pull the
family back together which was done after he served less than 2 years.
Simpson’s case was decided in 1959 so it would appear that punishment as
an end in itself is still an aspect of the Court’s approach to the problem of
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sentencing though the 1958 case ascompared to the cases of 30 years earlier
referred to two other aspects.
You may remember the case of George Blake, 45 CAR. p.292. Blake was
an ofﬁcer in the British Foreign Service who at one stage of his career was a
prisoner in Russia and while a prisoner became converted to Communism and
decided to dedicate his life to the cause of Communism. For no money or other
material beneﬁt for a period of some 8 years he spied and communicated
information to the Soviet Union.
He was sentenced to 14 years on each of ﬁve charges the ﬁrst three
sentences to be cumulative, the last two to be concurrent. This was an effective
sentence of 42 years. Apparently the view of the Lord Chief Justice who
sentenced Blake was that he should, less remissions, remain in prison for 30
years.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal, p.298, emphasises the
punitive aspect of the sentence. What it said was this: “It is of the highest
importance. . . . that such conduct . . .should receive when brought to justice
the severest possible punishment. This sentence had a three-fold purpose; it was
intended to'be punitive, it was designed and calculated to deter others and it was
meant to be a safeguard to this country.”
The Retributive Theory:
There is very little about retribution in the modern cases though’ the
retributory theory is bitten fairly deep into the administration of the criminal
sanctions of our law. Though there are various aspects of retribution as an
element of criminal sentences which are discussed in the recent book “Crime and
Punishment in Britain” by Nigel Walker at p.128, it has of recent years not been
greatly emphasised in our Courts. However, in 1952 in Goodrich’s case in the
Court of Criminal Appeal of this State, 70 W.N. p.42, there is a reference to it in
the judgment of K.W. Street,C.J. at p.42 where His Honour says: “It has to be
borne in mind that in imposing a sentence this Court must always give careful
consideration to three aspects of the case.. There is the retributive aspect, the
reformatory aspect and the deterrent aspect.”
In R. v. Aitken, 61 N.S.W.R. at p. 914 the Court of Criminal Appeal of
this State said: “The retributive aspect of punishment must be given full weight.
Perhaps this would be met in this case by the exposure of the crime, the arrest of
the applicant, the disgrace with which it is accompanied, and the disruption of
his life of previous good character. We do not think that the applicant is likely to
be led or to fall again into a crime of dishonesty. His school and family
background should be a guarantee of this.” Then Their Honours go on: “But
there remains the question of the deterrent aspect.” and proceed to deal with
that.
The Denunciatory Theory:
This theory is based on the public assertion that this type of thing cannot
be permitted by a civilised community and will meet with severe penalties. I
have referred earlier under the heading of “Punishment” to Blake’s case. In
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addition to the punitive element and judgment of the Court
of Criminal Appeal
referred to the fact that Blake’s conduct “should not only sta
nd condemned but
should be held by all ordinary men and women in utter abhorrenc
e.”
On the 24th April of this year, according to a newspaper report a
Judge at
Quarter Sessions said: “I want to record my and the community
’s displeasure at
this type of attack and let the sentences be a warning to others.”
The recent English case of R. v. Llewellyn Jones, 51 CAR. 204, is stated
in a note in 84 L.Q.R. p.14 to be an example of the denunciatory sentence. That
was a case in which a County Court Registrar in England embezzled funds
belonging to a paralysed youth of 21 and to a mentally deficient man. He was
sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment and on his appeal the Court of Criminal
Appeal said: “This Court is quite satisﬁed that this is not a deterrent sentence, it
is a sentence which is fully merited in the opinion of this Court as punishment
for very grave offences and is expressing a revulsion to the public of the whole
circumstances of the case.” -
The Deterrent Theory:
The deterrent theory of sentences for centuries has underlain th
e English
philosophy of criminal punishment. It is one that is still ve
ry much in the
forefront of the minds of lawyers. It also receives much criticism i
n the writings
of criminologists and psychiatrists. It was the deterrent theory
of criminal
punishment that induced Baron Hotham to refuse to respite the
judgment of
death on a boy of 10 who had been found guilty of secreting notes at
a post
ofﬁce. His Lordship referred to the infinite danger of its going abroa
d into the
world that a child might commit such a crime with impunity. This b
oy was
under sentence of death for 9 years having been tried in 1748 and pard
oned in
1757. (Radzinowicz — “A History of the Criminal Law”, p.13).
This State has recently in respect of certain types of offence committed
itself to heavier sentences by recent amendments of the Crimes Act and of t
hese
sentences the Court of Criminal Appeal of this State has recently said, in R. v.
Donaldson (as yet unreported): “This is a clear and recent direction to courts by
Parliament that such a crime demands heavier punishment than was formerly the
case. This direction stems, we have no doubt, from a recognition by Parliament
of the prevalence of armed robberies of the very type now under consideration,
and emphasises that Parliament has indicated that one of the principal elements
in punishment for such crimes is the deterrent aspect. Courts must henceforth
cease to be weakly merciful and inflict such heavy and substantial punishment as
will deter the actual criminals and those who may contemplate like crimes.”
The deterrent theory underlay Lord Ellenborough’s opposition to the
abolition of the death penalty for thefts of ﬁve shillings or upwards, and caused
him to say in the House of Lords: “Your Lordships will pause before you assent
to a measure so pregnant with danger for the security of property. The learned
Judges are unanimously agreed that the expediency of justice and public security
require there should not be a remission of this part of the criminal law.”
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Another well-know example of the deterrent and other elements is found
in the case of the great mail train robbery in August 1963 when the postal train
from Glasgow to London was held up and attacked by a gang of robbers not less
than 15 in number who stole approximately two and a half million pounds.
Some of the principals in this adventure received sentences of 30 years’
imprisonment. It was regarded by the English Court of Criminal Appeal, R. v.
Wilson & 0rs, 48 CAR. 329 at p.333, “as an Act of organised banditry at a vital
public service and it had the character of an act of warfare against the
community touching new depths of lawlessness for which the type of sentence
normally imposed for armed robbery is in our view inadequate. In ourjudgment
severely deterrent sentences were necessary . . .to demonstrate as clearly as
possible to others tempted to follow them into lawlessness on this vast scale that
if they are brought to trial and convicted commensurate punishment will
follow.”
Whether deterrent sentences really deter and if so'in what cases is a most
pressing subjct on which further understanding at all levels is needed. We seek to
apply the deterrent theory as much to the great criminal gangs in the Mail
Robbery case as to the boy who starts off at truancy, who at 14 is an expert in
breaking,entering and stealing and car stealing, and who at 18 ‘has graduated to
Long Bay and who will continue for a long time to be in and out of gaol. It
might even be thought that far from deterring him repetitiousgaol sentences
only institutionalise. It would seem that for a substantial proportion of the
community even severe sentences do not seem to deter.
l have said “seem to deter” because there is here an imponderable factor. I
have read the records of men who by the time they are 30 have received
sentences most of which are concurrent but which when added up total
somewhere between 30 to 50 years. This is not uncommon. Obviously the
recipients of these sentences have not been deterred.
But onecan have no idea at all of What offences have been deterred
because of the existence of Police, Prisons and Sentences. Speciﬁcally in relation
to sentences one can have no idea because the deterred person can never‘be the
subject of either research or statistics. May I venture to guess far more are
deterred by risk of detection than by length of possible sentence? Particularly is
this is so in respect of the restless impulsive irresponsible youths who comprise
so large a part of our present gaol population and we must ask ourselves — are
they deterred by heavy or repetitive sentences or are they merely
institutionalised? -
The Exemplary Theory:
This is in reality a facet of the deterrent sentence and is imposed in the
case of the prevalent crime. There are are many authorities for the proposition
that Courts are entitled to take into account the prevalence ofa particular crime
in imposing sentences and that in these circumstances deterrence of others can
be sought by making an example of the individual concerned.
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The Preventative Theory:
For many years we had in this State an Habitual Criminals Act by which if
a person was declared an habitual criminal he could be subjected to an
indeterminate sentence and it was if and only if the authorities came to the
conclusion that he manifested appropriate tokens of reform that he would be
released on licence. The “key” as it was termed on the basis of the “Kathleen
Mavourneen” sentence “it may be for years or it may be forever” was feared
more than anything else. Yet in the past one too often saw the sight of the man
who had been declared being arrested charged and convicted again under
circumstances which seemed to indicate that terror alone is not enough to
prevent men from committing criminal offences. Under the existing Habitual
Criminals Act if a person is qualiﬁed to be declared one and if the Judge before
whom he is convicted is satisﬁed “that it is expedient with a view to such
person’s reformation or the prevention of crime that such person should be
detained in prison for a substantial time, the Judge may, in addition to passing
sentence upon such person for the offence of which he is so convicted
pronounce him to be an habitual criminal and shall thereupon pass a further
sentence upon him . . .” The sentence now, instead of the former indeterminate
sentence is one for a term of not less than 5 nor more than 14 years
concurrently with the other sentences imposed.
Underlying the Habitual Criminals’ legislation is the preventative theory
that by keeping a man in gaol you incapacitate him from committing offences
while he is conﬁned. However, this is not the only circumstance under which the
Courts will apply the preventative theory. For instance in the Mail Robbery case
the Court gave as part of its ground forjustifying the sentences imposed as being
the protection of the community “against these men for a very long time.”
The Protective Theory:
To differentiate this from the preventative theory perhaps I might be
regarded as trying to state a distinction without a difference. However there is a
substantial difference in reality between the persons who commit criminal
offences for adequate motives and those whose offences are the result of mental
or emotional disturbance falling short of mental illness as legally deﬁned. It is
scarcely necessary to emphasise that this is one of the great areas in which the
conflict between law and psychiatry exists and in which the legal approach has
been subject to the most searching criticism. In the English case of Phillip
Morris, 45 CAR. 185, Morris was convicted of the killing of his wife, the
circumstances being those of a mercy killing. He relied on the defence of
diminished responsibility which is available in England but not here and on that
basis was found guilty of manslaughter. The Judge in sentencing him to
imprisonment for life made it plain that he did not intend the sentence as
punishment but said: “I am not going to have the responsibility of setting you
anywhere near liberty.”
In Gunnell’s case (50 CAR. 242) a man was convicted on four separate
counts of rape, two counts of attempted rape and three counts of larceny and
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Evidence was given by doctors that “he was
obviously a dangerous psychopath” and it was clear that unless he was kept in
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circumstances of strict security he was liable to be a menace to the public. In
this case the Court said: “Bearing the interest of the public in mind this Court
thinks it far safer that he should be kept in prison for as long as is necessary
rather than that he should be left to be dealt with as a hospital might deal with
him on a doctor-patient relationship under which it may be considered safe for
him to be set free whereas from the public angle he remains a menace.”
The same protective principle was applied in R. v.. Kocan, 1966, 2
N.S.W.R. 565, where the Court of Criminal Appeal took the view that where
viewed objectively as if the crime had been committed by a person of normal
mental condition the sentence imposed by the trial Judge was a proper one. “It
ought not to be so reduced where his crime is one of serious violence and his
condition is a continuing one so that if he remains at large he is potentially a
continuing danger to society and himself.” In that case one of the psychiatrists
gave evidence: “I think it would be a very bad psychiatrist who would say that
this cannot happen again or that it could not happen again.” He was also
described as clearly abnormal and dangerous though the totality of the evidence
was that he did not fall within the McNaghten Rules.
The Rehabilitative Theory:
The idea of rehabilitation as being any part of a penal system is of
comparative recent growth. The ﬁrst legislative recognition that rehabilitation
could take place by supervision of a person released after serving part of his
sentence is to be found, apart from the general law as to the Crown’s prerogative
of mercy permitting the release of persons on a licence after serving a part of
their sentence, in the Parole provisions originally within Section 464A of the
Crimes Act and now enshrined in the Parole of Prisoners Act of 1966. This Act
provides that in the normal case where a person is sentenced to imprisonment
for a term of not less than 12 months (with more permissive provision for
shorter sentences) the Court shall specify a non-parole period of not less than six
months so that after serving his non-parole period the case of the individual
concerned can be considered by the Parole Board and he can be released to
conditional liberty under parole supervision. The theory underlying this
legislation is that after a person has been exposed for a period to the punitive,
deterrent and reformatory influences of prison if released at the appropriate
stage and controlled for the rest of his nominal sentence he is more likely to be
able to be rehabilitated than if he serves his sentence and is then completely
released without that degree of control on the basis that his sentence is
completely finished and the released prisoner is able to do what he likes and is
not subject to direction and control as to what he shall do. where he shall live,
whom he shall associate with and how he shall behave. This parole legislation
reﬂects modern developments in many parts of the world. lt is interesting to
note that some Judges do not like the system and impose sentences in which the
non-parole period is so long that the time for release of the ordinary automatic
remissions can arise before the non-parole period is concluded. One Judge went
so far recently as to, extra-judicially, commit himself to the observation that no
rapist should ever be given parole. What the effect of the parole legislation is
going to be only time, investigation, experience and research will tell. But the
indications are that it represents a substantial advance and that a person released
 100 Conflict between Goals as viewed by the Court
from prison under control where employment and housing can be found for him
is much less likely to commit other offences than a person released without
these facilities being available to him.
The Reformatory Theory:
This might be regarded as one aspect of the rehabilitative theory butl am
putting it separately on account of 'the language in various cases used by the
Courts. The reformatory theory is best expressed in the words of the present
Chief Justice of Tasmania in the case of Lahey v. Sanderson, 1959 Tasmanian
State Reports, p.17 at p.21 where His Honour said:
“It is because the public interest is best served if an offender is
induced to turn from criminal ways to an honest living that a court rarely
sends a youth to gaol except in the case of crime of considerable gravity
(such as a crime involving violence), or in the case ofa persistent offender
who has shown himself not amenable to disciplinary methods short of
gaol. The courts have recognised that imprisonment is likely to expose a
youth to corrupting influences and to conﬁrm him in criminal ways, thus
defeating the very purpose of the punishment imposed. There has
accordingly been a universal acceptance by the courts in England,
Australia, and elsewhere of the view that in the case of a youthful offender
his reformation is always an important consideration and in the ordinary
run of crime the dominant consideration in determining the appropriate
punishment to be imposed. It has been said by Lord Goddard, the former
Lord Chief Justice of England, that a judge or magistrate who sends a
young man to prison for the first time takes upon himself a grave
responsibility. With that I respectfully agree.”
The theory underlying a sentence which avoids a gaol term is that the
shock of arrest, trial, the arraignment before a Court and the being put on
recognizance is an effective way not of rehabilitating a person who has been in
gaol and who hence has to be reﬁtted for community life, but of altering or
reforming the attitude of a person who never has been in gaol so that he can
behave in the community in a manner which will prevent him from committing
other offences and being sent to goal.The reformatory sentence can take various
forms. One of these is the Common Law bond by which a person is bound over
to be of good behaviour and come up for sentence if called on within a certain
time. The other type of bond is provided for in the First Offender’s provisions of
the Crimes Act, particularly Section 558, and the powers given by 556(a) for the
conditional release of offenders convicted before Courts of summary
jurisdiction. Cases in which an offender is given a bond rarely if ever see the law
books unless the Crown appeals because it would be an infinitesimal number of
persons who have been given bonds who would ever seek to appeal against the
terms of the bond, a number so negligible as to be for practical purposes
non-existent. Where a person is given a bond he is usually required to enter into
a recognizance to be of good' behaviour for a Specific period and the
recognizance may also contain additional conditions with respect to the
supervision of offender by a probation ofﬁcer, for preventing association with
undesirable people or frequenting undesirable places, for requiring him to work
or live where directed and to undergo suitable psychiatric or medical treatment
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and in some cases to pay compensation. The only references 1 can give to the
books are cases in which the Crown has successfully appealed on the ground that
according to the appropriate principle punishment retribution or deterrence are
required and the bond does not fulﬁl these requirements. In one case a bond was
given, for instance, to a young man of 17 who was guilty of a manslaughter
under circumstances which indicated an unpremeditated, unintended,
irresponsible and impulsive act. On a Crown Appeal a gaol sentence of 5 years
imprisonment was imposed.
In R. v. Cooke 1955, 72 Weekly Notes l32,twointox1cated youths
assaulted a third member of their party. When a member of the publ
ic
intervened they then attacked the member of the public knocking him to the
ground and before he could rise to his feet further blows were struck to his face.
The member of the public died a fortnight later but it could not be established
whether the subdural haemorrhage which caused his death was due to the
assault. Upon the two men concerned pleading guilty at Quarter Sessions to a
charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm they were released on a good
behaviour bond for three years. Here the Court of Criminal Appeal held the
sentence was insufficient to meet the deterrent act of punishment and
substituted a sentence for two years.
In the Queensland case of R. v. Peterson, the Court of Criminal Appeal
took the view that a bond was inappropriate in the case of incest between a
father and his daughter aged 18, the father hitherto having a good character and
never having been guilty of a criminal offence in addition to which he had war
service. The circumstances were that the girl had already been pregnant to
another person but that the father persuaded her to allow photographs to be
taken of him having sexual intercourse with her. This happened on one occasion.
In another case in the 1965 Queensland Law Reports at p.94 3 bond for an
attempted rape was set aside by the Court of Criminal Appeal notwithstanding
that the report of the Chief Probation Ofﬁcer, after an investigation of the
social, family, educational, religious, psychological and physical background of
the young man concerned who was aged 21, was that he expressed the view that '
a combination of circumstances led to the commission of offences of which but
for these circumstances he would not have been capable. The Probation Ofﬁcer
there was of opinion that the appellant would be very likely to profit from the
supervision and treatment he would receive on probation. Notwithstanding that
the incident was quite out of keeping with the man’s previous character a
sentence of imprisonment was substituted. This was also done in a New South
Wales case of bigamy, R. v.McAskill, 61 Weekly Notes p.153. These cases
emphasise the circumstances under which Courts should not grant bonds and
whatever the opinions of an individual Judge may be the current trend of
authority seems to be that in cases of the type to which I have referred if the
Attorney-General appeals the bond will be set aside and a sentence of
imprisonment ordered in lieu on the ground that such cases are not apt for a
reformatory sentence.
The Therapeutic Theory:
To date there is practically nothing about this in the law books. Whether
in the future the conﬂict between punishment and treatment will be so
mitigated as to enable a Judge where he has the case of the emotionally
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disturbed person or the borderline mental defective before him or where the
condition of the person concerned is due to some physical or psychological
abnormality 'to make some order in the nature of a hospital order requiring
compulsory treatment, perhaps even involving other members of the family, is a
matter very much for the future and not for now. It may well be that the future
will see, especially in the case of young delinquents, a situation in which the
parents can themselves be made the subjects of orders that will strictly control
them and require them as well as the individual offender to submit to treatment.
But this is not for today.
The Educational Theory;
In the past when I was able to go to the Criminal Courts other than those
in which I sit myself I often heard it said that: “I am sending you to gaol
because this will give you the opportunity of learning a trade or learning habits
of hard work or of discipline or of completing your education.” I leave it to you
to ask yourselves whether in the present state of affairs a Judge who sends a man
to gaol for the purpose of learning a trade or habits of hard work is merely
deluding himself.
Sheldon Glueck in the book to whichl referred earlier expressed the view
that the function of the Judge should be limited to the objective determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused person. He thinks there seems “no
longer any valid excuse for not taking a more realistic tack when it comes to
sentencing and its implementation.” He says: When a person is held to be legally
subject to removal from open society because of his dangerousness, it does
nobody much good to continue to speak and act in terms of blame, guilt, and
“just retribution”. Such an attitude is proved to be abortive both in curing and
deterring. He has suggested that the Judge should be removed from the
sentencing process and in lieu of that there should be something in the nature of
a treatment tribunal which implements a penalcode founded on the principles of
reformation and not of vindication. Justice should provide that therapy should
deliberately be the prime or integrative aim of the criminal law to which the
other objects should be recognised as subordinate though auxiliary.
Suffice for me to say that at the present time the conflict between the
lawyer and the other disciplines does exist. The resolution of this conflict can
only come through understanding, wisdom and research, by a general elevation
of the standards of all those associated with the social defence either in the
judiciary, the police, prison, probation and parole services. It would seem that
Glueck’s concept of a treatment tribunal is one that in the present stage of social
development could not be implemented in a democracy of the type we have here
but it does underline what may be of equal importance, namely, that those
Judges and Magistrates who sit in criminal matters, whether on appeal or at first
instance, should have a more detailed and broader based formation not only in
the law but of those para—legal disciplines which in the modern world are
becoming so increasingly a part of it and its implementation. No longer should
Judges say: “I sentence you to 10 years’ penal servitude” and treat the book as
being closed at that very moment.
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CONFLICT BETWEEN GOALS AS VIEWED BY A CORRECTIONAL OFFICER
D. K. Fowler*
“The main mission of a correctional establishment is the restoration of an
offender to society, where he will play a constructive part.” Therefore, this
envisages the use of conditioning elements to produce the change where his
behaviour is tolerable under the normal conditions of community life.
Punishment alone cannot produce these changes. Deprivation of freedom, which
is accomplished by committal to an institution, is the most signal punishment to
which any adolescent can be subjected, except, of course, the taking away of life
itself (then there are no consquences). What then, should be the basis for a
correctional programme? “True freedom is the fruit of discipline”, so the
adolescent youths with whom we deal need a disciplined, well ordered,balanced,
daily existence wherein by a defined system of incentives, they are able to
achieve clearly structured goals, which may appear of little immediate
consequence’to the layman but which constitute an immediate benefit to the
individual and become the stepping stones by which the inmate is able to live
and mature within the limitation of his social competence. A big percentage of
the adolescents who come into our care through the Courts has had no previous
success in meeting adult requirements and,in fact,has almost invariably failed to
achieve any recognition throughout its school days. Assuming then, as we do,
that an inmate’s punishment ceases with his commital, our aim must be to
reshape his attitudes, modify anti-authoritarian tendencies, build character,
improve self-esteem and convince him, through the accumulated experiences he
will have, that he is capable of behaving in a socially acceptable manner when he
leaves the controls of the training school. Therefore, our responsibilities are
threefold: mental, physical and moral.
A parent in a normal, healthy family environment does not exercise these
responsibilities through the medium of punishment alone; he or she employs
incentives. Essentially, our programme is based on a series of challenges which
demand effort of mind, body and spirit. The activities are so designed that each
boy can respond in accordance with his capacity and, with sustained guidance
and encouragement, reach the proposed objective. This envisages that all inmates
are made aware of their opportunities and obligations in a variety of ways, for
example:
(1) A lengthy induction interview.
(2) Tradition. ‘ .
(3) The appointment of a stable, senior, experienced boy to help
the newcomer identify himself with the programme as soon as
possible.
(4) The continued explicit enunciation of requirements.
(5) (a) The provision of regular opportunities to discuss
individual problems.
(b) Group counselling in regular discussion groups.
(c) Observation and interpretation of attitudes and
behaviour.
*Formerly Superintendent, Mt Penang Training School for Boys, Gosford. Now Deputy
Chief of Establishments Division, N.S.W. Child Welfare Department.
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It should be said at this stage that all the efforts of staff are directed
initially towards as complete an assessment as possible of the type of individual
admitted to a particular group in the institution (called a Company) so that his
management can be directed accordingly. Is he aggressive/hostile, arrogant,
self-opinionated, quiet/self contained, apprehensive or inadequate, dull or
discouraged? To assist in this regard full physical and mental surveys are
conducted before admission and copies of these reports are available. All cannot
be expected to achieve the same standard nor respond to requirements at the
same level. Therefore, staff are expected to evaluate performance, not on
external results: alone, but on the attitude the individual young person brings to
his daily duties. This attitude of mind is manifested in his demeanour,
deportment and degree of acceptance of the restrictions which are necessarily
imposed by a disciplined daily life. The physical and psychological benefits of
disciplined group living are fundamental to any measure of success achieved. An
inmate’s objectives would be, preservation of privileges, preservation of status,
promotion to special employment, acquisition of confidence and trust, Visiting
Day leave, home leave for a period of four days, transfer to the Privilege Cottage,
and finally discharge from the training school in the minimum of time.
Objectives/Goals
The very life blood of this programme is a points system, which in concept
compels an inmate to be positive in his thinking, accepting of criticism and
extremely industrious, His participation in each separate activity from rising at 6
ram. until retiring at 9 pm. from the mundane making ofhis bed to the folding
of his clothes in the prescribed manner,'can either swell his weekly points score
or reduce it, and upon the ultimate result at the end of the week depends his
promotion or otherwise. The school is divided into four Companies which are
housed in separate dormitories, and each divided into six sections. The objective
is to gain promotion from 6 section to 1 section, the attainment of’which holds
special significance not the least being the status attached to it. The acquisition
of status in this programme cannot be over-emphasised, because it is
constructively supportive by bolstering an inmate’s self-esteem to such an extent
that he is prepared to extend himself beyond his usual capacity. This is not
achieved except by the development of a considerable measure of self-discipline.
Youths will respond to demands if properly conditioned, but they expect
trust and conﬁdence in return. Once an inmate reaches 1 Section 3 great deal of
trust is placed in him: this emphasises the need to act responsibly in his own
interests and those of the school which, in itself, is a small community. An
element in training is the gradual removal of controls so that an inmate will work
with a minimum of supervision and in many cases without supervision at all. Let
it be emphasised that we are discussing a corrective system in an institution
where inmates in the 16—18 year old ,group are not contained by walls, or by
any form of physical restraint. This gradual removal of supervision is essential
for the young person’s satisfactory development and it could be the forerunner
of a period of leave when the inmate proceeds to his home unescorted and
returns within a prescribed time. In my thirteen years’ experience in the Mt
Penang Training School, only six inmates out of approximately 1,300 have
either failed to return or committed offences which have required further
action by the Court/Department. The use of home leave as an incentive for the
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assumption of responsibility, is a test of the progress of training and often times
it is a medium for resolving family conﬂicts. Before leave is granted an inmate
must have completed four months’ training at a very acceptable level and
manifested his ability to function satisfactorily without supervision.
The greatest enemies of any training system in a corrective institution,
particularly an “open” one, and especially for the long term trainee, are
familiarity, alienation and boredom. Therefore a graduated system of goals or
objectives is imperative to maintain the inmate’s interest and participation so
that he is returned to the community physically fit, mentally alert and
well-intentioned. There should then be less likelihood of further lapses than in
the case of an enforced conformity which has compelled the inmate to sacrifice
individuality. in the analysis of the correctional programme it seems that a short
period of leave outside the well controlled environment of the training school is
beneﬁcial, but it is only part of a total programme. A longer period should be
spent in a situation where controls are reduced to a minimum and where an
inmate has to rely on his own resources and the strengths he has accumulated, to
meet more personally demanding standards. Desirably, this longer period should
be experienced in a situation which is separate from, but an integral part of the
training school.
At Mt Penang we have set up a Privilege Cottage to which inmates are
transferred when they have clearly manifested sound development by a growth
in self-esteem, by personal pride in their achievements and by a genuine
acceptance of authority. Here even greater emphasis is placed on trust by the
absence of even minimal security measures. Inmates move to and fro in groups
and singly without supervision: all doors remain unlocked, and in the privacy of
separate rooms inmates can once again see themselves as individuals for whom
society has some regard, provided they are prepared to abide by its rules. In this
atmosphere, where the authoritarian approach is reduced to a minimum, the
inmate has to become more self-reliant, more self-directive and generally more
outgoing so that it is possible to expose him more regularly to community
influences. Youth groups, both male and female, visit the Privilege Cottage for
social activities and, in turn, inmates participate in social functions at Gosford.
It is impossible to assess the total impact that such measures have on
inmates but my experience suggests that these are helpful in their development.
As far as possible the training programme at Mt Penang is oriented towards
treatment, particularly towards building up an inmate’s personal image of
himself, so that he realises he has some potential. This permits him to return to
the community with healthy aspirations rather than with the conviction he has
undergone a period of punishment and must therefore compensate for his loss of
pleasure and time by an immediate resort to enjoyment-seeking devices, whether
they be intrinsically right or wrong.
Punishment/Sanctions
The accent in any modern training approach ought surely to be on
rehabilitation, not retribution and incapacitation, but the individual inmate
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must also realise that unless he keeps his behaviour within acceptable norms in
this particular society, and raises his own standards, he will suffer certain
consequences. Deliberate infractions of the rules, failure to exercise proper
control over his impulses, and an unwillingness to satisfy even minimum
requirements, must be met by effective sanctions, administered without fear or
favour but with tolerance and understanding. Loss of position, loss of status, and
loss of privileges are forms of sanction which do not incorporate physical
measures and yet are just as effective because they have proximate, and
sometimes, remote consequences. At Mt Penang the executive instrument which
determines an inmate’s “state” over the successive seven days from the Monday
of each week is a complex system of points to which even the most hardened,
sophisticated delinquent responds, and yet which even the dull individual can be
helped to understand. Response to this system determines an inmate’s progress
through the six sections in each Company where his promotion is dependent on:
(1) Minimum points lost.
(2) The acquisition of extra points whichare awarded in accordance
‘ with an inmate’s capacity and the quality of his application to all the
activities of his day. Although successive relaxation of control forms
the basic structure of the training programme the points system is
the medium by which an inmate’s progress is assessed, since a daily
record is maintained on his history card. Serious indiscipline or
insubordination is dealt with immediately and the penalty imposed
is in accordance with the gravity of the offence. Isolated detention
up to 48 hours may result, whilst the most recalcitrant, incorrigible
individuals and the persistent absconders may be transferred to a
maximum security institution. Here, because of the comparatively
smaller numbers, they can be given greater individual attention and
subjected to a more intensive training programme.
Some, inevitably, fail to identify with the institution and its programme
and therefore fail to respond to its obligations and challenges. Such young
people may ultimately earn a period of imprisonment but it can reasonably be
said that any inmate who deliberately resists change, or has no desire for change,
willzbe in further conﬂict with the law in some way. It is my experience under the
system discussed that most inmates identify themselves with the training school,
protect its reputation and try to contribute with some enthusiasm towards its
success on the sporting field and in other community activities. The pride with
which they display articles produced in the Vocational Training Workshops, the
response to calls for additional work when the occasion demands, and the
excellent behaviour of inmates when away from the environs of the training
school, under relaxed supervision, are some indications that the system is
effective. It is unfortunage, however, that we cannot wholly translate these
attitudes with them into the community.
Work
It has been said by John P. Conrad in his publication “Crime and its
Correction” that “few inmates can survive after release at the pace of work to
which they must accommodate when confined”. This will be so when the
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programme in the workshops, classrooms and elsewhere is inefficiently organised
and administrators have to resort to expedients to keep inmates occupied. They
soon realise these activities are only makeshift and consequently regard them as
an imposition to which they respond in a desultory way, if at all. Work, whether
it be academic, vocational or manual, must hold a primary place in any training
programme and the working day should be at least as long as that to which the
inmate would be accustomed in the community. Over the years a programme of
work in classrooms and workshops has been devised which will certainly not
qualify the inmate to take his place in the community as a fully qualified
tradesman, but which will enrich his experience, satisfy a basic need for
recognition and possibly uncover hidden talents which can be developed upon
return to his normal environment. But, perhaps, the greatest challenge has been
in the unskilled areas where inmates have shown surprising initiative and
aptitude when employed on particular tasks affording both job-interest and
pride of achievement. For example, in recent years the use of Gosford sandstone
quarried and worked on institution property has become a feature of the work
programme Each Company has its own individual project such as the
construction of a playing field, the landscaping of a section of the institution
grounds, and this has become so important to the individual that it is not
unusual to have inmates request permission to take their parents to see the work
they have done during the month prior to Visiting Day. It may be significant
' that abscondings from these outside work situations where “freedom” is only
steps away, are quite rare. ‘
In this paper, emphasis has been placed on the positive influences of a _
particular kind of programme and the satisfactions which inmates experience
from it during their training. I believe that these experiences have better
equipped them to meet the complex problems they will undoubtedly encounter
on return to the community.
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THE PROBLEM OF DEVELOPING A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE WITHIN AN
EXISTING CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMME
Dr J. S. Blow*
Institutions with “correctional” goals, such as prisons and delinquent
training schools, have existed for a very long time, and even the most modern
practices incorporated in their programmes have roots extending back many
years. The staffs of these institutions have built up, over this time, a vast body of
experience which has been handed on from one generation of workers to the
next. The result is that today our prisons and delinquent training schools carry
on their routine, apparently simple activities and programmes in a context of
very complex systems of implicit assumptions and of methods derived from long
experience, the origins of which are not always clear. Although all such
institutions now have staff training programmes of varying degrees of
sophistication, the major part of the skills required is still learned on thejob or
through personal instruction by more experienced officers, within the work
setting. Thus each institution, or set of related institutions, has developed its
own characteristic method of working which arises much more from its own
history and experience than from any outside inﬂuences or theories.
These correctional institutions have always had services provided by
professional workers, particularly by medical practitioners, but these have
almost always functioned in a strictly limited role related directly to their own
particular skill. The impact they made on the programme of the institution has
generally been conﬁned to such relatively simple questions as fitness for work or
for certain punishments. Involvement beyond this was rarely encouraged by the
institution staff, and in any case the professional worker was gravely
handicapped in making suggestions by his ignorance of the details of the
institution’s programme, and of the legal and administrative framework within
which its staff was required to work.
However, over the last two decades there has been a significant change
toward the employment of certain professionally trained persons in roles
requiring a much more intimate involvement in the work of correctional
institutions. This movement has included particularly psychiatrists,
psychologists, social workers and (to a lesser extent) sociologists. These workers
have been introduced partly because of a variety of community pressures, but
also partly because the senior staff members of the institutions have themselves
sought this additional help.
Experience has shown that there are important interpersonal and
interdisciplinary problems to be solved before the professional worker can make
his maximum contribution to the work of the correctional agency. lt is my
purpose here to describe some of these problems and to discuss some possible
solutions. Believing as I do that this kind of professional service will continue to
expand, and that it is greatly needed, I must assert that the solution of these
problems is of vital and urgent importance.
*M.B., B.S., D.P.M., M.A.N.Z.C.P., Deputy Director (Special Services),
Department of Child Welfare & Social Welfare.
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The personal experience upon which I base my comments has been
obtained in the course of my work over the last seven years as a psychiatrist of
the New South Wales Department of Child Welfare and Social Welfare. This
Department, which provides correctional programmes for young persons up to
about eighteen years of age, has a fairly highly developed system of professional
consultation and assistance, including a considerable number of clinical
psychologists (two of whom have residential positions in major training schools
for delinquents), a number of social workers, and two psychiatrists. All these are
employed on a full-time basis. It will be apparent that this represents a fairly
advanced example of the trend toward the use of professionals mentioned
earlier, and consequently the Child Welfare Department should be an excellent
subject for the study of the problems of developing a professional service within
an existing correctional programme.
Many, but not all, of the major problems arise in the early stages of the
development of the professional service. In the preamble I pointed to the
complex and ill-understood sociological structure of the correctional institution
underlying the apparently simple day-to-day programme. It will be clear also that
the staffs of these institutions will naturally be deeply committed to the
methods of training in use, which they rightly see as being the fruits oflong and
hard-won experience. Even though they wish to further improve their methods,
and genuinely look forward to the assistance they believe the professional
newcomer can give, they nevertheless feel threatened by him in some ways. At
the best, an interpersonal situation of a very sensitive kind is set up, in which
the inevitable blunders of the professional will produce disproportionately severe
reactions which are not easily overcome. At the worst, some of the correctional
staff may be openly hostile and opposed to the decision of their own
administrators to introduce the professional service.
The rational acceptance of the professional worker is not helped by the
fact that the correctional staff will in advance identify him with some members
of his own or allied disciplines who sometimes publicly stray outside the
boundaries of their own area of competence to make comments (often critical)
about matters which they have studied to a very limited extent or not at all. The
incoming psychiatrist or other professional worker may have to “live down” a
good deal of this.
The problems mentioned so far all arise quite independently of the actual
personal qualities of the professional, and probably begin to develop as soon as
his appointment is announced, before he appears in person. Clearly, his personal
qualities may either diminish or aggravate the developing problems. it is
unfortunately true that the systems of training for the various professions at
present do little to prepare the graduate to work in effective collaboration with
others having different training or experience, and not infrequently the attitudes
developed are the reverse of helpful. The result is that the incoming professional
is bound to make a number of mistakes in the way he offers consultation and
assistance, and these mistakes are usually publicised widely and quickly on the
correctional system’s “grapevine”. Much painful experience seems to be the only
sure basis for improvement in this situation.
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Now, perhaps one way to avoid many of these difﬁculties would be for the
professional worker to submit to the pressures playing on him and to conform
completely to the demands and wishes of the correctional system, avoiding any
action which called for modification or rethinking of the system’s traditional
methods. I am not sure that it would be successful. However, I think almost all
would agree that this would amount to a complete abdication of the professional
worker’s responsibility not only to the inmates of the correctional institutions
but also to the correctional system and its staff. Nevertheless, this mention‘of an
extreme attitude that might be taken does serve as an introduction to the most
subtle and difﬁcult problem which confronts the professional worker himself
when he elects to pursue a career within an organisation. such as a correctional
system. Clearly, except where some strictly medical.treatment is required, the
professional worker cannot entirely have his own way.in the management of
cases and situations. Some compromise will usually be necessary between the
various professional, legal, administrative and correctional factors involved. In
many instances in which he is consulted, the professional worker will find that
his specific professional skills have only a limited application. Even where he has
a major contribution to make, the other factors must be considered and
integrated into the plan or otherwise dealt with. The difﬁcult problem for the
professional is to determine the role he can properly play under these
circumstances, and the degree to which he can compromise without sacrificing
the essentials of his integrity as a professional worker.
it is apparent that for both the correctional staff and for the incoming
worker there are difﬁcult problems in their initial relationships to be solved.
Both must be prepared to recognise the important contribution that can be
made by the other, and, in particular, the professional must be prepared to
recognise that the correctional staff know a great deal about the task they have
to do under the conditions existing in practice. He will certainly not agree with
all aspects of the correctional programme, but he must be cautious in urging
changes until he is sure of the consequences of the changes. In a complex
organisation the consequences may be far more extensive than appears at ﬁrst
examination. And he will undoubtedly ﬁnd that he has no monopoly of the
ideas for improvement. It is my firm opinion that it is the ﬁrst task of the
professional to set up such a personal relationship with the administration that
.his ideas can be pressed forward on all suitable occasions' without the
administrators being threatened or he himself becoming the object of some
ridicule because of his ignorance of basic legal or administrative requirements.
Once this special personal relationship has been established the professional will
find that he will be accorded the opportunity of sharing in the planning of
ochanges and in the discussion of new programmes and ideas.
One further problem that arises early in the history of the professional
service is the development among staff of extravagant hopes and expectations
about what the professional can achieve. The origin of these “magical”
expectations is natural enough; in my experience the majority of the
correctional staff are sincerely trying to do their best to help the inmates,but
are very conscious of how far short of the desired result is the individual
outcome in many cases. The staff eagerly grasp at any form of assistance that
seems to offer substantial hope of improved results, and the “expert”
professional seems to offer this. The incoming professional is thus hampered in
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his efforts to develop a realistically helpful role within the correctional system
i
Equally unhelpful, of course, iS the disillusionment that follows his failur
e to
produce the anticipated “magic”. All these early irrational attitudes have to be
worked through before really effective collaboration can be established.
The final problem I will mention is one that is present at all stages, even
after the firm establishment of the professional service and the resolution of the
difficulties already discussed. That is the problem of the occasional failure of
communication between the professional worker and the administrative and
other staff of the correctional system. Here I do not mean the simple failure to
transmit a piece of information — this happens regularly and is usually corrected
without any particular trouble, especially as no one party can claim to be
faultless in this respect. I am referring to the situation which arises when the
“special relationship” I mentioned breaks down temporarily. This could arise,
for example, in a discussion in which the professional worker is perceived by the
others as refusing to discuss matterson the ground that these lie only within his
area of competence, when in fact the correctional staff believe that some
measure of discussion or explanation is possible. Similarly, they may feel on
some occasions that he has used his professional status to bolster up a
questionable proposition or indulge in some special pleading. It is very difficult
for the correctional staff to counter this, or even bring their feelings into the
open, so that negative feelings and resentment may arise without the knowledge
of the professional worker, who is generally quite unaware of the impression he
has created or that the others have gained. All this applies irrespective of the
validity of the correctional workers’ impression. I feel that the only protection
the professional has against this kind of difficulty is to be constantly alert to the
possibility, and to cultivate alternative channels of communication through
which he may hope to get indirect warning of the feelings of the correctional
staff involved. He can then take appropriate action to resolve the difficulty,
generally by a direct approach to discuss the problem with those concerned.
Recognition of these difficulties in advance does, I believe, greatly increase
the possibility of establishing an effective professional service within an
organisation such as a correctional system. All parties involved can be made
aware of some of the hazards, even though actual experience is still necessary to
allow of a working-through or resolution of the irrational attitudes inevitably
involved. The final section of this paper deals with the measures I believe to be
useful in facilitating this. Though my own experience relates entirely to one
particular organisation, the New South Wales Child Welfare Department, my
reading and discussion with colleagues has strengthened my view that much of
this has general application.
Once it has been decided that such a service is to be introduced the
administrators should publicise this throughout the correctional system and
indicate the purpose of the service in terms which are as realistic and
“down-to-earth” as possible. It is important to state clearly that the service is
not intended to overcome deficiencies in the work of the correctional staff but
that it is hoped that it will be able to make a helpful contribution to their
difficult task. Opportunities for staff discussion and for clarification of
misconceptions should be offered.
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The incoming professional must be prepared to recognise that the majority
of the correctional staff have a genuine wish to do their difﬁcult task as well as
possible, but that a number of them will be unsure of the value of their methods
and will be correspondingly sensitive to actions and statements which suggest
that these methods are wrong. From experience, the correctional staff will have
acquired a great deal of expertise in managing their institutions and maintaining
them as “going concerns". Short of a revolutionary change in correctional
institutions, this staff expertise will be the essential basis for programmes of
improvement and for the introduction of additional services, and is to be valued
accordingly by the professional. Nothing useful is to be achieved by the
destruction of staff morale even where the professional feels that changes of
method are necessary. In any case, by the time he is sufficiently well-informed
to be able to assess the real need for change and the manner in which it can be
practically effected, he should be a well-accepted member of the team.
There are a number of features of the particular correctional system with
which the professional must familiarise himself at an early stage. He must make
some study of any statutes which govern the operation of the system, and of the
associated regulations, and he should take every opportunity of finding out how
these are implemented in practice. He must visit as many parts of the system’s
facilities as possible so that he has some knowledge of the actual conditions and
will not make unqualiﬁed foolish recommendations. This will also give him the
opportunity of meeting as many staff as possible, of getting to know them, and
of giving them the chance to know him personally. He will learn at the same
time something of the usual practices and of the reasons for them — questions
about the basis of a procedure are always acceptable and offer a learning
situation for both questioner and questioned.
thatever special language or jargon that exists in the correctional
organisation must be learned early, so that the professional can communicate
effectively with the others. No doubt he ,will teach them some of his own
technical vocabulary gradually, but the major responsibility for proper
communication rests with him and he must be prepared to translate his concepts
into the correctional system’s terms as far as possible.
If the professional worker applies himself conscientiously to this effort to
understand the system he has entered, he will not only gain much practical
information which will make his decisions and recommendations so much more
apt and workable, but he will certainly win a greater respect from his fellow
workers at all levels, and much will be forgiven him in his inevitable failures. A
foundation will be laid upon which the professional service can develop and
flourish in a real and dignified partnership with the other sections of the
correctional organisation.
114 The Problem of developing a Professional Service
Appendix I
In this paper the nature of the service which can be supplied by a
professional worker to a correctional system has not been described in detail as
this information is not relevant to the main issues. For those unfamiliar with the
possibilities of such a service the following summary may be of interest. For
convenience the description is conﬁned to a psychiatric service, but the
principles are similar for any related discipline.
Broadly, a psychiatrist may offer a service in three areas:
(1) A consultative service to the correctional staff and administrators at
all levels.
(2) A routine clinical psychiatric service.
(3) Participation in staff training at all levels.
l.‘ Consultative Servicee
This is by far the most important area of service. It involves the
participation of the psychiatrist in the discussion of difficult cases and
difficult issues of general management and practice, with correctional staff
at all levels of seniority.
The psychiatrist may see the young person involved and then discuss his -
opinion with the responsible staff. (This procedure differs from the clinical
service in that the consultative procedure rarely involves taking any direct
responsibility for the young person, and often the psychiatrist does not see
the subject again.) Quite frequently the psychiatrist will not himself see
the young person at all but will contribute to the discussion upon the basis
of the history given by others during the discussion.
Similar assistance may be given during discussion of points of policy and
practice at all levels. The essential task in the “consultative” role is to
encourage the development of the staff’s own insight and management
skills, not to give dogmatic instructions or advice.
2 Routine Clinical Service
This resembles the ordinary practice of psychiatry, modified by the
consequences following from the fact of the inmate’s detention. The most
important consequence is that the co-operation of the correctional staff
will be required if any treatment programme is to be effective, so there
must be the fullest communication between all concerned.
3. Training
The psychiatrist can play a significant part in the training of staff, both
through formal teaching and through the informal consultation situation.
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CONFLICT BETWEEN GOALS AS VIEWED BY A PROBATION OFFICER
W. J. Keefe"
In considering the title of this seminar against contemporary thinking it is
difficult to distinguish between treatment and punishment and I am sure that
those charged with the administration of the institutions traditionally associated
with punishment will be the first to claim that rehabilitation is of primary
importance and that in reality they belong on the treatment side of the seminar.
In a modern correctional system perhaps the greatest punishment is the
deprivation of liberty plus the stigma which still attaches to a prison sentence.
Persons confined in institutions must of necessity be dealt with in groups and by
and large must all be treated alike, usually with clearly expressed rules. The
initiative for almost every function lies with the administration. Conditions are
rarely as comfortable as outside and the lack of privacy and freedom of choice
of companions are things which affect prisoners adversely no matter how much
the correctional authority tries to offset these matters. One of the worst effects
is the prison society and the inﬂuence of prisoner values which are not always
the personal values of individual inmates. Despite our open institutions and
enlightened policies these inﬂuences persist and sometimes are taken back into
the community in the form of continued association with prison inmates for the
purposes of crime. At best these experiences make it difficult for discharged
prisoners to adjust to normal living for some time after their discharge,
particularly if they have served a lengthy sentence. The recent parole legislation
in New South Wales is an attempt to ensure that prisoners are discharged under
as favourable circumstances as possible. Parole is “treatment” after management
or perhaps punishment. Intelligently applied with adequate and trained staff
backed up by positive community interest, it is hoped that prisoners who
previously were unable to cope immediately after release and lapsed into crime,
will now be supported through the crucial stages until they can achieve
reasonable goals as worthwhile citizens.
As a probation officer I naturally see probation as being associated with
“treatment” although it is extremely doubtful whether probation or any other
form of conditional liberty could function unless there was the alternative of
punishment, loss of liberty or some such sanction.
Adult Probation has operated in the Courts of England and the United
States of America since the latter part of the l9th Century. It was introduced in
the New South Wales legal system in .195]. In March, 1962, a Departmental
Committee on the British Probation Service (the Morison Committee) asserted
their prior conviction of the probation system’s permanent and probably
growing importance. They defined probation as “the submission of an offender
while at liberty to a Speciﬁed period of supervision by a social caseworker who is
an officer of the Court: during this period the offender remains liable, if not of
good conduct to be otherwise dealt with by the Court”. They summarised their
views as follows:
—.———.____
*Principal Probation Officer, N.S.W. Adult Probation Service. .
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“There is a moral case in a society founded upon respect for human rights,
for a system which allows an offender to continue to live and work in the
community. Such a system is also desirable on social and economic
grounds. A PRIORI, the system will be better if, as does the probation
system, it brings helpful inﬂuences to bear upon the offender while at
liberty; and this is confirmed by the experience of the courts and
probation ofﬁcers although that experience has yet to be adequately
analysed”.
The Morison Committee concurred in recommendations made by an
earlier Inter-Departmental Committee on the Business of the Criminal Courts
(the Streatfield Committee) concerning the provision of pre-sentence reports to
enable the Courts to select the most appropriate treatment for offenders.
Pre-sentence reporting has been a function of the New South Wales Adult
Probation Service since its inception.
Individualisation of sentence obviously requires reliable information
concerning the circumstances and background of the offender. The pre-sentence
report provides an objective account of the offender’s family background, home
environment, financial circumstances, education, employment history, mental
and physical health, general reputation, social and sporting activities, associates
and habits, together with his reaction to his environment and circumstances.
Special attention is directed to the circumstances of the offence, the factors
leading to his involvement, his reaction to arrest, his remorse and his plans and
attitudes as to the future. During the course ofthe pre-sentence inquiry members
of his family, his employers, his friends and other persons who have known the
offender are interviewed. Their opinions are assessed and can be extremely
useful in considering the offender’s prospects for rehabilitation.
Objective pre-sentence reporting not only assists the Court to determine
proper sentence but protects public interest by enabling the Court to recognise
not only the factors which indicate that an offender has the resources to respond
to positive treatment but also to recognise where such treatment may be
misplaced. ,
Probation offers further protection of the public interest by providing
official facilities for responsible supervision and guidance of offenders. The
unavoidable risk involved in releasing offenders on recognizance can be
minimised if such offenders are supervised. The supervisory aspects of probation
are distinctly authoritarian and probationers are required under penalty of breach
of recognizance to be of good behaviour, to remain in employment, to support
their families, to avoid undesirable associations and to comply with any other
special conditions which may be imposed by the Court. Without supervision, a
Court is rarelv aware of anv failure to observe the foregoing obligations until a
further offence lS committed. Under supervision these aspects of a probationer’s
mode of living are under close scrutiny by a trained officer. Any indications that
a probationer is likely to lapse are quickly noted and action can be taken to deal
with the situation before the probationer’s conduct deteriorates to a stage where
further offences occur. Probation supervision, of course, is not infallible but
there is greater prospect of compliance by unstable and irresponsible persons
where they are supervised and must regularly account to the Court through their
Probation Officer for their day to day conduct. In this regard Probation is not a
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“let off” but is a discipline under which many young offenders learn to accept
responsibility for the first time. At the same time they are not subject to the
negative aspects of imprisonment.
The guidance functions of probation ensure appropriate treatment for
each individual offender. Probationers vary greatly in their ability and readiness
to respond to the opportunities available to them. Most have a desire to take
advantage of their opportunities and to comply with reasonable demands but
often require encouragement and direction. Probation is aimed at developing the
positive qualities and correcting the deﬁciencies of each person as a means of
achieving a reasonable adjustment to their circumstances and the normal
demands of society.
Probation does not seek to deal with offenders to whom its techniques are
not suited and who merely seek their release to continue their criminal
behaviour. Nor is probation necessary for those fortuitous offenders to whom
the experience of arrest and conviction is salutary and who have the capacity to
ensure their own future good conduct.
Apart from the obvious fact that probationers remain in the community
whilst subject to the supervision and guidance of probation officers, another
very important aspect is that probation, unlike the management/punishment
treatment, is an individual form of treatment. Probation supervision and
counselling must represent a positive reality in the life of the probationer and
the probation relationship should be developed to its potential. No effort should
be spared to achieve the most constructive goals and attempts should be made to
develop strengths and insight that will not only enable a probationer to comply
with the terms of his conditional liberty but for the whole of his future he will
assume a stable and responsible manner of living. The important aspect of
probation is that the offender makes his own decisions, the probation officer
acting as counsellor, presenting the alternatives. This places considerable stress
on some people but the advantages of facing up to responsibilities soon become
apparent and most probationers are assisted to regulate their lives to not only
enable them to comply with the order of the Court but to enable them to
continue reasonable conduct thereafter.
The alternative is of course punishment and, at ﬁrst, many offenders
comply to avoid the alternative. However,with skilled treatment it is possible to
have people develop a personal set of values which replaces the original reaction.
Many probationers require the interest of a mature person and encouragement
towards worthwhile goals. Some, of course, need practical and material
assistance and often medical or psychiatric help but even then they will only
succeed when they can reach a degree of personal dignity where they refrain
from criminal conduct because of their own values rather than any fear of
consequences.
In a number of places some attempts have been made to deal with
probationers in groups, this representing a radical departure from the casework
concept referred to earlier. As yet it seems too early to assess the value of this
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form of treatment. A survey of Group Work in the British Probation Service was
carried out as a segment of the research programme. The following conclusion
was published:
“The survey only begins to show where group work may fit into future
probation practice. To use the information in this report as an argument
for the extensive use of probation groups would be to misunderstand
completely the tentative nature of many of its ﬁndings. We do not know,
and we may not know for some time, how effective various types of group
work are. Neither for that matter do we know yet how effective various
types of individual treatment are. It may be that group work offers a wide
range of new treatment methods, strengthening the skills of the probation
service in helping a wider variety of offenders, or it may turn out to be of
comparatively restricted value.”
Group work has not been tried with probationers in New South Wales.
Many probationers are however, referred to agencies dealing with specific
problems such as drug addiction, alcoholism, psychiatric and personality
disorders where group methods are used heavily. Those probationers are
participating in group work with many people who are disturbed in some way
but who do not necessarily have criminal convictions.
Any form of “treatment” for criminal offenders must have a measure of
public acceptance. At present there is still a fairly ready acceptance of the idea
of punishment or vengenace whilst other forms of treatment are regarded as
“weak” and encouraging the criminal element to disregard the consequences of
crime. This attitude is slowly breaking down but there is a long way to go. The
best argument is good selection of people for treatment, and /or
punishment/management; a high standard of supervision and a strictly
accountable Probation Service and Parole Service. Each person who succeeds
under such treatment is known to a number of people and it is at this level that
best acceptance is available. Statistics are useful to professional people for
various purposes but are often lost on the public who do not generally trust this
source of information. However, a former criminal working regularly, married
and accepting his responsibilities wins the respect of his acquaintances and
justifies the confidence displayed by the Court in releasing him.
Communications between the various disciplines concerned with the
treatment of offenders is of the utmost value and in recent times it has been
fairly common for Police, Child Welfare Ofﬁcials, Judges, Magistrates, Lawyers,
Psychiatrists, Academics and representatives of the many active community
organisations to meet to share experiences and toget to understand the role
played by each in dealing with the tremendous problem of crime. The value of
such meetings and seminars cannot be measured, but value there is and much
credit must go to the Institute of Criminology which has been to the forefront in
stimulating interest in social problems.
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THE FUTURE OF CORRECTIONAL PRACTICE
 
Dr W. E. Lucas*
As I am a psychiatrist speaking on corrections a few disclaimers are
necessary. I am not giving this paper primarily as a psychiatrist although my
professional experiences and training naturally colour my thinking. Most of the
paper is based on what I have read, heard and seen in a year studying
criminology at Cambridge and visiting penal institutions in Britain and Europe. I
do not believe that the problems of a correctional system can be solved by
psychiatry, any more than I believe that crime is a phenomenon to be explained
and treated by theories and techniques of psychiatrists. Psychiatric explanations
of the vast bulk of offences cannot stand critical examination and the number of
offenders requiring active psychiatric intervention is relatively small. Despite the
title of my paper I bring no news of miracles in the reduction of recidivism or of
preventive measure to reduce drastically the rate of crime.
The future of correctional practice is so intimately tied to the correctional
present with'its conflicts and irrationalities that I must devote much of the paper
to what I believe to be the central issues in corrections. I think it is fair to say
that most papers in this seminar have told us either what is being done or what
should be done. Aims are discussed in relation to speciﬁc settings or branches of
penal activity but what is needed before we rush on to the correctional
millenium is some idea, in the broadest possible context, of what we are trying
to do. Judges, penal administrators and professionals are constantly placed in the
position of having to do something about the offender or the institution placed
under their authority and little opportunity is given to examine the basis of
practice, belief and theory.
There are two related questions we should consider. The first is what is the
aim of the penal system, or rather what should it be. The second is what means
may we legitimately or humanely employ to achieve the desired results.
Nigel Walker (1966) in discussing the aims of a penal system reaches
conclusions with which I agree. He does not believe that retribution is a proper
aim for a penal system. The desire that an offence be revenged and that the
offender atone by suffering is easily roused in many if not most human breasts,
but the organisation and administration of a penal system should not be
designed to make life unpleasant for the offender simply because he deserves
this. Penal measures, however, have to take some account of public opinion so
an element of retribution cannot be eliminated.
Walker accepts the notion of economic reductivism. Crime should be
reduced by whatever means prove effective within the limits set by economic
and humanitarian considerations. The incidence of crime should be reduced and
the individual offender not recidivate. Methods of social hygiene, crime
prevention, general deterrence and reformation are acceptable if effective. In a
way this can be viewed as a broad type of treatment for the problem of crime,
*M.B.,B.S.,D.P.M.(Sydney), Dip.Crim. (Cantab.)’M.A.N.Z.C.P.,Senior Lecturer in Forensic
Psychiatry. University of Sydney, Consultant Psychiatrist to the Attorney-General’s
Department and the Department of Corrective Services.
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but punishment is by no means excluded. A reductivist would use punishment,
within the limits mentioned, if it could be shown that the desired result was
achieved.
If there is one penal measure which has been thoroughly tried and found
wanting it is punishment. It has been used with frightful refinements, with great
frequency and in public. It has been used more subtly and simply by deprivation
of creature comforts and normal human contact. The confirmed criminal and
the potential offender remain undeterred and decade by decade, if not year by
year, the public loses its stomach for such goings on. Even Du Cane’s “hard
labour, hard fare and a hard bed” are disappearing.
But humanitarian reforms have not been successful either, ifjudged from
their effects on crime and recidivism. Humanitarian concerns are an expression of
something other than therapeutic intent. Humanitarian reforms are simply not
treatment, although they may facilitate it. McCorkle and Korn (1954) wrote:
“The bleak fact is that just as the monstrous punishments of the 18th
century failed to curtail crime the more humane handling of the 20th
century has equally failed to do so.”
Don C. Gibbons (1965) defines treatment as:
“ . .. explicit tactics or procedures deliberately undertaken to change
those conditions thought to be responsive for the violator’s misbehaviour.
Treatment implies some rationale or causal argument . .3’.
and he goes on to state that:
“ . . .the issue in corrections is not one of punishment versus treatment. In
so far as the State invokes sanctions of some kind against persons who are
defined as law violators, sanctions which are experienced by them as
deprivations, such individuals are being punished for their
transgressions . . .
The complication is that in recent decades the view has arisen that one
consequence the offender should suffer is treatment.”
In other words whenever the community through medium of itsjudicial
and penal apparatus applies any measure to an individual guilty of an offence
and so deprives him of money, liberty, and/or assumes control over at least some
aspects of his immediate or distant future or demands the right to alter him
through procedures designated as treatment, we can consider this actual
intervention as punishment.
I believe it unacceptable that the penal system should. once it has control
of an offender, be geared to a policy of punishing him. In simple words the penal
system is not there to “put in the boot". Retributionists will disagree but] hold
that retribution serves no end other than the gratification of its advocates. They
will hold that it is just, rational and that the dispensation of “just deserts” may,
as a side-effect, have individual and general deterrent effects.
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We are all experts on deterrence. In the comfort of our armchairs we are
sure the rope would stop us strangling our wives and that the “cat” would
inhibit our desire to assault young ladies in the solitude of the Maroubra
sandhills. The bother is that these penalties would not, and in the past indeed
did not, stop others from so indulging themselves. Most of us are aware of the
differential detection rates for illegal parking and exceeding the speed limit and
adjust our pattern of offending accordingly. But some young fellow upsets this
sweet rationality by crossing the double lines in a defective vehicle to pass a
marked police car after having been disqualiﬁed from driving a month before.
Punishment is an effective method of controlling behaviour and altering it
in the long term. Parents know that if punishment of the right sort is applied in a
consistent fashion in close temporal relationship to the misbehaviour, and in
circumstances clearly understood by the child and on a background of love and
respect, that it is fair and effective. Psychologists now find, contrary to earlier
beliefs, that under properly controlled circumstances punishment is as effective
as reward in changing behaviour. Unfortunately the correctional system is unable
to reproduce the emotional climate of the home or the exactitude and control of
the laboratory.
If punishment was effective in the correctional context then we could call
it treatment. As it is not, and humanitarian conditions are not, we are forced to
look for treatment in the sense deﬁned previously. But doesn’t treatment itself
present us with another set of problems?
Treatment can be applied in the penal system, and in other settings, with a
number of ends in mind. An outright cure can be attempted, aimed at
eliminating the “disease” process. Palliation may be the aim. 0r again mere
symptom removal may be thought appropriate. if we are very up to date “total
care” is the answer and the subject treated may, we hope, emerge from the
process completely refurbished, cured. warts and all.
What degree of therapeutic enthusiasm is appropriate for a penal system?
It has been said that the criminal law requires only a minimum from everyone
and more than that minimum cannot be demanded by 'society. This minimum
must be kept in mind when criteria and conditions for release are decided.
Unrealistic conditions imposed on offenders released on parole or license are of
particular concern. For example, a property offender might be released with
conditions specifying a celibate, teetotal early-to-bed life. These conditions may
have nothing to do with the origins of his criminality and may make him
outstandingly deviant in his social setting and finally cause his failure on parole.
But we can look wider than this. The law demands that if a man offends he
become subject to sanctions which will include measures aimed at preventing his
offending again. The law does not demand the cessation of non-criminal
antisocial behaviour.
Those who advocate the elimination of the traditional concepts of criminal
responsibility generally want to see convicted offenders considered, perhaps by
the judge though usually by a treatment committee, to see what measures are
necessary for them. There are many difficulties and even the advocates of the
 N 
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idea, such as Barbara Wootton, admit this, but there are two of particular
concern, I think.
The ﬁrst is that the individual convicted of a minor offence may be found
on exhaustive assessment to be highly deviant in ways not related to his offence
and not likely to lead to criminal behaviour. Is he to be treated, against his will,
for these abnormalities? The fact that there are at large therapeutically minded
persons anxious to treat anything from a propensity for eccentric companions
down, makes me most apprehensive.
The second is related to another facet of justice. In sentencing it is
attempted as far as possible to keep sentences, especially for co-offenders,
relatively congruent. But with treatment the major consideration, it would be
possible to send one offender to prison for six months and his co-offender to a
psychiatric hospital for three years, conﬁdent that this was necessary and that
they would both respond satisfactorily. The degree of interference in their lives
is vastly different. This problem can be seen in the ﬁeld ofjuvenile delinquency
and child welfare. The deviant child with a good home is less likely to be
committed to an institution than an equally deviant child with a bad home.
Many workers see elements of injustice in this situation.
All manner of treatment methods attacking a wide variety of factors could
be countenanced if we had some half decent causal theories to account for
crime. Aside from crimes which are bizarre or committed by demonstrably
mentally ill people we are left with a host of inﬂuences non-specific usually for
both the crime and the individual. Poverty, poor homes, opportunity for crime,
inadequate socialisation and so on, set before a background of the afﬂuent
society and its middle-class ethic.
It is fair to say that most, if not all, penal administrations find that their
day to day preoccupations are those of control rather than treatment. This is
understandable for reasons ranging from public pressure to the problems of
overcrowding and inadequate stafﬁng. If the top administration is committed to
treatment concepts it may still ﬁnd it impossible to transmit this to the staff at
lower levels who will continue to see control as their main function. They know
who is in trouble if control functions are neglected or fail. if the administration
does not give visible, realistic support to the staff caught in the
control/treatment dilemma the staff have many methods of defeating treatment
attempts so that they can continue in the safe role of controlling their charges.
This is not to say that some treatment does not go on in a control
dominated penal system. Most likely, though, it is made up of what Street,
Vintner and Perrow (1966) have called “segmented therapeutic practices”, that
is piecemeal treatment in a basically custodial setting. There is some evidence
this may lead to problems including community criticism of permissiveness,
unrealistic institutional expectations, the jeopardising of executive security in
ofﬁce, division in staff groups and inconsistent handling of inmates. Finally,
perhaps as a solution, treatment efforts are subverted to custodial ends.
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Gibbons (1965) sums up the situation:
“No clear format has yet been devised which spells out the nature of an
effective treatment program operating within the limits of necessary
security provisions.”
Donald Cressey (1960) in his paper, “Limitations of Treatment”, writes of
administrators with their administrative responsibilities. He says the implication
of individualised treatment is organisational chaos. Two of his statements are of
particular relevance:
“(The administrators) must rely on guards and other non-professional
employees for carrying out administrative policy; yet the conflict between
organisational and professional ideologies is such that administrative rules
cannot be clearly formulated, instructions cannot be understood, and
enforcement of rules and understanding cannot be achieved by invoking
punitive measures for non-conformity.”
“(There) is a general phenomenon in treatment-oriented institutions: the
‘treatment versus punishment’ dilemma is shifted from the administrative
ofﬁcials to the guards and industrial foremen.”
Cressey is most pessimistic about the outcome of the situation he
discusses, especially of the chances for resolution of role conflict in the staff.
Conrad might say that the institutional type discussed by Cressey
illustrated the “standard practice of corrections” in that it attempts
individualised methods of change under standardised means of control. Conrad
(1965) believes, however, that “advanced correctional practice” can be
identified by three indices:
1. Deliberate conscious emphasis on social restoration as the primary
goal. ‘
2. Maintenance of aseptic social conditions.
3. A built-in evaluation system.
We are now back to the question of the proper, allowed if you like, aims
of treatment. Conrad says social restoration. Did the Departmental Committee
on Prisons (1895) mean the same in its report? It said:
“prison treatment should be effectually designed to maintain, stimulate or
awaken the higher sensibilities of prisoners and turn them out of prison
better men and women, both physically and morally, than when they
came in.”
I think that this is generally interpreted as recommending a fairly general
assault on the prisoner’s moral and social make-up, attempting reformation
beyond the point necessary for mere obedience to the criminal law. The end
result implied is a non-recidivist with standard, proven(and approved) middle
class values, regardless of his social background.
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I doubt if Conrad means this. Another writer takes the view that the
community contains a very large number of individuals defective in some respect
who function in a non-criminal way; and the proper aim in the treatment of a
similarly defective offender is that he should return to the community to
function as well as his non-criminal counterpart. And of course be non-criminal
himself. While my own views are not really firm on this problem I tend to agree
with this. It is realistic and more likely to be achieved than attempts to reduce
deviant behaviour not related to criminality and not complained of by the
offender. I expect many will disagree with me.
Certainly those with more extreme views on what Baroness Wootton calls
the elimination of responsibility will not accept this outlook. I do not pretend to
know the answers to the matters I have raised. What I do believe to be important
is that we, who are for the most part associated with the law, its enforcement
and the handling of offenders in an administrative or professional capacity,
realise the complexity of the problem. The apparently simple policy decision to
treat may lead to all manner of delusion and disaster.
Effective penal treatment, if it is to be possible at all, must not be thought
to be the exclusive preserve of supervisory and institutional sections of the penal
system. Legislation, enforcement, the courts and after-care have vital roles to
play. I will return to this shortly.
So far the offender has only been mentioned as the subject of the penal
measures. What important information do we have about the offender?
It may be trite to say that delinquency and crime are common, but they
are. Wallerstein and Wyle (1947) in a balanced non-criminal sample found 91%
of the subject’s reported acts, excluding juveline activities, which could have
earned a prison sentence if they had been detected. 64% admitted at least one
felonious act. Some reservations are necessary but the figures are an indication.
The sample was biased slightly; it included an excess of the upper social classes.
Other studies provide general support for the findings. Convictions forindictable
offences, not self-reported crime, were examined by Avison and Rose (1966).
They estimated that 29.5% of males, 7.1% of females, in England and Wales
would at some time in their lives be convicted of an indictable offence.
Criminal behaviour and some forms of antisocial, non-criminal deviance
show characteristics suggesting they are often self-limiting disorders. 70% of
juvenile offenders are said not to progress to adult crime, many adult criminals
cease to offend in their thirties. There are suggestions that some alcoholics,
personality deviants and drug addicts cease. or at least control their deviant
behaviour by about the age of forty. We know something of the differential rates
of recidivism for classes of offences. For example those who commit sexual
offences are among the least recidivistic of offenders. On the other hand there
are habitual offenders and the group Donald West (1963) identifies as habitual
prisoners, who provide difficult problems in law and management. Some have
very long criminal careers and others commence to offend relatively late in life.
Lest we tend to incautious optimism about the cessation of criminal
activity as mentioned above, we should remember that we do not have reliable
 The Future of Correctional Practice 125
means to identify those offenders who will recidivate. Lee Robins, (1966)
massive follow—up of children with behaviour disturbances should remind us that
the wait for personality disorders to “burn out” is at huge personal and social
expense.
To make use of this basic information, and more sophisticated data of
course, we must be able to predict the likely course and outcome ofa criminal
act or career, the wisdon of intervening or not (in a treatment sense) and the
type of treatment which will serve our ends. Research work in client/treatment
interaction shows that treatment must be ﬁtted to the individual and that the
wrong treatment can do positive harm. As radical new therapeutic measures are
unlikely to arrive on the scene better selection of types of offenders for types of
treatment must be one of the major directions in penology.
Loveland’s (1951) summing up of the process of classification of offenders
should be noted here. He says classification is:
“... (the) method by which diagnosis, treatment planning and the
execution of the treatment programme are co-ordinated in the individual
case. It is also a method by which the treatment programme is kept
current with the inmate’s changing needs . . . the method by which these
programmes can be directed efficiently toward the treatment of the
individual.”
We should remember how often attempts at classification fall short of
these ideals. Frequently long and expert assessment is frustrated because the
penal system does not offer sufficient alternatives and ﬂexibility in treatment
programs. Also personnel engaged in classification find that they do not hear the
results of their suggestions, or even if the management programme was
instituted. Classification is not just initial selection; it is the institution of
treatment and on-going assessment of treatment and selection methods.
Anything less than this is uneconomic and is nearer to being ritualistic than
scientiﬁc.
In penal treatment as in psychiatry there is a magic number, the fraction
two-thirds. Two-thirds of subjects always seem to be responding to some
therapeutic manoeuvre. Critics often say that two-thirds will respond to no
treatment at all or to more simple measures. Two-thirds of those offenders
received into prison for the first time do not return after release. Clearly some
did not need to go to prison and some others probably were helped by prison.
And of the third who recidivate some must have been harmed by prison. But
who are they? We don’t know.
The future of correctional practice will of course depend on influences
outside the correctional system proper. The sytem does not select its own
clients and when it does receive them certain decisions have already been made
which limit what can be done to or for them. The process of selection is made
up of three basic steps, leglislation, enforcement and sentencing, and public
opinion has a profound influence on all of these. These segments of the selection
process interact to produce the correctional client. An unrealistic law,
enthusiastically enforced, coupled with injudicious sentencing may produce a
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problem no penal system can solve. Of course various combinations are possible.
A shrewd policeman or a wise judge may be in a sense defeat stupid legislation,
but it is best to have a good law to start with.
I do not propose to say much about sentencing. Sentencing is a complex
task, an art not a science, and I am happy I do not have to do it. The more
scientifically oriented of us are unable to give really useful guidelines to
magistrates and judgeS. They do not have enough information to predict the
offender’s response to a particular measure and at any rate they must respond
also to other inﬂuences, not only the offender’s welfare. As an art sentencing
leaves much to individual talent, or lack of it. Individualised sentences may be
criticised for inconsistency; and consistent sentences raise suspicions of a tariff
system.
What is needed if the offender is to receive supervisory or institutional care
is a ﬂexible sentence. When he is assessed, treated and his reponse evaluated
there should be room to manouvre within the limits of the sentence. A long
sentence with a short non-parole period may do several things admirably. The
public desire for retribution is satisﬁed, the judge thinks he is providing an
individual and general deterrent and he also allows maximum freedom for
sensible treatment and release if it is indicated.
The most important thing about the institutional side of the correctional
system is to avoid sending people to it. There is a growing emphasis on
non-institutional methods of dealing with offenders. The enormous growth in
the use of fines is an example of this. Complicated provisions to assist the
collection of fines to prevent imprisonment for default were a feature of the
English Criminal Justice Act (1967). The idea of the interchangeability of penal
measures has application here and if several lines of action seem to lead to the
same end result then the least expensive and least noxious one should be used.
Drunks and vagrants for the most part have no place in prison. What has
yet to be found is an alternate place and until it is created this stage army will be
tramping in and out of prison clogging the correctional apparatus and straining
facilities which could be better used. Short-term sentences in general are to be
deplored; ultra-short sentences for drunks and vagrants are penological nonsense.
Alternatives are needed urgently.
Probation is being used increasingly and claims a good success rate for its
clients. Work by Diana (1955) in Pennsylvania showed that most cases were
presumably self-correcting low risk ones as only 14% received casework.
Casework was concentrated on poor risks. Ralph England (1957) believes most
people placed on probation are essentially pro-social as recidivism is not related
to treatment- However, with the expansion of probation services increasing
numbers of difﬁcult clients are being placed under supervision and this may
change the pattern and allow a real demonstration of the usefulness of
probation.
Institutions in the penal system have to perform many functions. I will not
make special reference to the problems of containing very long term prisoners or
those who present great danger to the community; I will concede that in a
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number of cases security must be the prime consideration. Most offenders are in
prison for a relatively limited period and their return to the community is a
certainty. If the institutional arm of the penal system is to provide anything
worthy of the name treatment then institutions must be changed from the
traditional pattern, and indeed from what might be called the traditional form
with treatment frills. Total change is needed.
But, it may be protested, we don’t know what to do and no one can tell us
and if they could they could not prove it would be better. Institutions can be
changed. A revolution has occurred in psychiatric hospitals in New South Wales
and other States within a decade. A psychiatrist with long hospital experience
must feel a twinge, or wince, of nostalgia on visiting some prisons. Change in the
basic nature of penal institutions may not in itself decrease recidivism but unless
it occurs then further advance to effective treatment is blocked. It is a
springboard. The psychiatric therapeutic community may not cure all its
members in itself but it facilitates other treatment. The therapeutic community
model has penal applications; it can be and is being used. It of course is not
suitable for total transplantation.
Favourable public opinion and money are needed for widespread changes
in a penal system but perhaps they will follow rather than precede treatment
oriented change. What is needed is for the administrators to be totally and
aggressively committed to the treatment ideal. Part of the job is to win opinion
and funds.
Street, Vintner and Perrow (1969) looked at the organisational problems
of treatment. Theirinstitutionalmodels were mentioned in an earlier paper. They
found no completely successful institution but the treatment model was the
most promising. Even this shared the common critical weakness of all
correctional institutions in that there was little anticipatory training for release
or co-ordination with after-care. They set out the basic organisational problems
for treatment model institutions:
I | I
1. The executive must have enough power to staff units to ensure a
treatment orientation. Bifurcation of~ aims must be reduced so
decisions are on treatment lines.
2. Efforts to deal with community hostility and to gain support from
sources both in the community and within the penal system.
3. High organisational ﬂexibility is needed to cope with disruption,
ambiguities, conﬂict within staff ranks and between staff and
inmates. Decisions Over means are to be decentralised while
decisions over ends are to be the monopoly of those with a
treatment committal.
4. Executive enthusiasm coupled with expansive goals and effort is
needed to gain willing staff participation.
5. The limitations on the correctional institution and executive to
accomplish major changes, as well as of the treatment model to
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provide a wholly satisfactory model for innovation. There are
problems of integrating all staff in a total programme.
The perspectives of the mental health programme are inadequate when
faced with organisational realities and design even in a “milieu”
treatment institution; and staff find it hard to grasp this approach.
All institutions that I have seen attempting the treatment model have their
own combinations of the basic problems outlined. I think particularly of
Grendon Prison in England, the Professor Pompe Clinic and Van Der Hoeven
Clinic in Holland.
Implicit in the notion of a treatment institution is the idea that all levels of
staff are involved in therapy, that it is not the exclusive right of professionals
and that the staff receive in-service training, support and guidance on a day to
day basis. Staff problems must be recognised and dealt with by consistently
enthusiastic and concerned personnel.
Obviously a treatment approach is harder and more demanding than
simple custody. Treatment is more extravagant in terms of staff and facilities;
and lack of staff and overcrowding of inmates has effects which virtually
preclude introduction of a treatment programme into an institution as a whole.
The American studies of prison sociology while most probably not applicable to
many small institutions do seem to have some relevance when considering the
problems of those with high inmate-staff ratios, high rates of inmate turnover
and a control orientation.
Although I am a psychiatrist I am not dealing with the problem of the
mentally abnormal offender. I believe that the present seminar is not aimed at
prolonged discussion of this offender group. The offender with relatively clear-
cut evidence of disorder, especially if psychotic, has had provisions made for him
for some time. It is largely a matter of whether penal or health authorities
provide the facilities and where they are to be located. The class of offender
causing most concern from the psychiatric point of view is the sociopathic or
psychopathic one. These offenders fit poorly into the more traditionally set up
institutions for abnormal criminals and cause much difficulty. Some institutions,
prisons such as Grendon in England, and clinics such as some in Holland and
Scandinavia, are trying various solutions for this increasing problem.
There is a growing interest in the problems of releasing prisoners and in the
problems faced by the released prisoner himself. Correctional agencies will come
to concentrate more and more on conditional release and after-care.
Release on licence (“parole”) was introduced into the English penal
system in 1967 and for a time I tried to follow the fortunes of the various
opinion groups arguing about the provisions. Later I had explained to me all the
chopping and changing involved in selecting parole boards, local and national.
lntitially it seemed the aim was to have an almost totally inexpert national
committee, excluding all with the slightest taint of actually knowing anything
first-hand about prisoners and their problems. Eventually some compromise was
reached. This points up about the only thing I want to say about parole.
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Everyone agrees it is a good thing but there is less agreement about how to do if,
or who to do it. Whatever method is adopted evaluation of results‘of selection
and supervision must be constant. Some courage in selection is important as
without this nothing is learned about the release of different groups of prisoners
or of the limits of the system.
Daniel Glaser’s (1964) large study of prison and parole gave results
suggesting after-care might be a prime method of reducing recidivism. Glaser
emphasises the dynamic conception of the non-criminal careers. 90% of released
criminals are non-criminal for one month, 65% non-criminal indefinitely and
35% criminal at times for a few years. Most disengage from crime eventually.
Because of the unsteady balance between crime and non-crime it is important to
know why some return to crime and others do not. Non-recidivists seem to be
distinguished by economic self-sufficiency and satisfactory primary group
relationships. Glaser develops a theory of “differential anticipation” to explain
post-release behaviour. One of his propositions is of particular importance for
after-care:
“After each release from prison most prisoners are reformed, or recidivate,
according to whether or not adequate change develops from their prior
pattern of coping with dependence on relatives and with the need to
achieve social and economic independence.”
Also he states that new patterns need to be reinforced by greater
gratification in legitimate than in illegitimate economic pursuits.
While not telling us how to conduct after—care services Glaser does suggest
two main targets. Economic self-sufficiency is of vital importance of course, but
for some groups of prisoners the problem of satisfactory group relationships is of
even greater concern. Many prisonersjust do not have family or friends to return
to, and in the case of West’s inadequate psychopathic group strong dependent
relationships seem to be the only thing which can keep them out 0t gaol.
Much of the effort around the time of a prisoner’s release now centres on
the problem of resettling him in the community. Pre-release hostels and working
out are one aspect of this. In the after-care field the halfway house or
post-release hostel is a focus of attention. In England Norman House is the best
known of this type of hostel. It aims to have as therapeutic an atmosphere as
possible and fosters a “family setting”. The released prisoners work and treat it
as their home. Norman House, by its history, illustrates two key problems in the
halfway house concept.
Firstly, if the staff, usually consisting of a warden, his wife and an
assistant, are to be anything more than landlords they must become involved
with their guests. As many of these are extremely dependent this imposes a
tremendous strain on them and it is difficult to find staff to take on this task, or
endure it for very long. This is only one aspect of the major problem of stafﬁng.
Secondly, the prisoners who do best in a halfway house of this type are
the ones who are dependent and who want to make it a “whole-way” house.
They frequently recidivate if'they are moved out.
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However, this approach does concentrate on the most important immediate
post-release period when recidivism can perhaps be averted.
After-care is a ﬁeld worthy of energetic development and hostels deserve
not only a fair trial but experimentation. The problem of co-ordinating and
rationalising voluntary after-care bodies and ofﬁcial ones is difficult. Perhaps
diversity in the after-care ﬁeld is a good thing at this stage provided some
attempts are made at assessing results from the various approaches
I have tried in the latter part of this paper to show aspects of correctional
practice which point to a not entirely grim future. The issues I have raised
suggest more questions than I have attempted to answer, but then in a seminar
of this nature it is probably more important to provoke the audience than to
inform them.
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